

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN

Number 36

\$5.00

Racism and the National Security State

● FBI Targets Arab Americans ● U.S. Destabilization in Africa ● Racism at Home



Editorial

The White House would have the world believe the Gulf War is all over but the gloating. Throughout the 43 days of aerial bombardment and ground invasion, the Pentagon was eerily silent about the mammoth levels of Iraqi and Kuwaiti casualties. Finally, on the last day, General Norman Schwarzkopf acknowledged "a very, very large number of dead [Iraqi troops]." NBC and ABC estimated between 80,000 to 150,000 troops killed. Other independent analyses suggest possibly as many as 200,000 Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilian dead.

It is tempting to say that the Gulf War was fundamentally unnecessary. Surely it was unnecessary for the dead and wounded soldiers on both sides and even more so for the civilian victims, whose number will increase by tens of thousands as the ecological and public health consequences of the war surface. Nor was it needed by the countries of the Third World, which will suffer the economic fallout and the increased threat of U.S. military intervention as a substitute for political negotiation. Surely it was unnecessary for the people of Kuwait who, already invaded by Iraq, were plunged into a monumentally more devastating air war. Nor was it necessary for U.S. taxpayers who will pay the costs of the war or the poor from whom services will be diverted in the frenzy of renewed military funding sure to follow.

For others, the war was not only necessary but highly desirable. Before this adventure, U.S. economic dominance was threatened by a consolidating Europe led by a unified Germany and a powerful Asian bloc dominated by Japan. U.S. control of Middle East oil is a key economic lever over nations which rely heavily on this resource.

The military-industrial complex's trough runneth over. The Gulf War killed the "peace dividend" promised at the end of the Cold War at the same time that it revived the military machine. In the wake of the New World Slaughter, the war economy, in place since World War II, can continue to concentrate and funnel its vast protected profits to a small core of transnational corporations. During the worst days of the blitzkrieg on Iraq, a commentator gleefully anticipated "the spinoff markets" from rebuilding the war-devastated region. Indeed barely hours after the war's end, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers — part of the institution which helped destroy Kuwait — awarded massive reconstruction contracts to hundreds of U.S. corporations including Bechtel. Estimates are that \$100 billion in contracts is up for grabs in the region.

There will be political spinoff benefits as well. George Bush has emerged dripping with blood but smelling like roses. Bush's stock — damaged by the recession, the read-my-lips tax increase debacle and the S&L crisis — is now soaring. While the U.S. public sat mesmerized by a sanitized video war, his spin controllers rewrote history. The recession which began *before* the war

is now being blamed *on* the war. But relief is in sight. Pundits predict that the "euphoria of victory" will cause "jubilant consumers" to go out and spend, spend, spend.

While the cities, the small farms, the sick, the elderly, and the poor are abandoned, monies will be found to pay for the military. If the flayed and flaccid Democrats oppose inevitable tax increases or try to allocate resources for human services, the Republicans will brand them unpatriotic.

Surely all these benefits are worth going to war for, especially if someone else's sons and daughters are doing the fighting. It is no wonder then that Bush was committed from the beginning to military victory or that he slammed shut numerous windows of opportunity for a negotiated solution. Each time Iraq made new concessions, Bush cynically moved back the goalposts.

His "nightmare scenario" was not chemical warfare, or ecological disaster, or even the expected massive U.S. casualties, but an end to the war through a political rather than a military solution.


Only after the ceasefire, now that it is too late, documents are revealing how early the White House began planning for total war and how impossible it would have been to deter it from this course. The U.S., heir to the 19th century white man's burden, would settle for nothing short of being undisputed policeman of the New World Order and lead inquisitor in dispensing justice and retribution. The media collaborated, displaying a seemingly endless parade of retired generals and pale male "experts" to support the administration's carefully constructed web of disinformation, lies and deceit.

The kinder, gentler America Bush promised is guarded by new world Hessians. The thousand points of light have been revealed as the explosion of 200 million pounds of ordnance on yet another non-white country. If Bush is so intent upon freeing the world from despots, why didn't he start with the death squad regime of El Salvador funded by \$4.5 billion in U.S. taxes or the apartheid regime of South Africa, propped up by U.S. constructive engagement? If he is so intent upon freeing victims of occupation, why has he ignored the Palestinians? If he opposes invasion, why did he launch "Operation Just Cause" on Panama?

Washington's rhetoric about morality, justice, or defense of liberty is hollow. An understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East can best be gained by asking who benefits. What has been called the national interest of the U.S. is in fact the special interests of a small elite. The real national interest would be served by a war on poverty, racism, and repression here at home.

Washington's rhetoric about morality, justice, or defense of liberty is hollow. An understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East can best be gained by asking who benefits. What has been called the national interest of the U.S. is in fact the special interests of a small elite. The real national interest would be served by a war on poverty, racism, and repression here at home.

● *This issue, except for the editorial, went to press during the Gulf War. The Summer issue will focus on the causes and implications of the War and the continuing crisis in the region. CAIB welcomes Terry Allen, Barbara Neuwirth, and Richard Ray to its staff.*



Posterred around Washington

CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 36, Spring 1991 (ISSN: 0275-309X) is published quarterly for \$17 per year by Covert Action Publications, Inc., 1500 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, DC, 20005. Application to mail at second-class postage rates pending at Washington, DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, 1500 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, DC, 20005.

CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 36, Spring 1991, copyright © 1991 by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation; P.O. Box 34583, Washington, DC 20043; (202) 331-9763; and c/o Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., 145 W. 4th St., New York, NY 10012; (212) 982-2897. All rights reserved. Staff: Terry Allen, Bill Montross, Barbara Neuwirth, Ellen Ray, Richard Ray, William Schaap, Louis Wolf. Photography consultant: Dolores Neuman. Typeset by CAIB. Indexed in the *Alternative Press Index*, ISSN 0275-309X.

In This Issue

● DOMESTIC REPRESSION

FBI Targets Arab Americans 4



Ann Talamus

Using the Gulf War and fear of terrorism as a pretext, the FBI has launched a new offensive to harass Arab-Americans and threaten the civil rights of all citizens.

Two Decades of Federal Harassment 9

Richard J. Arrington

Richard Arrington has paid a heavy price to survive within the political system. The Mayor of Birmingham speaks out about his experiences with the Bureau and the Justice Department.

The Ordeal of Dhoruba bin-Wahad 12



Robert J. Boyle

COINTELPRO destroyed the Black Panther Party, killing and jailing members with impunity. One of Hoover's prime targets, framed and incarcerated by the U.S. legal system, is finally free.

The Man Who Did Something 17

Terry Bisson

The First Amendment is one thing. Actually exercising free speech, particularly for a dissident, is another. Mumia Abu-Jamal is a journalist who may pay with his life for his political principles.

Reconstruction's Second Demise 20

William Kunstler

One of the country's foremost defense lawyers reflects on institutionalized racism and the lack of political progress in the United States.

● DESTABILIZING AFRICA

Media Images of South African Violence 22



Ruth Tomaselli

"Black on black violence" seems incomprehensible through the distorting lens of the corporate media. Up close, it looks like another facet of *apartheid*.

CIA Coup in Chad, 1982 27

Jean Dupuy

Chad doesn't get much attention in the U.S. But that doesn't mean U.S. planners have not been interested, and working overtime to undermine moves toward political and economic independence.

Breathing Space for Africa 32

Jane Hunter

Before the Gulf War, it appeared the 1990s would be the decade the U.S. would have free rein in Africa. The political deals cut for the war on Iraq could make Libya a major player in Africa's future.

Cover: Capetown, South Africa, 1988. Credit: Guy Tillim/Impact Visuals.

Have Gun, Will Travel 40

Jane Hunter

Hunter carefully tracks the shameful career of a mercenary who has killed for hire since the 1950s when he was a French soldier in Indochina. Now he may be working for Mobutu in Zaire.

UNITA's War on Angola 41



Phillip W.D. Martin

The CIA used war and economic sabotage against Angola but failed to overthrow the MPLA. Now, as in Nicaragua, it is seeking to impose its will through manipulation of the electoral process.

Greasing the Killing Machine 46

Prexy Nesbitt

Even the State Department has condemned Pretoria's proxy war on Mozambique, but true believers in Reagan/Bush style "constructive engagement" are *still* helping to expedite the slaughter.

Disappearance in Uganda 51

Anthony L. Kimery

In 1988 a North Korean envoy to Uganda suddenly disappeared. Classified cables indicate the U.S. wanted information badly enough to risk relations with this friendly African nation.

● OTHER INTERVENTIONS

Breaking with Dictatorship 54



Fritz Longchamp & Worth Cooley-Prost

With the historic election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti has a chance for peace and democracy. Is this the end of the U.S.-backed Duvalierists and the murderous *Tonton Macoutes*?

Racism and Resistance in Panama 60

Clarence Lusane

One year after the invasion, Panama is an occupied country. U.S. troops patrol the streets. Institutionalized racism has returned, but popular resistance is rising.

Bush's Splendid Little War 64



Michael Parenti

The Ivy League oilman who rushed the country to war is no Rough Rider, but he's following a timeworn tradition. Nothing like a winnable war to take serious problems off the political agenda.

The Art of COINTELPRO centerfold



Roz Payne

Infiltration and disinformation are tools of secret police around the world. Here at home, the FBI used propaganda, terror and art to destroy a movement.

National Security Humor **Louis Wolf 66**

We live in a very bizarre world. Some evidence you might have overlooked.

FBI Targets Arab-Americans

Ann Talamus

● On January 17, an Arab-American woman was approached by FBI agents while at her job in an Arizona power plant. They led her to a company conference room where they subjected her to intense and aggressive political questioning. The incident upset the woman greatly, and has affected her relations with her fellow employees. Since the interrogation, she thinks that her co-workers have begun to look at her with suspicion and seem uneasy in her company. "Is she," they must wonder, "a terrorist? Why else would the FBI be questioning her?" The Arizona woman reported the incident to the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) and said that other Arab-Americans have been questioned since officials at the company gave the FBI access to their employee rosters.¹

● In Columbus, Ohio security was tightened at "sensitive installations" including airports and defense-related factories. The FBI advised Columbus police to pay "particular attention to reports of suspicious persons, particularly if they appear to be Arabic [sic]."²

● In Detroit, home to some 250,000 Americans of Arab descent, several Arab-Americans have been victims of physical attack since the commencement of war. In order to protect them against potential violence, Arab-American school children are reportedly kept indoors during recess. On January 19, Detroit Mayor Coleman Young asked Michigan Governor John Engler to call out the Michigan National Guard "to assist in security-related activities in Detroit," citing reports by federal and international anti-terrorism agencies identifying Detroit as a target for possible terrorist attacks.³

The war in the Gulf has opened another sad chapter in the history of anti-Arab stereotyping, defamation, and violence in the United States. Since August 8, when the U.S. announced that it would deploy forces to Saudi Arabia, the number of threats and acts of violence against Arab-Americans has spiraled. Prior to Iraq's August 2 invasion of Saudi Arabia, ADC had logged five anti-Arab incidents in 1990; in the following five months, ADC received reports of more than 60 additional incidents. After the U.S. invasion of Kuwait, in the month of January alone more than 100 Arab-Americans reported being harassed, threatened, intimidated or attacked.⁴

FBI Interviews Chill Community

An FBI program has further fueled the current wave of anti-Arab sentiment aroused by the Gulf crisis. On January 7, the Bureau said it would begin "conducting a number of interviews of Arab-American business and community leaders." The purpose according to the report was both to get information on ter-

Ann Talamus is director of publications for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee in Washington, DC.

1. *1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews*, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (database in process), Washington, DC, .

2. *1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews*.

3. *Columbus Dispatch*, January 17, 1991.

4. 1990 ADC Report on Anti-Arab Hate Crimes, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington, DC., February 1991, p. 2.

rorism and to "advise that the FBI recognizes the potential for backlash against elements of the Middle Eastern population in the U.S. in the event of war."⁵ Given the questions asked and the targets of the interviewing process, however, it soon became clear that soliciting information about the potential for terrorist activity was the more important objective of the FBI campaign. Despite its stated concern, the FBI did not consult with Arab-American leaders prior to its interview offensive. In fact, the Arab-American community only became aware of the investigation after it was reported in the media. Since January 8, nearly 50 Arab-American community leaders and activists have reported to the ADC that they have been contacted by FBI agents. (ADC believes that many more have been contacted but have been reticent about filing reports.)

The FBI Goes Fishing

Albert Mokhiber, president of the ADC, expressed "shock and dismay" over the investigation. "We appreciate the investigations into hate crimes against Arab-Americans," he wrote in a January 8 letter to FBI Director William Sessions, "but are equally opposed to what appear to be fishing expeditions into Arab-American personal and political beliefs...Whether intended or not, this decision gives an appearance that the Arab-

5. FBI Public Release, January 7, 1991. p. 2.

American community is 'suspect.' We further believe that this will allow others who have acted against the Arab-American community 'justification' for their continued suspicions and acts of violence."⁶

The Movement Support Network of the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) has also been monitoring incidents of hate crimes. In a January 31 statement they charged: "Our experience with the FBI demonstrates that they use fear of terrorism as an excuse for investigation of constitutionally protected activities."⁷

Their fears were not unfounded. Almost immediately after the announcement of its interview program, the FBI had stepped beyond its official agenda of safeguarding Arab-Americans against a backlash and ferreting out information about potential acts of terrorism. Under the guise of concern, agents questioned the political beliefs and affiliations of many of those interviewed. In addition, the FBI initiated a search for Iraqi citizens in the U.S. with visa overstays and announced that it would begin photographing and fingerprinting Iraqi and Kuwaiti visitors entering the U.S.⁸ Such FBI scrutiny clearly violates legitimate activities protected by the First Amendment, and poses a threat to the civil liberties of Arab-Americans and non-Arabs who have spoken out against U.S. policy in the Middle East.

"...The greatest danger facing U.S. civilians is not Iraqi-sponsored terrorism, but anti-Arab violence, fueled by the FBI's irresponsible announcement that Arab-Americans as a group are being asked about terrorism."

— Center for Constitutional Rights

"The FBI's announced anti-terrorism campaign contributes to anti-Arab hysteria and violence and has already produced a strong 'chilling effect,' " according to the CCR. Nor has the Bureau seemed to focus its investigation on those geographic areas in which there is the most potential for backlash against Arab-Americans. According to a January 14 article in the *Washington Post*, most "terrorism experts" agreed that in the event of full-

6. ADC News Release, January 8, 1991, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington, DC.

7. Statement by Center for Constitutional Rights, January 31, 1991.

8. According to a January 11 article in the *Washington Post*, the Justice Department announced on January 10 that, in an effort to counter "the mounting threat of terrorism," immigration officials would begin fingerprinting and photographing anyone entering the U.S. on an Iraqi or Kuwaiti passport—a measure that one INS spokesperson called unprecedented. Justice Department officials said that Kuwaiti passport holders were included in this latest effort because, they allege, Iraqi occupying forces had confiscated thousands of blank Kuwaiti passports during the August invasion. On January 18, the FBI announced that it had begun to locate and interview Iraqi citizens in the U.S. whose visas had expired to inquire about the reasons for their visa overstays.



Catherine Smith / Impact Visuals

Muna Hassan, an Arab-American who lives in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn, New York, reported to the Center for Constitutional Rights that she and her family have been harassed because they are Arabs.

scale war, anti-American sentiment would be strongest throughout Europe, the Middle East and Asia. However, should incidents occur in the United States, the most susceptible U.S. cities were New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit, all of which are major entry points to the U.S. While some of the largest Arab-American communities are in these cities, few community leaders in these areas have reported being approached by the FBI.⁹ In fact, "although the FBI claims to be visiting 'community leaders'" said the CCR, "they are...targeting the unaffiliated who are more likely to be intimidated." As a result of this harassment and the "chill" it has engendered, many are afraid to go to community events, much less take part in the growing anti-war movement.

While the FBI also seeks to justify its campaign by claiming that it is seeking information about possible terrorist actions by supporters of Saddam Hussein, according to ADC reports, the majority of those reporting FBI visits are Palestinian and Lebanese activists. In addition, many non-Arab activists in the anti-war movement and supporters of Palestinian rights have reported suspected FBI surveillance.

Even prior to public disclosure of the FBI's interview policy, it was reported that seven Arab-Americans in Ohio had already been visited by the FBI in November and December 1990. In these instances, agents probed into Arab-American community activities, political beliefs, and views on the Palestinian-Israeli crisis. They asked few if any questions pertaining to the Gulf crisis. In all but one of these instances, FBI agents approached these people at their places of employment, without prior contact or consent.¹⁰ Other Palestinian activists and supporters of

9. 1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews.

10. 1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews.

Palestinian statehood have reported being "tailed" and feel that the overt surveillance of their comings and goings is an attempt to intimidate and ultimately "chill" their activities.

An explicit statement by the FBI's chief of counterintelligence, Neil Gallagher, has swelled suspicions that the FBI is using the current crisis as an excuse to harass pro-Palestinians. Since recent reductions in Iraqi embassy staff in Washington have hindered the work of Iraqi intelligence agents in the U.S., "[t]he real threat," he said, "lies with Palestinian rejectionist groups."¹¹

Concerned with the implications of the FBI's probe into terrorism, ADC officials asked to meet with the Bureau and specifically requested an end to political questioning of the Arab-American community. Following a January 14 meeting with FBI Director William Sessions and Deputy Director William Baker, ADC's Mokhiber was informed that the FBI would continue to contact Arab-American leaders, but had instructed field agents to refrain from asking political questions. Despite this assurance, however, in several instances agents continued to exceed the stated guidelines. They probed into individuals' organizational affiliations, country of origin, attitudes about the Gulf crisis, and their opinions on Arab support for Saddam Hussein and U.S. policy.

"They asked [me] if the Palestinian community is supportive of Saddam Hussein," said ADC's West Coast regional organizer Nazih Bayda, "[and] if the Iraqi community thinks the invasion of Kuwait is right."¹² It should also be noted that many of those contacted either refused to meet with the agents or requested that questions be submitted to them in writing. To date, the FBI has made no further contact with those who requested written questions.

Coalition Support, Mixed Official Response

Many civil rights and minority groups reacted quickly. They denounced the racially motivated stereotyping and violence and the "chilling" effect such intelligence operations have on political expression. At the forefront is the San Francisco-based Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL), which pointed out that fifty years ago, similar difficulties led to the infamous decision to send Japanese-Americans to concentration camps. "The Japanese-American community is well aware of the manner in which racism coupled with misdirected emotion can victimize an entire ethnic community," warned a group spokesperson. "Extreme caution must be exercised to ensure that neither the mood nor the events experienced by Japanese-Americans in 1942 are visited upon Arab-Americans today."¹³ Several members of Congress expressed concern over the potential damage the investigation could pose to civil liberties. On January 23, Representative Don Edwards (D-Calif.), chair of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, held a press conference along with Norman Mineta (D-Calif.), David Bonior (D-Mich.), John Conyers (D-Mich.), John Din-

11. GAO Report to Congress, *International Terrorism: FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to Identify Terrorists*, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1990.

12. 1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews.

13. Statement by JACL National Director, January 10, 1991.

gell (D-Mich.), and Nick Rahall III (D-W. Va.). Also speaking at the press conference were representatives of ADC, the ACLU, JACL, CCR, the American Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish Committee. Edwards, himself a former FBI agent, warned that FBI questioning based on ethnic, religious and political views was in violation of the Bureau's internal security guidelines. Further, he said that if the FBI did not satisfactorily report on its investigation of Arab-Americans, he would convene congressional hearings into its interview campaign. Edwards met with the FBI on January 28, and was told that the Bureau had ended its interviews of Arab-American leaders since the investigation had "run its course."

"I'm lucky that I've worked with these people for six years," he said. "They know me, they know what I think. If I had only worked there six months, I think I'd be looking for a job."

—Ghassan Khalek

On January 30, without prior notice, FBI agents went to the Washington, DC offices of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) where Arab-American Ghassan Khalek worked. In their attempt to locate Khalek, who was out sick that day, the agents made nearly all of the 80-person staff aware of their mission. The next day co-workers asked Khalek about his "visitors." He then called the FBI to arrange an appointment and requested that his lawyer be present.

During their February 4 meeting, the agents made fleeting reference to safeguarding Arab-Americans and then launched into a long series of political inquiries. What organizations did Khalek belong to? What were the positions of those groups on the Gulf crisis? What did they think of Saddam?

Following the meeting, Khalek and his attorney met with Representative Edwards. "We are deeply disturbed," said the staunchly civil libertarian California Democrat, "by this latest report and are pursuing it."

On February 7, Khalek participated in an ADC press conference in Washington. "I'm lucky that I've worked with these people for six years," he said. "They know me, they know what I think. If I had only worked there six months, I think I'd be looking for a job." Khalek requested that the FBI submit a letter of clarification to his supervisor at the FCC to dispel any erroneous impression that he was under suspicion or investigation. The agents refused, claiming that they were "too busy."¹⁴

Although Bush met with Arab-American leaders at the White House on January 25, he failed to mention the FBI investigation. Rather he issued a general statement deploring "discrimination against anyone in the United States."¹⁵ The President has also been noticeably silent in assuring Arab-Americans of their safety, let alone their civil, constitutional and political rights.

14. 1991 ADC Log of FBI Interviews.

15. "Remarks by the President in Meeting with Arab-American Leaders," White House Press Office, January 25, 1991.

U.S. Foreign Policy Comes Home

Given the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the Middle East, which so often fundamentally conflicts with the interests of the Arab nations and peoples, it is no wonder that U.S.-Arab relations have been strained. Since World War II, U.S. interests in that region have been determined by support for Israel, antagonism toward the Palestinian struggle for self-determination, desire to control the flow of Arab oil, and the geopolitical position of the area. Given this official bias, a generally negative and stereotyped U.S. view of the Arab world seems inevitable. Also predictable is the reality that few Americans question the dehumanized portrayal of Arabs by Hollywood and the media as greedy oil sheikhs, sex-starved womanizers, and terrorists.¹⁶ They have been well-prepared by the media to accept the "Hitlerization" of Hussein intended to whip up war fever and the administration's characterization of the war as a simplistic battle between good and evil.

Alien Terrorists and Undesirables

The current wave of FBI harassment is neither unique nor isolated. FBI surveillance of Arab-Americans dates back at least twenty years. Following the violence at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Bureau initiated "Operation Boulder," a program directed at "ethnic Arabs"—all persons of Arab parentage or ancestry. As part of its investigation, immigration authorities "screened" Arabs residing, visiting or studying in the United States for supposed irregularities in their documents or legal status. The CIA and FBI coordinated intelligence information on the whereabouts and activities of Arab individuals and organizations, non-Arabs who voiced support for Arab causes and American citizens of Arab descent.¹⁷

...the "Task Force on Terrorism"—headed by then-Vice President George Bush—had drawn up contingency plans to deal with the possible detention in internment camps and eventual deportation of Arabs in the U.S. in the event of war, terrorist attack or national emergency.

In September 1990, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on domestic FBI efforts in combatting international terrorism. The report revealed that between 1982 and 1988, the FBI closed 19,500 investigations relating to "international terrorism"—many dealing with "First Amendment-type" activities.¹⁸ According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, the FBI utilized the "international terrorism" label as a cover for illegally investigating numerous individuals and or-

16. *Sex, Lies & Stereotypes: The Portrayal of Arabs in American Popular Fiction*, ADC Research Institute, 1990.

17. *ADC Issues #5, The FBI and the Civil Rights of Arab-Americans*, 1984, ADC Research Institute, Washington, DC.

18. CCR News Release, January 10, 1991.



Associated Press

Joint anti-terrorist command center in New York, set up to handle local "terrorist" threats related to the Gulf War. Facilities are shared by 16 groups including the NYPD, FBI, Emergency Medical Service and the Coast Guard.

ganizations opposed to U.S. government policies, monitoring a wide range of political, religious and academic activities.

In January 1987, in a particularly blatant case, the FBI picked up seven Palestinians and a Kenyan in Los Angeles alleging that they were members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The "LA-8" were charged as subversives under the McCarran-Walter Act which legalized the prosecution of aliens who "knowingly circulate, distribute, print or display" material which could be construed as advocating either "the overthrow...of the government of the United States" or world communism. The government declared that the group was "a threat to national security," refused bond, and placed them in a maximum security facility.¹⁹ Despite their denials and numerous court rulings in their favor, the "LA-8" still face the threat of deportation.

During the height of the "LA-8" case, it was revealed that the "Task Force on Terrorism"—headed by then-Vice President George Bush had drawn up contingency plans to deal with the possible detention in internment camps and eventual deportation of Arabs in the U.S. in the event of war, terrorist attack or national emergency. The plan, titled "Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan," was formulated by the INS Alien Border Control Committee which was made up of representatives of the FBI, INS, U.S. Customs, and Office of National Emergency Preparedness. It sought "to implement specific recommendations made by the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism regarding the control and removal of terrorist aliens in the United States."²⁰

This "contingency plan" included provisions for detaining thousands of Arab immigrants at remote facilities in Louisiana and Florida and plans for a small-scale test case to establish the necessary legal precedents. It "reads," said Professor David Cole, who represents the "LA-8," "like a blueprint for these ["LA-8"] prosecutions."²¹

19. *In These Times*, Jan 23-29, 1991, p. 7.

20. INS Memorandum: Alien Border Control Committee, Group IV Contingency Plans, November 18, 1986.

21. *Washington Post*, January 11, 1991.

Bush Takes on Wartime Powers

Since declaring the State of Emergency on August 2, President Bush can implement 470 statutes not within his power during peacetime. According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, he now has the authority to:

- “apprehend, secure and remove all subjects of the hostile nation (“alien enemies”) over 13 years of age;”
- “order necessary products to be manufactured on a priority basis at private plants and to take over such plants upon their refusal to comply with such orders;”
- “take possession and control of property needed for military purposes;”
- “suspend any of the statutory provisions regarding the production, testing, transportation, deployment and disposal of chemical and biological warfare agents;”
- declare martial law and suspend *habeas corpus*.

The State of Emergency also:

- makes it a crime... “to damage any war material, war premises, or war utilities with the intent to obstruct the war effort or to conspire to do so.”²²
- Allows the Pentagon “the most protected and pervasive polluter in the country,” according to Gary Cohen of the National Toxics Campaign Fund, to avoid filing environmental impact statements. With a presidential signature, it could also get waivers to violate the Clean Air, Clean Water and Toxic Substance Acts.²³

— Terry Allen

22. David M. Ackerman, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, “Statutory Authorities Triggered By a Declaration of War and/or a Declaration of National Emergency,”* January 7, 1991. (all of the above)

23. National Public Radio, “Morning Edition,” February 20, 1991. Also see: Keith Schneider, “Pentagon Wins Waiver on Environmental Reform,” *New York Times*, January 30, 1991, p. A20.

Institutional and individual attacks on Arab-Americans tend to follow a consistent pattern. Whenever there is a crisis in the Middle East, there is a corresponding upsurge in anti-Arabism. Arab and Muslim Americans were targeted, and mosques and Islamic centers were vandalized and bombed following the 1985 TWA hijacking. During the October 1985 Achille Lauro crisis, ADC regional director Alex Odeh was killed by a bomb planted at his Santa Ana, California office. (The prime suspects in Odeh’s assassination, members of the extremist Jewish Defense League, have found safe-haven in the West Bank Israeli settlement of Kiryat Arba.) In the wake of the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya, Arab-American homes and businesses were vandalized and Arab students were attacked and beaten.²⁴ It was then, too, that the Task Force on Terrorism “contingency plan” was formulated. In July 1989, when an American hostage in Lebanon, Marine Colonel William Higgins was killed by his captors, racist banners were hung over New York City freeways declaring “Shi’ite hunting season opens today” and “Let’s F-14 Beirut.” Anti-Arab leaflets proclaiming: “A good Arab is a dead Arab” were found along Brooklyn’s heavily Arab-populated Atlantic Avenue, prompting New York City Mayor Ed Koch to visit the Arab-American community to assure them of police protection and support.²⁵ During the 1979 hostage crisis, Iranians were beaten and killed. Since the invasion, Iranians and even Afghans, mistaken for Arabs, have been threatened and attacked.

Because of this history, many Arab-Americans are suspicious of the FBI’s motives. Arab-Americans, said the ADC’s Mokhiber, have been the victims and not the perpetrators of terrorist actions in the U.S. The FBI, however, continues to treat them as a monolithic mass worthy of suspicion of terrorism based solely on their ethnic background.

Terrorist Threat or Political Intimidation

On August 2—the same day that Iraq invaded Kuwait—President George Bush declared a state of national emergency. According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, this Executive Order gives him the power to implement up to 470 statutes.

Given the established pattern and current climate, Arab-Americans can expect further attacks and increased repression. Incidents already range from threatened shootings and acts of arson to physical violence and death threats. The effects have infected society as a whole and civil liberties of all Americans are endangered by war fever, hate crimes, FBI harassment and the lack of reporting or analysis of these issues by the media.

Arab and Japanese-Americans have warned against repeating the xenophobia of World War II. It is up to all defenders of the First Amendment to ensure that Arab-Americans and all ethnic, religious and political groups are protected from state-sanctioned scrutiny and intimidation. Those subjected to or knowing of hate crimes are urged to report them to: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee—4201 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 500, Washington, DC 20008 (202) 244-2990; and Movement Support Network, CCR—666 Broadway, New York, NY 10012 or (800)338-1277. ●

24. 1990 ADC Report on Anti-Arab Hate Crimes, p. 2.

25. ADC Times, September 1989. 2

Dancing with the FBI:

Two Decades of Federal Harassment

Richard Arrington, Jr.

Richard Arrington, Jr. has been Mayor of Birmingham, Alabama since 1979. From 1971 to 1979, he served on Birmingham's nine-member City Council. He was the second African-American elected to the Council, and the first to be elected Mayor. This is an edited version of Arrington's testimony before the Congressional Black Caucus, in Washington, September 27, 1990.

It All Began with COINTELPRO

I first became a target of a federal investigation in 1972 under the FBI's infamous COINTELPRO, a well-documented racial counter-intelligence program which selectively and without cause targeted vocal black civil rights activists. Twenty-three FBI field offices participated in "COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist." The activities of this FBI program included harassment of Martin Luther King and other civil rights activists; development of "target lists" of some 1,879 African-American activists during the 1960s and 1970s to be "neutralized"; drafting and mailing of obscene, racist hate mail and tape recordings to family, friends and supporters of African-American activists; and the planting of embarrassing stories in "friendly newspapers."¹

According to FBI documents, I was erroneously linked to the Black Panther Party, the Alabama Liberation Front and the Concerned Citizens for Justice—groups viewed by the FBI as "National Security Risks." Since I was never a member of any of these groups, I can only assume that I was investigated because I was waging a vocal and vigorous fight against police brutality in Birmingham, which at that time was quite prevalent. According to FBI documents, I have been the target of continuous investigation and harassment from 1985 to the present by the FBI, the U.S. Justice Department and the IRS.

Investigations initiated by the City of Birmingham indicate that Black elected officials (BEOs), who constitute less than two percent of our nation's leadership, have been singled out by federal agencies investigating public corruption. I also believe that the statement of David Runkle, spokesman for U.S. Attorney Richard Thornburgh, reflects bias in these investigations. Runkle said "the only targets of these investigations are those doing wrong."² The presumption that those being investigated are guilty is disturbing to say the least.

In response to the harassment to which I and other BEOs in Alabama are subjected, the City of Birmingham, with the assistance of legal counsel and the Alabama Elected and Appointed Officials Legal Defense Fund, have taken a number of steps.

1. For a thorough description of COINTELPRO activities, see Kenneth O'Reilly, *Racial Matters: The FBI's File on Black America, 1960-72* (New York: The Free Press, 1989) and Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Boston: South End Press, 1990).

2. Linn Washington, "Stalking the Black Leaders," (Chicago) *North Star*, October 1989, p. 9.

Birmingham's Response to Harassment

In May of 1989, the City filed a complaint and request with the Justice Department for an investigation into possible prosecutorial and law enforcement misconduct by federal agents who attempted to entrap Alabama BEOs. The complaint and subsequent actions have been based on FBI records, affidavits of FBI operatives, a letter from an Alabama U.S. Attorney, and tape recordings of conversations between federal agents, their undercover operatives and other sources.³

On May 31, 1989, the City sought the appointment of a Special Assistant State Attorney General to investigate whether federal agents had engaged in criminal solicitation, conspiracy, attempted bribery, and/or obstruction of Birmingham's governmental operations. The State Attorney General designated a member of his staff to investigate and report back. I have no knowledge of what, if any, further action was taken in this matter.⁴

In June of last year, approximately 100 Alabama BEOs and representatives of twelve black advocacy groups (including the Alabama Lawyers Association, the NAACP and SCLC) held a news conference in Montgomery, Alabama, calling for a full investigation into the conduct of these federal agents by the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights and the Senate Judiciary Committee. Later a formal complaint was filed with the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.

Two formal reports on this matter have been produced. The first Alabama report on the *FBI Investigation of Black Elected Officials: Atlanta and Birmingham* was published in July of 1989. It focused on the pattern of racial bias by federal agents; federal investigation of several black Atlanta officials including the Mayor of Birmingham; and affidavits of two FBI undercover operatives concerning federal harassment of BEOs. In December 1989 the second report on *FBI Investigation of BEOs*, was published, focusing on the federal trials of several BEOs and the shooting death of a Birmingham FBI undercover operative.⁵

In January of 1990, a letter of notification was filed with the Justice Department concerning U.S. Assistant Attorney Bill Barnett's reported effort to solicit "creative" testimony from an FBI undercover source against me. A February follow-up report was filed with the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee.

3. Source documents are in the custody of Attorney Donald V. Watkins of Birmingham. Many have been published in whole or part in the *Congressional Record*, March 9, 1990, pp. 2533-46 and October 27, 1990, pp. 17826-29.

4. Then Alabama Attorney General Don Siegelman left office on January 14, 1991 without issuing any public report on this matter. To date, the City has heard nothing from the State Attorney General's Office.

5. *The FBI Investigation of Black Elected Officials: Atlanta and Birmingham* (Montgomery: AEAO Legal Defense Fund, July 1989), and *The FBI Investigation of Black Elected Officials* (Montgomery: AEAO Legal Defense Fund, December 1989). A limited number are available at no cost. Mail request to: Mayor, City Hall, 710 North 20th Street, Birmingham, AL 35203.

Summary of Investigations

The FBI conducted a "preliminary investigation" of me to determine if Hobbs Act violations had been committed. The investigation covered virtually every aspect of my business, financial and political dealings. Included were: (a) an investigation of a marketing corporation in which I was part owner, despite prior State Ethics Commission clearance for my participation in the corporation; (b) a funeral home business in which both my wife and I are part owners; (c) the purchase of a City-owned building by one of my business partners in the funeral home; and (d) my appointment of an architect for a City project, who later became partner in the marketing corporation.

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Birmingham concluded that the preliminary inquiry gave no reason to believe that a federal crime had been committed, and noted that sufficient probable cause to proceed with the investigation *did not exist*. No further inquiry into this matter was being made, according to FBI records on the investigation. During the investigation period, a bugging device, never traced to any source, was found on my office phone.

The 1986-88 FBI Investigations

Following the publicity of the 1985 FBI investigation, the Bureau initiated new investigations of me in 1986 on complaints of unidentified sources alleging City Hall corruption. This was an undercover FBI operation code-named "BOWTYE" or "BOWTIE," naming me as the investigation's target. Two Atlanta FBI agents worked with Birmingham-based agents in efforts to implement "sting" operations against me in a city land purchase. In addition to undercover agents, from May 1986 through November 1988, federal agents used electronic devices, video monitoring, concealed body microphones, audio tapes, 35 mm photographs, and visual surveillance against me. The surveillance activities included tracking my whereabouts, listing automobile licenses at places I visited, and video taping. These activities are substantiated by FBI files obtained under FOIA.

Following these extensive investigations of about two years, which involved at least four other FBI out-of-state field offices (in addition to the Alabama offices), the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office reported a lack of evidence from its undercover operation to substantiate allegations of wrongdoing. FBI files indicate the investigations were closed on October 4, 1988.

FBI-IRS Efforts to Entrap Myself and other BEOs

At some point during 1988, federal agents in Alabama met and developed a "hit list" of Birmingham area BEOs and others to target for public corruption probes.⁶ BEOs headed the list, and I occupied the top spot.

On October 25, approximately three weeks after FBI files said the investigation had ended, IRS agent William E. Cooper recruited Robert A. Moussallem, a Birmingham developer. Moussallem had been assisting the IRS in tax sting operations

6. Information about the list was corroborated by multiple confidential informants who have proven reliable and who did not know of one another. Documented in the Mayor's July 1989 statement to the Department of Justice, office of Professional Responsibility.

and would later be convicted of tax code violations. He was recruited to assist the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI and IRS in sting operations targeting me and at least three other BEOs. In exchange for his cooperation, the local U.S. attorney promised Moussallem, by letter, immunity for actions taken by him after October 25, 1988. (He was already working for the IRS prior to October 1988.)

On April 25, 1989, after Moussallem had been unsuccessful in the federally-directed sting operation targeting BEOs, and had been told that the immunity deal offered him was being called off, he exposed the "sting" operation against BEOs. Upset at federal agents because he was to be indicted despite his cooperation in the tax sting operations directed at a number of persons (who were not BEOs), Moussallem came to City officials with his story.

Several days after exposing the federal entrapment scheme, Moussallem was indicted on tax code violation. A few weeks after his conviction and before his sentencing on September 26 1989, Moussallem was killed by a shotgun blast which blew away most of his face. Federal agents were on the scene shortly after the killing. They reported that Moussallem was shot accidentally by one of several persons he was meeting with at the time. Moussallem was also found to possess tape recordings of some of his phone conversations with federal agents about the sting operation targeting BEOs. Transcripts of the recordings are included in the earlier reports on FBI investigations of Alabama BEOs.

The 1990 Federal Efforts to Solicit "Creative" Testimony

On January 17, 1990, Jay Kelley, a Birmingham-area man, informed a City investigator that U.S. Assistant Attorney Bill Barnett had offered him (through his attorneys at the time) a six-year probation recommendation on his felony tax charges if he would give Barnett information on illegal activity by me in a 1985 City land deal. Kelley had previously worked with federal agents in tax sting operations and was subsequently indicted for tax code violations in December 1989. He informed Barnett that he had no such evidence nor any relationship with me. When Barnett suggested that Kelley could be "creative" in his testimony against me,⁷ he reported to the City's investigator that he refused to be coerced by Barnett into fabricating such evidence.

On January 19, 1990, federal prosecutors agreed to drop criminal tax charges against him, without explanation.⁸

7. Interviews by Attorney Donald Watkins with Jay Kelley on January 17, 1990 and Birmingham attorney Sam McCord on September 12, 1990. Mr. Kelley was the defendant in *U.S. v. Jay R. Kelley*, CR 89-PT-257-S (N.D. Ala.).

8. Kelley was treated differently from Moussallem because his attorneys filed an affidavit in his January 1990 criminal proceeding stating that he immediately reported to his lawyers in January 1985 an apparent bribery solicitation by someone he believed to be a corrupt IRS official. The attempted bribe was reported by Kelley's attorneys to federal prosecutors, who agreed not to indict him if he cooperated in the prosecution of other cases. Despite assisting federal prosecutors over a considerable time, Kelley was eventually indicted anyway. His attorneys then became witnesses against the government. Unlike Kelley, Moussallem did not use attorneys to structure his cooperative relationship with federal prosecutors. When those prosecutors reneged on their immunity agreement with Moussallem, he had no witnesses to support his legal position. As a result, they indicted and prosecuted him.

The 1990 Subpoenas of Records of Black Firms

On June 26, 1990, the City of Birmingham received the first of several Grand Jury subpoenas from the U.S. Attorney's Office and the IRS seeking various financial records dealing with about a dozen black-owned businesses which had obtained City contracts between 1985-90. The subpoenas were issued by Bill Barnett. The IRS is taking the lead in this latest investigation, but Barnett is supervising and facilitating the case. According to City investigators, several Birmingham attorneys who have had professional contacts with Barnett claim that he is determined to indict and prosecute me on criminal charges, "whether it takes one year or ten."⁹ Barnett reportedly believes that I take payoffs. He was apparently embarrassed by the aggressive stance I took in the Moussallem revelation. City investigators are currently developing further evidence on this matter.

The Role of the Media

Biased and inflammatory media coverage, spurious investigations, and unfounded accusations of criminal activity are common tactics used against BEOs according to Dr. Mary Sawyer, of Iowa State University, who, since 1977, has researched and published works on the harassment of BEOs. The role of the media, especially the print media, can clearly be discerned in the federal investigations under discussion. The files assembled by the Birmingham FBI office on me are filled with unfavorable media reports. The City's investigation indicates that reporters who write such stories often contact federal agents to inquire whether an investigation is under way. An Alabama U.S. Attorney said such queries spurred a number of investigations.¹⁰

A biased media report on the City's purchase of land in 1985 for a theme park made the action appear to be a suspicious overnight act. Despite the fact that the City clearly showed that the theme park plans were initiated years earlier, repeated news reports never included this fact. The City had hired one of the nation's top theme park consultants to assist in planning for the park. The City had solicited and received presentations from several established theme park firms. Two of Birmingham's well-known white City councilors, Russel Yarbrough and Nina Miglionico, had visited other parks as part of the City's planning process. When the nine-member City Council, which by 1985 had reached a 5-4 black to white ratio, voted along racial lines to make a loan to a theme park firm which would include some black ownership in their proposed Birmingham park, some of the white councilors started court action. After the City abandoned the loan idea and instead voted 5-4 to purchase a proposed theme park site, the news media began its inflammatory reporting, raising the ire of the neighborhood near the site and clearly giving the impression of an unwise action by a black council majority and a black mayor.¹¹

9. Until the City's pending complaints of prosecutorial misconduct are resolved by the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, the City must protect the identity of these attorneys.

10. 1988 telephone call between Mayor Arrington and U.S. Attorney James Wilson (M.D., Ala.).

11. The Council became predominantly black in 1985 and began working with Arrington on policy and program shifts to redress discrimination against women and minorities. Thereafter, many City decisions attracted barrages of negative reporting. This was particularly true when issues were decided by racially divided Council votes.

Rumors were reported that the property purchased by the City for \$2.2 million was only worth \$750,000. This charge was widely spread by a white conservative organization well-known for its opposition to my administration. The City recently sold the property for \$2.2 million.¹² Federal agents continue to investigate the 1985 land purchase.

Similar coverage of the City's purchase for \$165,000 of a lot from a black legislator's firm claimed that the market value of the property, according to tax records, was considerably less. When the City produced records and reports showing that most City property purchases were based on current professional appraisals and always exceeded the tax assessor's value by *two to thirty times*, the media failed to report these facts. The only difference between the \$165,000 land purchase and other City land deals cited here is that most of the latter purchases run in the millions of dollars *and were bought from white owners*.

Dr. Sawyer also noted that investigators often plant or leak unfavorable reports on activities of BEOs to a "cooperative white media." This is a recurring feature of the federal investigations. Several reporters for the white media are known plant outlets for federal investigators.¹³ Judging BEOs by a standard more rigid than that applied to white officials has led to widespread selective investigation and prosecution.

Complaints from the Birmingham HUD Office and white racists also spurred some of the Birmingham investigations.

These have been my own experiences with federal law enforcement agencies during my terms in office. They are not especially unusual. It is my considered opinion that until there is a vigorous, collective response by a national coalition of BEOs, such harassment will probably continue. ●

12. The City was forced to sell the property because of the practical impossibility of developing it in the aftermath of the negative media coverage.

13. "Report from the City of Birmingham to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on the Harassment of African-American Birmingham City Officials by Various Federal Law Enforcement Agencies," February 21, 1990, p. 40.

In June 1989, prosecutors leaked grand jury evidence to a reporter for the *Birmingham Post-Herald* and a second paper. One of the reporters blew his source by telephoning the mayor's staffer about the allegation, citing documentary evidence which was in the sole custody of the prosecutors, and was legally unavailable to either the press or those implicated. The staffer was never charged.

● PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *The COINTEL-PRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States* (Boston: South End, 1990).

In this detailed review of the subversive activities of the national political police over many years, the authors show that the commitment to undermine free association and independent thought is deeply rooted in national policy and subject to only superficial challenge. Their harrowing and extensively documented study lends much credibility to their supposition that "COINTELPRO lives on," and efforts to organize poor and oppressed people and dissident movements will be targeted for destruction by state power.

—Noam Chomsky

The 19-Year Ordeal of Dhoruba bin-Wahad

Robert J. Boyle

On March 22, 1990, before a packed New York City courtroom, former Black Panther Party leader Dhoruba bin-Wahad was ordered released on his own recognizance after serving 19 years in the maximum security prisons of New York State for a crime the government knew he had not committed.

One week earlier, Justice Peter McQuillan had vacated Dhoruba's conviction for the 1971 attempted murder of two police officers on the ground that the prosecution had failed to disclose the existence of pre-trial statements by its chief witness which exonerate him. Dhoruba's freedom came only after a 15-year struggle to expose a politically motivated frame-up designed to neutralize an effective Black spokesperson.

More than 300,000 government documents obtained during this legal fight vividly illustrate how the U.S. government uses its criminal justice system as part of a counterinsurgency campaign against domestic liberation movements.

The Black Panther Party and COINTELPRO

In the 1960s, people throughout the world were successfully challenging the imperialist policies of the U.S. government. The Vietnamese people were defeating the most sophisticated war machine on Earth. In Africa and Latin America, national liberation movements began to expose and fight against western colonialism.

Inside the United States, Black people were organizing a mass movement to overturn 400 years of domestic colonialism driven by a racist culture and society. Thousands of Black people took to the streets to demand jobs, food, adequate medical care, housing, education, and an end to racist police brutality and murder. In short, Black people were demanding control over their own lives. Many organizations emerged from this struggle for Black power. One such organization marked a significant development in the struggle of Black people — the Black Panther Party.

The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP) was organized in Oakland, California, in 1967. Its 10-point program demanded, among other things, community control of the police and education, the right of Black people to defend themselves from racist attack, and an end to the draft of Black men into the military. The BPP instituted and maintained free breakfast-for-children programs, community health clinics, and classes in political education. It captured the imagination of the Black youths who swelled its ranks. By 1969, the BPP had 27 chapters throughout the United States.

The BPP program, particularly its vocal advocacy of armed self-defense, was viewed with racist paranoia by federal and

Robert J. Boyle is a criminal defense and civil rights lawyer in New York who, together with Elizabeth Fink and Robert Bloom, represented Dhoruba bin-Wahad.

local law enforcement agencies. They responded with armed confrontations around the country which resulted in the deaths of numerous BPP members.¹ On the national level, the FBI embarked on a disinformation campaign, publicly labeling the BPP the "greatest single threat" to the internal security of the United States. Covertly, the FBI instituted a counterintelligence program, known by its acronym, COINTELPRO, designed to "disrupt" and "neutralize" target groups and individuals. According to the final report of the Church Committee:

Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a free society even if all the targets had been involved in violent activity but COINTELPRO went far beyond that. The unexpressed major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do *whatever is necessary* to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political order.²

Labeling groups working for civil and human rights as "Black Nationalist-Hate Groups," FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent a letter to all field offices in March 1968 describing COINTELPRO's goals as follows: (1) to prevent the "coalition of militant black nationalist groups which might be the first step toward a real Mau Mau in America"; (2) to prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could "unify and electrify" the movement, naming Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammad as its leaders; (3) to prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups by pinpointing "potential troublemakers" and neutralizing them "before they exercise their potential for violence"; (4) to prevent groups and leaders from gaining "respectability" by discrediting them to the "responsible Negro community" and to the white community; and 5) to prevent the long-range growth of these organizations, especially among youth, by developing specific tactics to "prevent these groups from recruiting young people."³

Other FBI documents of the operation speak even more frankly about COINTELPRO's racist nature and goals:

In seeking effective counterintelligence, it should perhaps be borne in mind that the two things foremost in the militant Negro's mind are sex and money. The first is often promis-

1. A report issued by BPP attorney Charles Garry in 1970 estimated that between 1966 and 1970 more than thirty members of the Black Panther Party had been killed by police gunfire. This includes the December 4, 1969, murder of Chicago BPP members Fred Hampton and Mark Clark who were killed during a pre-dawn raid by Chicago police while they lay sleeping in their beds.

2. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Session, Report No. 94-755, Book III, p. 3, emphasis added.

3. FBI Memorandum dated March 4, 1968, from Director to all field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups."

cuous and frequently freely shared. White moral standards do not apply among this type of Negro. You don't embarrass many Negroes by advertising their sexual activity or loose morals....

*The Negro youth and moderates must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries.*⁴

The BPP became the primary target of the FBI's COINTELPRO operations. According to the Church Committee, almost 90 percent of all counterintelligence activities aimed at the Black Liberation Movement targeted the BPP. In a letter dated November 25, 1968, Hoover ordered all field offices to submit "imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the Black Panther Party."⁵ Proposals were to be submitted every two weeks and field offices were ordered to inform Hoover immediately of any "tangible results" achieved by each operation.⁶

Local police agencies worked closely with the FBI to "neutralize" the BPP. While the FBI worked covertly with its disinformation campaign, electronic surveillance, and informants, local police agencies were conducting their own campaigns against the BPP. They physically attacked and arrested Panthers while sharing all intelligence information with the FBI. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) for example, was assigned three undercover officers to work full-time as BPP members. One of these officers, Ralph White, was a founding member of the BPP chapter formed in the Bronx.⁷ A March 1969 FBI "Inspectors' Review" (a quarterly report of FBI intelligence activities) noted that the NYPD had

4. FBI Memorandum dated April 3, 1968, from San Francisco to Director, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence," emphasis added.

5. FBI Memorandum dated November 25, 1968 from Director to all field offices captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Racial matters, Black Panther Party."


6. Among the numerous counterintelligence activities directed against the BPP in late 1968 and early 1969 were several efforts to divide the BPP internally. In one operation, the FBI sent former BPP leader Eldridge Cleaver a spurious note warning him that New York Panthers were going to murder him. At the same time, the FBI anonymously informed the New York Chapter that Mr. Cleaver had misappropriated funds from a speaking tour. (See FBI memoranda dated October 22, 1968, and October 30, 1968, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.") Distribution of the BPP newspaper, the major source of the organization's funds, was also disrupted. As stated in a December 2, 1968, memorandum to Hoover, the FBI's New York Office was making "[e]very effort to misdirect the operations of the BPP on a daily basis."

7. Ralph White's role was disclosed during the 1969-71 conspiracy trial of the "Panther 21" discussed below.

a "program" of arresting BPP members on spurious charges.⁸ Such activities severely hampered the BPP because Party members spent much of their time raising bail money and defending against false criminal charges at the expense of the community programs.

Maximum Surveillance and Disruption

Dhoruba bin-Wahad, then known as Richard Dhoruba



Mahmood Nadia/Impact Visuals

April 27, 1990. Dhoruba bin-Wahad one month after his release. Before him are part of the more than 300,000 government documents obtained in his case — documents which vividly illustrate the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign against domestic liberation movements.

Moore, joined the Black Panther Party in the summer of 1968 and worked out of the Harlem and Brooklyn, New York offices. An articulate speaker and organizer, he quickly rose to the rank of Field Secretary, becoming responsible for organizing BPP chapters throughout the Northeast. Law enforcement responded with alarm to these First Amendment-protected activities. On September 5, 1968, the day Dhoruba attended his first BPP meeting, the NYPD commenced a "criminal" investigation of him.⁹ By January 1969, the FBI had commenced its own "investigation" of Dhoruba, placing him on the "Security Index" — a list of American citizens subject to internment in the event of a "national emergency."¹⁰ In April 1969, the FBI labeled Dhoruba a "key leader" of the New York BPP and a main target for their counterintelligence activities.¹¹

On April 2, 1969, Dhoruba bin-Wahad and 20 other New

8. FBI Inspectors' Review of the New York Office, January 1969, through April 1969, p. 20.

9. In bin-Wahad's civil rights lawsuit against the NYPD and FBI, the former agency disclosed that they commenced a criminal investigation of him merely because he attended a meeting of the Black Panther Party.

10. FBI Memorandum from Director to New York dated June 5, 1969, captioned "Richard Moore."

11. FBI Inspectors' Review, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 17.

York Panthers were indicted and arrested on a New York State indictment charging them with conspiracy to commit murder and arson, the "Panther 21" case. The indictment only charged conspiracy—no act of murder or arson was actually alleged—and was based entirely upon the testimony of the three undercover NYPD officers. The entire New York leadership of the BPP, including Dhoruba, was incarcerated in lieu of exorbitant bail.

By March 1970, fund-raising efforts were successful enough that bail money could be posted for a few Panther 21 defendants.¹² Party members chose Dhoruba for release to act as

...prevent the coalition...which might be the first step toward a real Mau Mau in America...prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the movement...pin-point potential troublemakers and neutralize them...prevent...leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them to the responsible Negro community...

spokesperson for the Panther 21 and build support for BPP programs. Notified of his release, the FBI ordered immediate and continuous surveillance.¹³ In succeeding months, Dhoruba's whereabouts were recorded, his speeches taped, and information concerning him disseminated to state and local police agencies. In June 1970, Dhoruba was placed on the FBI's "Agitator Index" solely because of his "extensive public appearances on behalf of the BPP."¹⁴ This index, established in 1967, was "a convenient list of primary targets for COINTELPRO activity."¹⁵

Dhoruba bin-Wahad then became a target of a sophisticated plan carried out by the FBI during 1970 and early 1971 to divide the Panthers internally. In executing this plot, the FBI manipulated differences in political perspective and exacerbated personality conflicts to create two violently opposed factions within the Party, one on the West Coast loyal to BPP leader Huey P. Newton, who was released from prison in August 1970, and the

other on the East Coast loyal to Eldridge Cleaver, then in exile in Algeria. As one of the few Panther 21 defendants on bail, Dhoruba became a pawn in this plan.¹⁶

A myriad of counterintelligence operations were directed at Huey P. Newton, causing him to fear many loyal BPP members. In one such operation, in October 1970, the FBI anonymously warned Newton that Cleaver intended to "set up" Newton through New York BPP members.¹⁷ Through the efforts of high-level informants, provocateurs, fictitious letters, and manipulation of the media, an unprecedented level of fear and suspicion existed within the BPP by late 1970. Numerous loyal members were expelled by Newton and others demoted. This internal strife was noted by J. Edgar Hoover in a memorandum to several field offices on January 28, 1971. Observing that counterintelligence operations have caused Newton to react violently to criticisms, the Director ordered that:

The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be exploited and recipients must maintain the present high level of counterintelligence activity.... Immediately furnish Bureau recommendation for further counterintelligence activity designed to further aggravate the dissension within BPP leadership.¹⁸

The field offices responded with enthusiasm. On February 1, 1971, the New York Office proposed a letter be sent to Eldridge Cleaver, purportedly written by the Panther 21, criticizing Newton.¹⁹ In early February 1971, Newton began a speaking tour of the East Coast. The FBI used this opportunity to further heighten existing tensions. An anonymous letter was sent to Newton's brother, Melvin, warning him that Huey would be killed by East Coast leadership while on the tour.²⁰ As an outspoken member of the New York Chapter and a Panther 21 member, Dhoruba bin-Wahad was suspected of making this alleged threat. Dhoruba found out, and he, along with three other BPP members fled New York for their safety in mid-February 1971, jumping bail in the Panther 21 case.

16. This tactic had been successful earlier in bringing about the expulsion of the entire BPP International Staff. Commenting upon this operation, the FBI noted as follows:

"To create friction between Black Panther Party leader Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria and BPP Headquarters, a spurious letter was sent to Cleaver, who accepted it as genuine. As a result, the International Staff of the BPP was neutralized when Cleaver fired most of its members. Bureau personnel received incentive awards from the Director for this operation."

See FBI Memorandum from G.C. Moore to William Sullivan dated May 14, 1970, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups."

17. FBI Memorandum from New York to Director dated October 7, 1970, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups." The New York Office notes further:

"The NYO believes the proposed may bear fruit because it would appear that Huey P. Newton is apparently unstable and suffering from a sort of complex."

18. FBI Memorandum from Director to Boston dated January 28, 1971, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Extremists, Racial Matters."

19. FBI Memorandum from New York to Director dated February 2, 1971, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups."

20. FBI Memorandum from San Francisco to Director dated February 2, 1971, captioned "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups."

12. The brutal overt repression of the BPP did arouse some support for them in the liberal white community. For example, in January 1970, noted composer and conductor Leonard Bernstein hosted a fund-raising party for incarcerated Panthers. The FBI responded by mailing copies of articles from the BPP newspaper which expressed support for the goals of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Jewish guests at the event. Through this mailing, the FBI hoped to expose the alleged "anti-Semitic posture" of the BPP. The New York FBI office was instructed to sign the letter "with an anonymous name with additional phraseology such as 'Concerned and Loyal Jew,' or other similar terminology." Memorandum from Director to New York dated February 25, 1970 captioned "Counterintelligence Program." Alienation of Jewish support for the BPP was a frequent goal of FBI counterintelligence operations.

13. Teletype dated March 26, 1970, captioned "Black Panther Party-Travel of Leadership."

14. FBI Memorandum from Director to New York dated June 1, 1970, captioned "Richard Moore."

15. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 511.

Dhoruba's fears of FBI-inspired factional violence were not unfounded. In March 1971, COINTELPRO was successful and the BPP erupted into bloody factionalism.²¹

The Arrest and Frame-Up of Dhoruba bin-Wahad

The split in the BPP did not bolster the weak case against the Panther 21. On May 13, 1971, all defendants, including Dhoruba *in absentia*, were acquitted of all charges. Alarmed by the acquittal, J. Edgar Hoover ordered an immediate intensification of FBI operations against all acquitted Panther 21 defendants.²²

On May 19, 1971, two New York City Police officers who were guarding the home of Manhattan District Attorney Frank Hogan (the prosecutor in the Panther 21 case) were shot and seriously wounded. Two days later, two other officers were shot and killed in Harlem. In communiques issued a few days after each shooting, the Black Liberation Army, an armed clandestine organization, took credit for both actions.

These shootings, claimed by a previously unknown organization, prompted a coordinated federal, state, and local campaign to capture anyone the government thought could have been involved. This investigation, given the name "Newkill," was launched at a White House meeting on May 28, 1971, attended by President Richard M. Nixon, Attorney General John Mitchell, assistant Attorney General for internal security Robert Mardian, J. Edgar Hoover, and representatives of local police agencies.²³ Nixon ordered a "no-punches-pulled" campaign to imprison Black political fugitives. The minutes of this meeting have allegedly been lost by Nixon.²⁴

The "Newkill" investigation marked the formalization of the FBI and local police strategy to prosecute Black political activists under the guise of "criminal" investigations. "Newkill," and the later "Chesrob" investigation²⁵ served as the basis for the hunting down, murder, torture, and prosecution of Black revolutionaries forced into hiding by the successful COINTELPRO operations of the FBI.²⁶

At the time of the May 19, 1971 shooting, Dhoruba was still a fugitive in the Panther 21 case as the result of the BPP split. Federal and local law enforcement agencies believed he was in Algeria. On June 5, 1971, Dhoruba and three others were ar-

21. In March 1971, Robert Webb, a BPP member loyal to Cleaver was shot and killed in New York, allegedly by Newton supporters. In April 1971, Sam Napier was killed, allegedly by Cleaver supporters. In an April 5, 1971, memorandum, the FBI congratulated itself for the Webb murder noting that the high state of confusion in the BPP was a direct result of their counterintelligence efforts.

22. In a May 24, 1971, letter, Hoover frantically ordered the New York field office to:

"Intensify investigations of [the Panther 21]. Target sources at determining their black extremist activities. Develop additional sources and informants close to these individuals in order that the Bureau can be advised on a timely basis as to their day-to-day activities and associates of a black extremist nature."

23. FBI Memorandum from E.S. Miller to A. Rosen, dated November 23, 1971, captioned "Newkill."

24. "Break-In Memos Allegedly Missing," *New York Times*, June 22, 1978, p. 16.

25. "Chesrob" is the FBI acronym given to its search for Assata Shakur (Joanne Chesimard) and other suspected BLA members.

26. For example, BPP members Twyman Meyers, Frank Fields, Zayd Malik Shakur, Harold Russel, Anthony Kimu White, and Woody Green were all shot and killed by police and/or FBI agents who claimed they were merely trying to apprehend suspects in BLA-related cases. Yet none of these individuals had criminal charges pending against them.

rested in the Bronx at the Triple O Social Club, an after-hours narcotics hangout, while committing an armed robbery of that club.²⁷ A machine gun of the caliber used to shoot the officers on May 19 was recovered at the scene. The police and FBI now had all they wanted: They had a machine gun; they had in custody one of the most vocal BPP leaders; and they had a way out of the deep embarrassment caused by the recent acquittal of the Panther 21.

But other than the alleged weapon, the government had no evidence. Of the seven eyewitnesses to the shooting, none could

Not satisfied with incarcerating an innocent man for 19 years, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office is currently appealing the decision releasing Dhoruba. Moreover, they have stated that if they fail on appeal, they will seek to try Dhoruba for a fourth time.

identify Dhoruba after viewing a lineup. Indeed, two witnesses chose another participant in the lineup as closely resembling one of the perpetrators. Then, on June 12, 1971, the NYPD received an "anonymous" telephone call from a woman who stated as follows:

The four men you are holding are not suspects. They may know who did it. They did not do it, either the [May 19] or [May 21] shooting. They were at my girlfriend's house, 757 Beck Street, Bronx. Her last name is Joseph.... They did nothing until the Social Club incident. I will call again.

The anonymous caller turned out to be Pauline Joseph herself. Scores of police descended upon 757 Beck Street, arrested Ms. Joseph, and had her committed as a material witness. For nearly two years Ms. Joseph remained in the exclusive custody of the New York County District Attorney, mostly living at the old Commodore Hotel in Manhattan with various NYPD officials. This tragic woman who had a history of mental disorders and was recently diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, was literally brainwashed by the FBI, NYPD and District Attorney to become the chief witness against Dhoruba. Through the 20 months she was in custody, her story changed from exonerating Dhoruba to being present during certain comings and goings at the time of the shooting.

In order to achieve Dhoruba's false conviction, prosecutors then proceeded to stack the case. First, all prior, recorded statements of Pauline Joseph, including the text of her "anonymous" telephone call, were withheld from the defense, precluding defense counsel's most effective weapon in cross-examination. Second, Pauline Joseph was fed details, allegedly "corroborated" by uncontroverted physical evidence, so that her testimony might seem plausible. Third, exculpatory

27. Stating that this action was an attempt to rid the Black community of drugs, Dhoruba subsequently pled guilty to this robbery.

ballistics and fingerprint examinations performed by the FBI and NYPD were withheld and/or destroyed. Finally, although the FBI was intimately involved in every aspect of the prosecution, its activities were kept secret, as was all information concerning the counterintelligence program.

In response to defense motions at trial for exculpatory information, the prosecuting District Attorney (now U.S. District Judge) John F. Keenan swore in October 1971 (four months after Pauline Joseph's telephone call) that no exculpatory information existed and that all evidence "ineluctably" pointed to Dhoruba's involvement.²⁸ The District Attorney's office repeatedly represented that, except for a one-paragraph statement taken on the night of her commitment, there were no recorded statements from Pauline Joseph, a woman kept under 24-hour police guard for nearly two years.

Dhoruba's first trial commenced in the fall of 1972 and ended with a hung jury, with a majority voting for acquittal. The second trial, begun in January 1973, ended in a mistrial after the judge, Joseph Martinis, became ill with a "cold" during jury selection and after several Black jurors had been sworn.²⁹ Jury selection for the third trial began one week later. To the defense's astonishment, Black people accounted for only five percent of the jury panel.³⁰ Confronted with a stacked jury pool, fabricated evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and ignorant of the fact that he was a target of COINTELPRO, Dhoruba was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

All direct appeals from the conviction were denied. In 1975, after Church Committee disclosures concerning COINTELPRO, Dhoruba began a civil rights lawsuit in federal court in New York charging that he was the victim of an FBI/NYPD frame-up. The litigation stagnated until 1980. The NYPD maintained that they possessed no documents relevant to Dhoruba's claims. The FBI produced documents from Dhoruba's "name" file but maintained that additional papers did not exist. In May 1980, confronted with documents obtained from a related litigation showing that the NYPD and FBI were committing perjury, U.S. District Judge Mary Johnson Lowe finally ordered the FBI to produce its massive files on the BPP and Dhoruba.

From 1980 to 1984, the FBI produced approximately 300,000 pages on Dhoruba, COINTELPRO, the BPP, and related investigations. However, the contents of these documents were nearly two-thirds excised on "executive privilege" and other grounds. Thus, over the next several years, Dhoruba's lawyers were forced to conduct a document-by-document review to submit legal challenges to these deletions. Finally, in 1987, the FBI produced an almost uncensored copy of its "Newkill" file, including documents generated during the investigation of the May 19, 1971 police shooting. Among these 5,000 pages were over 30 prior interviews with Pauline Joseph, contradicting every aspect of her

28. Affidavit of John Keenan submitted in *People v. Richard Moore*, Ind. 3885/71, New York County.

29. In accordance with established procedure at the time, Joseph Martinis was chosen by the District Attorney to preside over Dhoruba's trials.

30. The usual percentage of Black people was about 25 percent.

trial testimony. Also included were exculpatory scientific tests and documentation showing that the District Attorney, with the cooperation of the NYPD and FBI, intentionally misrepresented the existence of this exculpatory material.

A motion for a new trial was filed in April 1988. Nearly one year later, New York State Supreme Court Justice Peter McQuillan issued a five-page decision finding that the DA had wrongfully withheld the prior statements and, had they been disclosed, Pauline Joseph would have been "successfully impeached." However, the court denied the request for a new trial on technical grounds and refused to rule on the documented allegations of misconduct.

On February 8, 1990, Justice McQuillan was reversed by the appellate court and essentially ordered by that court to vacate Dhoruba's conviction. A bail hearing held on March 22, 1990, finally resulted in Dhoruba's release.

Not satisfied with incarcerating an innocent man for 19 years, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office is currently appealing the decision releasing Dhoruba. Moreover, the Office has stated that if it fails on appeal, it will seek to try Dhoruba for a fourth time. The decision only underscores the political nature of this case.

The District Attorney surely knows that the racist, politically motivated prosecution of Dhoruba bin-Wahad was not an aberration. His prosecution was part of a counterintelligence strategy designed to neutralize the Black Panther Party and thereby weaken the movement of Black people in the United States for self-determination and human rights. Other members of the BPP who were direct and/or indirect targets of COINTELPRO were prosecuted in the early 1970s and remain in prison today; others were murdered. The juries which convicted those targeted by the FBI were also unaware of COINTELPRO. In these cases, FBI documents obtained years after conviction also show that evidence was fabricated and exculpatory evidence suppressed for political reasons.³¹ Thus, it is expected that federal and state law enforcement agencies will use all their efforts to re-incarcerate Dhoruba not only to prevent him from continuing the political work he began 20 years ago, but to prevent a precedent which might ease the release of the remaining Black political prisoners in jails throughout the country.

The existence of Black political prisoners in the U.S. is a consequence of the vicious racist repression of illegal COINTELPRO activities under the pretext and guise of the criminal law. Their existence exposes the U.S. government as one of the most hypocritical violators of human rights in the world. The freedom of U.S. political prisoners is therefore something that must be supported by all freedom-loving peoples. ●

31. For example, in the case of the "New York Three" (former BPP members Albert Nuh Washington, Herman Bell, and Anthony Jalil Bottom), convicted for the 1971 murder of two police officers, the prosecution withheld the results of an exculpatory FBI ballistics comparison. In another well-known case, documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act show that former BPP leader Geronimo ji Jaga (Pratt), a documented COINTELPRO target, was in fact under FBI surveillance in Oakland, California, at the same time that the state maintained he was committing a murder 400 miles away.

Mumia Abu-Jamal:

The Man Who Did Something

Terry Bisson

As many nations around the world free their political prisoners, the U.S. holds onto its own ever more tightly. The rationale for this injustice is that the U.S. has no *explicitly political* prisoners — apparently defined as *those who have done nothing*. The Nelson Mandelas of the world are not men and women unwilling or afraid to act, and have for the most part clearly *done something*, and usually something manifestly illegal; but the generally accepted notion is that no one is imprisoned in the United States simply for making subversive statements or publishing a radical newspaper.

There is some truth to this conceit, for the U.S. press is a very powerful institution, although the benefits of this power may not be apparent to those who suffer its assaults. And except for that significant minority (Leonard Peltier, Geronimo Pratt and others) who were simply framed, most of the political prisoners in the U.S. — the surviving Black Panther Party (BPP) members; the Puerto Rican FALN and other armed groups; the heirs to the Weather Underground — are in jail, as Mandela was, for what they *did*, not for what they proposed that others should do.

It is thus doubly ironic that the only U.S. political prisoner actually on Death Row, in line for execution, is a revolutionary *journalist*. The first irony is that his weapon in support of both the Panthers and MOVE, the two causes that have evoked his considerable eloquence, is the word and not the sword. The second is that he would have never been involved in violence at all except for an attempted execution that went wrong.

His own.

The History

Mumia Abu-Jamal's story as a conscious political creature begins in 1968, when as Wesley Cook he was one of four West Philadelphia teens who slipped into a George Wallace rally and gave the "Black Power" salute in protest.

They were shouted down, spat on and thrown out of the auditorium by police, who left them in the parking lot. There

Terry Bisson is a science fiction writer and political journalist living in New York City.

they were assaulted by a gang of middle-aged white men, several of whom, it was later revealed, were police.

Abu-Jamal, 14 years old, was thrown to the ground and kicked over and over. He saw the uniformed blue and gold leg of a cop nearby and called out for help. The cop rushed over — and kicked him in the face.

"I was always grateful to that cop," he recalled later. "He kicked me straight into the Black Panther Party."

Wesley Cook took the Swahili name Mumia from a high school exchange teacher from Kenya and adopted Abu-Jamal (father of Jamal) when his son Jamal was born a few years later.¹ While still in high school he became the editor of the local BPP newspaper, and by 1970, at the age of 17, he was the Philadelphia Chapter's Lieutenant of Information. This coincided with the height of the FBI's COINTELPRO operations against the Panthers, when some 38 Panthers were assassinated by police across the country, and FBI "dirty tricks" exacerbated the already bitter divisions within the party.² (See centerfold.)

Abu-Jamal's eager identification with the BPP led to an equally sharp disillusionment as the Party disintegrated. He retained his flair for journalism, however, and by the middle

1970s was beginning to make his mark in news radio with broadcasts heard on National Public Radio, National Black Network, Mutual Black Network, even hosting his own talk show on WUHY. Brilliant if cynical, like many Black survivors of the 1960s, he was on the career track — until his acquaintance with MOVE.


MOVE

MOVE is perhaps the most savagely repressed of all the organizations to come out of America's experiments with alternate life-styles in the 1960s. Twenty four of its members are in prison — not including Mumia Abu-Jamal³, and there are

1. Betty and Horace Liveright, *The Guardian*, January 9, 1991.

2. Ward Churchill, "Wages of Cointelpro," *Studies on the Left*, 1990.

3. I include here the baby killed in a melee with police on the street in 1976; see Linn Washington, "MOVE, A Double Standard of Justice?" *Yale Journal of Law and Liberation*, 1989.



Partisan Defense Committee

Mumia Abu-Jamal at work, radio station WUHY, Philadelphia, 1980.

reasons not to count Abu-Jamal — and twelve are dead, including six children — and there is every reason to count the children.

MOVE came to Philadelphia in the early 1970s. Originally founded by Vincent Leapheart, called John Africa by himself and his followers, the group became known in the poor neighborhoods of Philadelphia for its naturalistic lifestyle. MOVE members ate no meat and cooked no food, they killed no rats or roaches, and they never combed their hair. They shunned not only drugs, but also alcohol, tobacco, and junk food, those debilitating staples with which the Black community, deprived of health care, education and housing, is so freely supplied.⁴

MOVE was no more popular with the Black press than with the white press — perhaps less so. Their uncompromising radical utopianism, their “nappy-headed” intransigence, and their long streams of invective, did little to endear them to the rising young Black reporters and journalists on the scene — except for Mumia Abu-Jamal. He saw in the men and women of MOVE some of the old militancy and spirit that he associated with the Panthers; perhaps he was drawn to lost causes; certainly always to fighters.

When MOVE protested a Jesse Jackson rally because admission was charged, Abu-Jamal aired a tape of an attack on MOVE pickets by Jackson’s staff — many of whom were off-duty cops. He was ordered by his station never to cover MOVE again, but he continued to do so, moving from station to station as he got fired. He covered the fateful 1978 Powellton Village confrontation in which 15 MOVE members were convicted for the murder of one cop, and he was one of the “new breed” of journalists threatened by former police chief, then-Mayor Rizzo at a 1979 press conference.⁵

In spite of the continual controversy he aroused, his career flourished. In addition to interviewing MOVE women and men in their jail cells, he interviewed such media personalities as Bob Marley, Alex Haley, and Julius Erving. At age 26 he was elected head of the Philadelphia Chapter of the Association of Black Journalists, and cited by *Philadelphia Magazine* in 1981 as one of its “People to Watch.” But the magazines were not the only ones watching Mumia.

The Police

Mumia has written: “While walking to work one day, I passed in front of an idling cop car. I glanced at the driver. White, with brown hair, and wearing dark shades. He ‘smiled,’ put his hand out the car window, and pointed a finger at me, his thumb cocked back like the hammer of a gun. Bang... bang... bang. The finger-gun jerks as if from recoil and the cop gives it a cowboyish blast of breath before returning it to an imaginary holster.”

“He & pal laff.

“Whatta joke, I thought as I sat down to type up an interview with three women known as the Pointer Sisters. But it was hard to

4. Washington, *op. cit.*, n. 3.

5. “The Case of Mumia Abu-Jamal,” Legal Dossier, Partisan Defense Committee, New York, June 1989.

concentrate. There was only one kind of pointing going on in my mind. And it wasn’t those glitzy sisters.”⁶

The harassment of the Philadelphia Police against the Black community is well-documented. Its most famous chief, Frank Rizzo, set the tone. He once promised “to make Attila the Hun look like a faggot.”⁷ Between 1970 and 1978, 162 people were fatally shot by Philadelphia cops (five times as many as in the decade 1950-60); in 1974 alone, 148 were shot and wounded, twice the number as in New York City with four times the population.⁸ Things were so heated that the U.S. Justice Department even sued the city, charging a pattern of police abuse.⁹

It was in this context that Mumia Abu-Jamal practiced the personal brand of advocacy journalism that got him known to his listeners as “The Voice of the Oppressed” —

and to the police as “Mumia Africa.”

At his trial, Abu-Jamal characterized the incident that ended his life as a free man with characteristic brevity:

“On December 9, 1981, the police attempted to execute me in the street. This trial is a result of their failure to do so.”¹⁰

Arrest and Trial

Arrest and Trial

On the night of December 9, 1981, Abu-Jamal was moonlighting, a tactic he had adopted to maintain his journalistic autonomy. He was driving a cab when he saw the police beating a man with dreadlocks who looked eerily like himself. It is unclear whether it was a case of mistaken identity, or an attempt to get to him through his family — for in fact the man was Mumia’s brother. In any case, he pulled over and, as he has never yet failed to do, intervened. In the struggle that ensued, he was shot in the stomach and the policeman was killed with a gun that was never recovered.

Abu-Jamal, who was near death himself when the police back-up arrived, was beaten before leaving for the hospital and again on arrival. After several hours of surgery he survived, only to be charged with murder and set on the path toward a slower but more certain death.

There is a macabre logic to the consistent higher court contentions that there were no reversible errors in the trial of Mumia Abu-Jamal. Certainly the devices and procedures used to convict and condemn him to death were the standard ones used in the trial of a Black person; especially an unreconstructed Black militant; particularly a Black militant accused of that most unforgivable sin — killing a cop.

All but one of the potential Black jurors were excluded with peremptory challenges, as well as a white who admitted *uncertainty* as to whether or not he could impose the death penalty. At the same time the defense was denied the right to challenge a juror who stated with *certainty* that he already knew that the

6. Mumia Abu-Jamal, unpublished memoirs.

7. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

8. Washington, *op. cit.*, n. 3.

9. *Ibid.* The suit was dismissed for lack of standing.

10. Transcript, *Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal*, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, January Term 1982, Cases 1357-1359, July 3, 1982, p. 16.

accused was guilty.¹¹

Abu-Jamal's request for a lawyer of his own choosing (John Africa; and then himself) was twice denied. Instead, a court-appointed attorney was assigned. He challenged few of the court's rulings and operated most of the time over the protests of his client. It was impossible to call a witness who had seen another man run from the scene; nor to expose contradictions in the testimony of police who claimed Abu-Jamal both had and had not made a confession.¹²

Conviction was sure and swift. This was an open and shut case after all. A cop was dead; a Black militant was in hand.

The Death Penalty

Pennsylvania law requires a separate hearing in capital cases to determine penalty. It was in this second, penalty phase of his 1981 trial that Mumia Abu-Jamal took the stand to plead his case. He was interrupted while making his statement and cross-examined about his beliefs and actions twelve years before, even though this line of questioning had been disallowed as prejudicial in his trial.

"Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Do you recall saying that, sir?"

"I remember writing that. That's a quote from Mao Tse-Tung."

"Do you recall saying, 'All power to the people'? ... Do you recall saying that, 'The Panther Party is an uncompromising party, it faces reality'?"

The prosecutor even went so far as to ask the defendant: "You are not an executioner?"

And Mumia Abu-Jamal, beginning to get the picture, coolly answered: "No. Are you?"¹³

Sonia Sanchez, a Black poet and educator at Temple University, was a character witness for Mumia. She was subjected to the same abuse, and accused by the judge of associating with "cop-killers."¹⁴

The prosecutor made a curious argument to the jury when asking that they approve the death penalty in the case of Mumia Abu-Jamal. He said it would never be used.

"You are not being asked to kill anybody," he said. "You are being asked to follow the law; the same law that will provide for him appeal after appeal after appeal."

This instruction to the jury has been considered misleading enough to overturn death penalty convictions in a number of cases.¹⁵ In Mumia's case however, it was allowed.

11. *Op. cit.*, n. 5.

12. According to the official Homicide Report filed by the arresting officer, Gary Wakshul, Abu-Jamal had said nothing after his arrest. But when he was questioned by the DA two months later, an arresting officer recalled that "Jamal said, 'I shot him, I hope the MFer dies.'" *Op. cit.*, n. 10, p. 11.

What was the truth? It was never brought out. At the time of trial, the defense was told they could not cross-examine the officer since he was on vacation, and Abu-Jamal's lawyer acquiesced.

13. *Op. cit.*, n. 5.

14. *Op. cit.*, n. 10, pp. 21, 22, 23.

15. In *Caldwell v. Mississippi* the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument, making it grounds for automatic reversal of a death penalty, saying: "That appellate review is available to a capital defendant sentenced to death is no valid basis for a jury to return such a sentence if otherwise it might not. It is simply a factor that in itself is wholly irrelevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence."

Pennsylvania courts have ruled that this prosecution argument is grounds

When the Philadelphia Police bombed MOVE in 1985, there was no local partisan journalist to come to its defense. Mumia Abu-Jamal, the "Voice of the oppressed" was on Death Row in Huntingdon Prison, where he has been for the past several years. He is now under "disciplinary action," denied most reading material and mail privileges because of his refusal to cut his dreadlocks.

In March 1989 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court turned down Abu-Jamal's last state appeal, and on October 1, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court opened its fall term by refusing to review his conviction and death sentence, thus clearing the way for his execution. There have been no executions in the state of Pennsylvania since 1964. If state officials succeed in killing Mumia Abu-Jamal, and there is no reason to doubt either their seriousness or their desire to do so, his will be the first explicitly political execution since the Rosenbergs were put to death in spite of world wide protests on July 19, 1953.

Conclusion

Black executions (everyone knows we're not talking about Black people executing whites) have never been properly counted in this country, since the official records of the death penalty leave out the 3,400 to 5,000 lynchings in the South between the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of the Depression.

But lynchings are no less executions simply because they evaded the documentation that is now mandatory before any human being can be shot, gassed, injected with poison, or hanged in the U.S. Were the murders of Chaney, Schwerner, and Goodman any less acts of law enforcement because the officers were off duty? Was the murder of Fred Hampton by the Chicago police anything but a lynching?

The pending execution of Mumia Abu-Jamal is, then, whatever irregularities may be shown to occur, *legal* in every sense of the word. And it is just as certainly a lynching. It is the court-sanctioned elimination by the Philadelphia Police of one of their more articulate and outspoken enemies, a journalist who had the effrontery to be not only Black, but Panther- and MOVE-associated; that is, fair game.

Equal Justice USA, a project of the Quixote Center, P.O. Box 5206, Hyattsville, MD 20782 has more information on this case and is organizing a grassroots campaign to free Mumia Abu-Jamal.

Mumia has been defended by the Partisan Defense Committee, P.O. Box 802876, Chicago, IL 60806.

for reversal; *Commonwealth v. Baker*. In another case, also involving the killing of a cop, *Commonwealth v. Beasley*, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed a death penalty on appeal precisely because of the same "appeal after appeal" language used by the prosecutor in Mumia's case.

• PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

200 Years of the Penitentiary System, (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1990). Reports that only the U.S. incarcerates a larger proportion of its African-descended population than does *apartheid* South Africa. African Americans are jailed at six times the rate of whites. Available from: AFSC, 1501 Cherry Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102-1479.

Americans Behind Bars: A Comparison of International Rates of Incarceration (Washington, D.C.: Report of The Sentencing Project, January 1991). Available from: The Sentencing Project, 918 F Street N.W., Washington DC 20004.

Reconstruction's Second Demise

William Kunstler

America's first Reconstruction period ended in 1876 with the election of Rutherford B. Hayes. Hayes won by a single vote in an Electoral Commission composed of ten Congressmen and five Supreme Court Justices, following disputed returns in several southern states. The termination of Reconstruction was the end of a period of real, unprecedented, and perhaps unequalled, progress in race relations in the U.S. The enactment of the Civil War Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—and the legislation necessary to enforce them, ushered in a decade during which southern Blacks assumed and capably executed top elective and appointive governmental positions. They accomplished this despite the dehumanizing oppression to which their people had been subjected for centuries.

“The spectacle of former slaves representing...the domain of Natchez cotton nabobs epitomized the political revolution wrought by Reconstruction.”

While whites continued to dominate the political systems of almost all the states of the old Confederacy, the only exception being South Carolina, a number of Blacks, many of them newly freed slaves, were elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, sixteen in all, and one, Hiram Revels of Mississippi, made it to the Senate. On the state side, one succeeded to the Governorship of Louisiana, six became Lieutenant-Governors, two Treasurers, four Superintendents of Education, and eight Secretaries of State. More than six hundred served in state legislatures and, as historian Eric Foner has noted, “The spectacle of former slaves representing...the domain of Natchez cotton nabobs epitomized the political revolution wrought by Reconstruction.”¹

The End of the First...

Unfortunately, Hayes' election symbolized the end of Reconstruction. As John A. Martin, chair of the Kansas Republican State Committee, wrote in early 1877, “the policy of the new administration [was] to conciliate the white men of the South. Carpetbaggers to the rear, and niggers take care of yourselves.”² Two months after entering the White House, the new President began the process of withdrawing the last remaining federal troops from below the Mason-Dixon Line. “The Negro,” lamented *The Nation*, “will disappear from the field of national politics. Henceforth, the nation, as a nation, will have

William Kunstler is a founder, vice-president, and volunteer staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York City, and one of the country's foremost legal defense authorities.

1. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 355.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 581.

nothing more to do with him.”³ Or, as W.E.B. Du Bois put it, “the slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery.”⁴

Early in the 20th Century, a mammoth intellectual effort, headed by Columbia University's William A. Dunning, was underway to downplay Reconstruction.⁵ The crux of this analysis was its insistence that Blacks were mentally incapable of assuming significant governmental positions. Those who had been elected or appointed to such posts during the Reconstruction years were portrayed as incompetent and lazy buffoons. D. W. Griffith's film *Birth of a Nation*, which had its premiere in the Wilson White House, glorified the Ku Klux Klan, and popularized the racist Dunning School image of “Negro incapacity.”⁶

...and the Beginning of the Second

The country's second Reconstruction, stimulated by the Supreme Court's outlawing of the doctrine of “separate but equal” in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) began with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and peaked with the election in 1989 of a Black Governor of Virginia. In between, hundreds of Black appointed and elected officeholders appeared in the southern tier of states. New York City, the last major metropolitan holdout, finally elected a Black mayor. What Hayes' election had brought to an abrupt close in 1877 now seemed fully on the road to revival.

However, just as in 1877 and after, the white-dominated political system, country-wide, was determined to curtail or inhibit Black inroads into its domain by any means necessary. The unconstitutional attempt in 1966 to unseat Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. marked the public beginning of this effort. As chair of the House Education and Labor Committee, Powell wielded more political power than any other Black, past or present. Although his exclusion from the 90th Congress was later invalidated by the Supreme Court, he had been so broken in spirit and body as to foreclose any resumption of his previous Congressional role. He died shortly thereafter.

During the next two decades, through such programs as the FBI's COINTELPRO, every conceivable avenue by which Black

3. *Ibid.*, p. 582.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 602.

5. William A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic 1865-1877*, (New York: Harper, 1907).

6. *Op. cit.*, n. 1, p. xx.

officeholders could be discredited was explored. The instigation of criminal charges, the circulation of derogatory rumors (sometimes called "whisper campaigns"), and the institution of disgraceful but legal scam operations, among others, have been employed to accomplish this end. Even when such tactics ultimately failed, as with the wholesale indictments of African American election workers in Alabama in 1985, they succeeded in pinning down their quarries long enough to subvert or destroy their effectiveness.⁷

The latest example of what is essentially the revival of the Dunning School of racial inferiority is the FBI's "Fruhmen-schen" (German for "early man" or "ape man") program, which began in 1979. According to the affidavit of attorney Hirsch Friedman, a former FBI informer, "the purpose of this policy was the routine investigation without probable cause of prominent elected and appointed Black officials in major metropolitan areas throughout the United States...[on] the assumption...that Black officials were intellectually and socially incapable of governing major governmental organizations and institutions."⁸ Its immediate targets in the Atlanta area were Mayor Maynard Jackson, Eldrin Bell, a top-ranking police official, and Reginald Eaves, a member of the Fulton County Board of Commissioners. While neither Jackson nor Bell were ever indicted, derogatory rumors were circulated about them. Eaves was found guilty of extortion and his conviction affirmed by the appellate court, which did not address the issue of selective prosecution raised by him.

Recently, reports were leaked that the FBI was surreptitiously investigating Black Representative William Gray (D-PA) for alleged misconduct. Gray went on the offensive and the Bureau dropped its allegations. According to Gray's office, no apology has been issued from the FBI.

Regardless of how many such apologies or retractions might theoretically be issued, there is little doubt that such tactics leave permanent personal and political scars on their targets.

Racism by the Numbers

By 1990, although Black officeholders held only 2% of elective and appointive positions in the U.S., they comprised 40% of those indicted for alleged corruption. Recently, the National Council of Churches demanded a Congressional investigation into the "unwarranted and unjustified criminal investigation of African American elected officials."

Former DC Mayor Marion Barry has admitted using drugs and breaking the law, but contends his prosecution was racially motivated. In a police "sting," Barry was lured to a hotel room by a former paramour and plied with cocaine. The police video was then "leaked" to media outlets nationwide. Many elected office holders are guilty of wrongdoing, but only a small portion

7. See: U.S. v. Gordon, Cr #85-PT-200-W (N.D. Ala.).

8. *Congressional Record*, January 27, 1988, p. H 31; *New York Law Journal*, September 14, 1990, p. 1.

By 1990, although Black officeholders held only 2% of elective and appointive positions in the U.S., they comprised 40% of those indicted for alleged corruption.

are brought to task. The clear pattern of law enforcement bias, and the sheer complexity of Barry's elaborate legal entrapment lends cre-

dence to his charge.⁹

Former U.S. District Judge Alcee Hastings was the first Black appointee in Florida. Impeached by the Senate for the same alleged misconduct of which he had been earlier acquitted by a jury, he ascribed the vendetta against him to his anti-government decisions in such cases as those involving the draconian treatment of Haitian refugees and his steady and outspoken criticism of the Reagan administration.

In 1935, W. E. B. Du Bois published *Black Reconstruction in America*, his answer to Dunning's major thesis of Black inferiority.¹⁰ "One fact and one alone," he wrote, "explains the attitude of most recent writers toward Reconstruction; they cannot conceive of Negroes as men." Although his work was largely ignored by white academics, it accurately anticipated the findings of modern scholarship. In *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution*, Eric Foner eloquently and accurately put yesterday and today in perspective when he concluded:

Over a century ago, prodded by the demands of four million men and women just emerging from slavery, Americans made their first attempt to live up to the noble professions of their political creed — something few societies have ever done. The effort produced a sweeping redefinition of the nation's public life and a violent reaction that ultimately destroyed much, but by no means all, of what had been accomplished. From the enforcement of the rights of citizens to the stubborn problems of economic and racial justice, the issues central to Reconstruction are as old as the American republic, and as contemporary as the inequalities that still afflict our society. ●

9. *New York Times*, August 11, 1990, p. 1.

10. W.E.B. DuBois, *Black Reconstruction in America* (New York, Russell and Russell, 1935).

MEMO TO OUR READERS

- First, **WE'VE MOVED**. Please note our new address on the back cover. While we occasionally receive mail addressed to our old P.O. Box it would be naive to rely on such mail being forwarded.
- Second, if **YOU'VE MOVED**, send us your new address. We're mailing third class, so misaddressed magazines are gone forever.
- We regret that we must charge full cover price and postage for replacement copies. So keep us up to date.

— THANKS!

South Africa's "Hidden Hand"

Ruth Tomaselli

"In the past three months, close to 250 lives have been lost in the black-on-black violence in the Pietermaritzburg area of Natal.... [V]irtually every residence has been affected by the power struggle.... Black-on-Black violence has left in its wake a bewildered people who do not understand the intrigue of polity, do not even know who the UDF [United Democratic Force] is, who do not understand why they should belong to Inkatha, and others who haven't the faintest inkling of what the policies of AZAPO [Azanian People's Organization] and AZAZO [Azanian Students Organization] are."¹

This news report is typical of the dominant narrative presented by the South African state when discussing political violence. The terms, and the often racist assumptions behind them, are then relayed internationally by foreign correspondents to U.S. newsrooms. The South African state's media perspectives are not significantly different from those that determine American interpretations of U.S. and African racial conflicts. The term "black-on-black violence," originally coined by the public relations arm of the South African Police, is often uncritically reproduced in the American media. What is at best a superficial description of internecine violence thus takes on the status of analysis.

The emphasis on the ethnicity of the killings serves another function as well. It absolves the South African authorities from any responsibility for the underlying conditions out of which the disputes arose and from accountability for policing the consequences of these disputes. It encourages ethnic myths which define the protagonists as different, and by implication inferior, to the mainly white authorities. The tribal connotations underscore the perception that the violence is analogous to faction (inter- or intra-"tribal") fighting, which is seen as vengeful, self-perpetuating and outside the ambit of (white) authority.

Defining Violence

Like the term "terrorism," definitions of "political violence" tend to be a normative, revealing more about the viewpoint of those who use them than about the phenomenon itself. Official South African and U.S. accounts of political violence assume that it is only used against the state. Violence used on behalf of the state is tacitly ignored, or seen in terms of "law and order." Rather than accept this definition, we will use the term to mean an unequal relationship between authorized violence by the state, and violence aimed at undermining the authority of the state. It is also necessary however to account for the *divisiveness* within and among organizations with similar goals—such as the

Ruth Tomaselli is editor of *Broadcasting in South Africa* (Chicago: Lake View Press), and a part-time lecturer in the Centre for Cultural and Media Studies, University of Natal, Durban. She is an associate editor of *Critical Arts: A Journal of Media Studies*.

1. South Africa Broadcasting Corporation, January 14, 1988.

abolition of *apartheid*. We need to come to terms with the question of why people who apparently have the same interests turn on one another.

The Course of the War

The Natal Midlands violence is part of the general revolt against *apartheid* that flared up in late 1984. *Indicator SA (1989)*² estimated the total killed between September 1984 and December 1988 at 4,012, more than one-fourth of these, 1,113, were killed by security forces.

The imposition of the states of emergency after 1985 reduced the number of deaths, particularly those perpetrated by the state. However, from 1986 on, the Natal death toll escalated. Most commentators thus concluded that the Natal violence was essentially different from that occurring in the rest of the country because of Inkatha's claim to the unequivocal leadership of blacks in Natal. Between 1977 and 1988 however, Inkatha's support in South Africa's industrial heartland—the Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging (PWV) area—actually declined from approximately 30 percent to less than 5 percent, while UDF/African National Congress (ANC) support rose from 30 percent to nearly 70 percent. Faced with this erosion of its national power base, Inkatha needed to shore its relative hegemony in Natal. It was Inkatha's attempt to recruit membership aggressively, both for itself and for its labor wing, UWUSA (United Workers Union of South Africa), which created the situation that resulted in the dramatic violence in 1987 and 1988.

The political insurrection in the PWV in 1984 had little impact on the Natal midlands. However, 1984 did see the growth of a number of UDF-affiliated organizations, and sporadic acts of violence between individual UDF affiliates and Inkatha supporters during 1985.³

The establishment of UWUSA in 1985 as the union arm of Inkatha heightened conflict between Inkatha and the ANC-affiliated COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions).

2. *Urban Monitor*, "Indicator S.A., 1989," Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 53-74.


3. John Aitchison, "The Pietermaritzburg Conflict—Experience and Analysis" (Pietermaritzburg, Natal: Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, 1990), p. 3.

The local spark was the strike at BTR Sarmcol in Howick, owned by the British tire manufacturer Dunlop. The entire black workforce was dismissed and replaced with scab labor, many of whom were Inkatha members. In an area beset by economic stagnation and unemployment, the Sarmcol strike and dismissal had devastating repercussions. In solidarity with the dismissed workers, COSATU organized a stay-away on July 18, 1985, accompanied by a consumer boycott in Pietermaritzburg, a move strongly opposed by Inkatha. Radical youth coercively enforced the boycott. Inkatha retaliated by busing large numbers of supporters into Mphopheni township in December 1986, leading, in the tension that followed, to the execution of three COSATU supporters. Although a March 1988 inquest accused nine Inkatha members of the murders, no prosecutions have occurred. The pattern of what was to be termed "The Pietermaritzburg Violence" had been set.

During 1985 and 1986, Inkatha warlords in Imbali "enlisted" youths and unemployed men as para-military groups or "impis." Radical youth, calling themselves "comrades," and their families were forced from their homes and fled to surrounding areas. This exodus had a politicizing effect as new UDF affiliates were formed in areas previously unrepresented. Inkatha recruiting drives during May and June 1987 were unusually coercive, and often involved the busing-in of heavily armed groups from Inkatha strongholds. The number of deaths rose to about 13 a month. UDF and COSATU believe that these deaths were in large part the result of Inkatha attacks aimed at the intimidation of individuals and communities, in an attempt to consolidate their then limited power base.

In September 1987, a month of devastating floods destroyed thousands of houses and killed hundreds in the Natal midlands. Inkatha exploited the opportunity to extend its recruitment campaign, by using its state-sanctioned access to Emergency Relief funds, shelter, hospital admission, and food allocation as leverage. The violence reached truly horrific proportions, culminating in 162 deaths in January 1988. Coercive Inkatha action was allegedly facilitated by the security forces.

Revelations of police partiality and a sense that the situation was getting out of control spurred massive police reinforcements into the area from February 1988. Controversy over police involvement was heightened with the deployment of KwaZulu police, loyal to Inkatha, and the introduction of 150 *Kitskonstables* at the end of December 1988, and another 289 in March. These "instant constables," drawn from the ranks of the unemployed and desperate, received only six to eight weeks' training and were badly disciplined and unprepared for the sensitive task of policing a crisis situation. Many of them were Inkatha supporters with records of engagements in previous acts of violence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the policing during this period was overwhelmingly aimed against UDF supporters, and charges of active police collusion with Inkatha were rife.



Afrapix / Impact Visuals

Vigilantes destroy the homes of 70,000 squatters at Crossroads, Capetown with no interference from police or military.

With the unbanning of the ANC, UDF, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and other organizations in February 1990, these groups became legal players, and the violence took on a more overtly "political" tone, losing some, though not all, of its "tribal" overtones. More than 350 people were killed in the first four months of the year.

In April 1990, Inkatha launched a massive attack on non-members in which more than 200 people were burnt, hacked or shot to death in the "Valley of Death" around Edendale.⁴ Inkatha claimed that the attack was in retaliation for ANC members stoning buses returning from a March 25 rally. Other commentators saw the attack as too sustained and well-coordinated to be simply revenge killings. Rather, Inkatha's "rapid loss of support," and the alternative political avenues offered by the unbanning of the ANC were seen as a threat to Inkatha, which was then prepared to do all in its power to command Zulu allegiance in Natal: "People have become too politicized, and Inkatha's methods are seen as a regression to the worst aspects of tribal life."⁵

Also in early April 1990, more than 100,000 UDF-associated protesters staged a demonstration against the presence of the KwaZulu police in the Umlazi area. In response, President F.W. de Klerk announced in the same month that the army, which had a somewhat more neutral image than the police, would be deployed in Natal. Approximately 2,000 troops were stationed around Pietermaritzburg and the greater Durban area. Their presence was tentatively welcomed by the ANC, which exercised a restraining influence on its armed wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, which maintained a quiet presence in the conflict areas.⁶

The Inkatha-initiated attacks and the resulting counter-strikes by anti-Inkatha groups were reported in the U.S. media

4. *The Star* (Johannesburg), March 3, 1990.

5. John Aitchison, *Numbering the Dead: Patterns in the Midlands Violence* (Pietermaritzburg, Natal: Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, 1988), p. 25.

6. *The Star* (Johannesburg), May 18, 1990.



Afrapix / Impact Visuals

Vigilantes attack squatter camp as police drive by in armored vehicle.

as “blacks not listening to their leaders.” The attribution by *Time* magazine of alleged ANC comrades as “warlords” is a cruel irony in the face of the real Inkatha warlords.⁷ The Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, who is partially responsible for this murderous miasma, when interviewed on American television during the first two weeks of March 1990, was allowed to get away with self-serving “soundbites” about the need to restore “law and order.” The legitimacy of capitalist states is an enduring value in the American media, along with an illusion of stability. U.S. media images of blacks out of control only strengthen the South African securocrats who use this kind of reporting to reassert the levels of Police repression that existed between 1986 and September 1989.

In March 1990, the “Natal” brand of violence was exported to the Transvaal. Migrant workers from KwaZulu, living in single-sex hostels on the Witwatersrand, engaged in bloody battles with ANC/UDF supporters. While these outbreaks of violence were organized along political lines, they were exacerbated by a general rise in civil and domestic violence: young gangs with little or no political affiliation, and ordinary criminals took advantage of the chaotic circumstances.

By mid-year, an uneasy truce prevailed. Then, in late August, the townships in the East and West Rand again flared up. In one week, 331 deaths were reported.⁸ Mid-September saw a new upsurge, with death totals running to 227 people per week.⁹ Altogether, an estimated 800 people were killed in six weeks.¹⁰

During this period, the killings were still characterized as “Inkatha/ANC” rivalries, or more starkly as “Zulu/Xhosa” clashes. However, a clear pattern of planning and professionalism, not previously discernible, now came to the fore. Analysts increasingly noted orchestrated attempts by unknown persons to intervene in the violence in order to destabilize and disrupt the prospects for a negotiated settlement. The long-standing allegations of police collusion took on new and sinister connotations;

7. April 9, 1990, p. 55.

8. *The Star* (Johannesburg), August 20, 1990.

9. *Toronto Star*, September 16, 1990.

10. United Press International, December 3, 1990.

shadowy networks of government-linked death squads, ultra-rightwing and counter-insurgency groups, as well as top ranking police officials emerged, targeting both white and black anti-apartheid activists, ANC officials, trade unionists and members of local community groups. These death squads are the outer visible edges of extremist para-military organizations which reach into the heart of the state apparatus itself.

President F.W. de Klerk conceded that a “hidden hand” was manipulating the township violence. He acknowledged that he saw it as rogue elements within the security establishment, and he promised to investigate the matter.

The ANC accused the government of collusion with Inkatha and rightwing black vigilante groups. Mandela and PBS’s *South Africa Now*¹¹ referred to these changes in tactics, particularly the use of military precision and discipline, indicative of

combat training, as evidence of the beginning of a RENAMO-style confrontation. (RENAMO is the South Africa-supported insurgency group responsible for continued attrition in Mozambique, in which 100,000 people have been killed, hundreds of thousands more maimed and left homeless, and the economy of the country shattered.) (See page 46.) There is evidence of ex-RENAMO agents selling arms in Inkatha-controlled hostels on the Witwatersrand. However, rightwing mercenary-type intervention need not be confined to RENAMO. The same kind of combat-ready attacks could have been executed by any of the

President F.W. de Klerk conceded that a “hidden hand” was manipulating the township violence. He acknowledged that he saw it as rogue elements within the security establishment, and he promised to investigate the matter.

many hundreds of militarily trained, disaffected whites and mercenary forces from South Africa, Zimbabwe, or the ex-Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola.

Other white attacks have been made independently of Inkatha as well. From September 2 to 7, 1990, for example, police confirmed that a minivan driven by a white and containing armed black and white men, was responsible for a wave of attacks in Soweto, Thokoza, and other townships, killing at least 32 people and wounding dozens more. Rightwing sympathizers were also implicated in a bomb blast at a black taxi stand on July 6, in which 27 people were injured.

11. October 7, 1990.

The State's View on Violence

The government contends that the violence is a direct result of the ANC's effort to make the country ungovernable and that the states of emergency were declared to "restore law and order" and to "facilitate the on-going reform process." The extraordinary level of "black-on-black" violence and killing required the use of extraordinary measures to prevent it. Mass detentions were justified as a "cooling off measure," taking "troublemakers" out of circulation until the situation was "stabilized."

Policing in South Africa is premised on the overriding importance of the security of the state. Anybody, and any action, seen to be a threat to the state has been regarded a fair target for harassment and suppression. In these circumstances, the protection of citizens takes second place to the protection of the existing order.

The greatest threats to the state were seen as "radicalism" and "communism," terms usually applied to anyone sympathetic to the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). Ranged against these so-called "radical elements" were the "forces of moderation," which included Bantustan leaders, conservative township business people, and administrators loyal to the state patronage system, as well as vigilante forces, including of course, Inkatha. The Minister of Law and Order put it this way: "The Police intend to face the future with moderates and fight against radical groups."¹²

Policing in South Africa is premised on the overriding importance of the security of the state. Anybody, and any action, seen to be a threat to the state has been regarded a fair target for harassment and repression.

The idea that white interests are best advanced by the cultivation of "moderate" black leadership like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, while destroying community-based structures and representative leadership, has left communities ill-prepared to handle conflicts creatively. Black leaders co-opted into the state, through fear or vested interests, operate repressively toward any critical opposition, and support the infrastructure of repression through their cooperation.

The Mass Democratic Movement's View on Violence

Before 1987, the conflict was seen as a battle between the democratic movement and the state. After this date, the perception was extended to a battle between the MDM and Inkatha, in

12. Adriaan Vlok, quoted in *Natal Witness* (Pietermaritzburg, Natal), February 27, 1988.



Afrapix / Impact Visuals

An injured man watches as his shack burns during renewed violence in a Capetown squatter camp.

which the state has played an ambiguous, albeit consistently provocative role. The ANC's explanation is that because Inkatha is losing support, it is necessary for Inkatha to maintain its power through force, and it has declared war on Zulus who have not joined it, as well as all other blacks who do not acknowledge Inkatha as pre-eminent. This view holds that Inkatha has resorted to violence and then used the various efforts at peace talks to secure itself a position on the national agenda. Buthelezi is intransigent because he thinks that the longer he waits, the better terms he will be able to negotiate with both the ANC and the government.

Inkatha's View on Violence

Inkatha casts the "war" between itself and the UDF/ANC alliance as a direct result of the ANC's ungovernability quest. Inkatha was targeted because it was seen as a force for moderation. Violence has continued because the white and Indian leadership of the UDF have no interest in ending it and are using young black people as gun-fodder. The peace initiative is just one more way to gain advantage over the peace-loving people of the townships, and undermine Inkatha.

Inkatha's rallying point is that it is an ethnic, cultural organization, appealing to the popular memory of traditional Zulu values. Part of this "traditional" construction is the figure of the "Zulu warrior" as the symbol of the pre-eminent black nation: fierce, proud, undefeatable in battle, "We are Zulus," members of the "impis" tell reporters with pride. To people subjugated to the market economy, impoverished and stripped of all value except their labor, such a return to the idyll of "tradition," with its promise of restored dignity, is very seductive. This rubric fits into the *apartheid* mentality of "tribal" divisions. It allows the police to cast a group of armed Zulus as fulfilling their "traditional" role, while a group of unarmed "comrades" are "troublemakers."

Layer Upon Layer of State Violence

Hegemony is achieved as a balance between force and consent. Attempts at engineering consent were made through the mechanisms of "negotiation" and "reform," defined only in the state's terms. The state increasingly relies on force—the "fight against radical groups"—through the use of stringent police and military options. This force is recognized by the democratic opposition as state violence and the root cause of MDM counter-violence. Three basic categories of state violence exist: individual, institutional, and structural.

Individual violence is perpetrated by individuals and targets specific persons. Examples of such violence would include police and military violence in controlling demonstrations; assault or undue force during arrest; assault, torture, abuse, and suspicious deaths during detention; and death threats and assassinations against community leaders and those who work on their behalf.

Institutional violence shifts culpability from individual agents to the state. It goes beyond the first category in that it systematizes violence, and gives it a legal form: The state's agents are "just carrying out orders." The declarations of emergencies and the legislation by which they are implemented are prime examples. Detentions became an institutionalized form of coercion, and extra-legal regulations were enacted without due democratic process. The elimination of the free press and prohibition of international media coverage of state violence made it impossible to report on the Security Forces or publish the names of those assaulted or detained. Under this legislation, security forces were shielded from scrutiny by the media and were able to act with impunity. It is with regard to this level of state violence that the term "state terrorism" is usually applied.

Structural violence. At the deepest level, state violence can be seen in the *structural* basis upon which the sociopolitical system is organized—*apartheid*. While the Influx Control and Job Reservation laws have been abolished, the Bantustans and attendant migrant labor, with its disruption of family life, its single-sex hostels, and depressed wages, are still very much in evidence. Official discourse may claim that "*apartheid* is dead," but the forced relocations, poor housing, high urban crime rate, and endemic rural underemployment and child malnutrition remain. These and other inequities systematically tear away the fabric of black social structures, leaving disrupted and impoverished communities in their wake.

This level of state-engineered violence, because it is so pervasive, becomes difficult to encapsulate as a news event. Yet for the millions of black South Africans living under these conditions, structural violence is the crux of *apartheid*.

Both the MDM and Inkatha speak of "war." The MDM asserts that Inkatha wages war on the community, and that the local chiefs of Inkatha bands act as "warlords." The state refuses on the other hand to see the violence of resistance as "war," since this admission would acknowledge a complete breakdown of the state's hegemony and thus undermine its ability to contain social conflict. It prefers to define the current struggle as terrorism or tribal conflict.

Conclusion

U.S. media euphoria when Mandela was released in early February 1990 shifted, over the first year of his release, from euphoria to bewilderment and confusion. Mandela's visit to the U.S. in June 1990 totally smashed the civil rights frame into which he had been boxed. No matter how much he was compared to Martin Luther King, Jr., he constantly evaded the reconstitution of his image and ANC policy in terms which were comfortable for the dominant American political agenda. U.S. elites wanted a South Africa safe for capitalism, and antagonis-

Official discourse may claim that "*apartheid* is dead," but the forced relocations, poor housing, high urban crime rate, and endemic rural underemployment and child malnutrition remain.

tic to the PLO, Col. Qaddafi, and Castro. It also became clear to the media here that the resolution of the conflict in South Africa did not rest on one face that reappeared after 27 years in jail, meeting another face, the rehabilitated "other" that is de Klerk. Neither, nor both, of these men have the capacity, the power, or the support to resolve the struggle without reference to their constituencies. The *New Republic's* naive claim¹³ that de Klerk wants to hand over power to Mandela has been shown to be patent nonsense.

The conflict is much more complex. Consensus does not exist at any level in South Africa—neither within the state and its Bantustan allies, nor in the ANC. This is why naive U.S. reporters fail to take into account and analyze the roots of the conflict, and thus serve the interests of the South African state by blaming the victim. The media thereby reinforce the popular white American conception of black Africans as "savages," unable to agree amongst, let alone rule, themselves.

This is the benefit of lifting the emergency media restrictions. The "free flow of information," mostly couched within racial categories, and "law and order" discourse supportive of capitalism, will see to it that the struggle in South Africa can be blamed on blacks fighting blacks, rather than political groupings maneuvering, often violently, to either ensure themselves prominent positions at the negotiating table, or to destroy the move towards negotiations altogether. The South African government could not get better propaganda if they had paid for it.¹⁴ ●

13. March 12, 1990.

14. See generally, Ruth Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli, "The Media and

The 1982 CIA Coup in Chad

Jean Dupuy

France colonized Chad at the end of the last century, primarily for strategic reasons. The French saw the conquest of Chad as a way of linking its territories in equatorial Africa with Algeria. Today Chad remains an area of great strategic importance in north-central Africa, bordering on Libya, the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger.

Chad became nominally independent in 1960, but France retained control of the country. The powers of the government were highly circumscribed; the French controlled the police, the military, and the judiciary. Paris provided vast subsidies to the national budget, controlled the monetary system and international trade, and furnished the personnel who assured essential services.

Chadians therefore continued to live under essentially the same conditions which they had lived under since the country's colonization. By the mid-1960s, there were growing protests and scattered rebellions over the abuses by puppets installed by France, over taxation, over repression, and over the French presence itself.

From 1965 to 1980, the people of Chad, including organizations of every main ethnic group, waged war to bring an end to indirect rule and to the French military presence. The liberation struggle was led by the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT), formed in the Sudan in 1966 under the leadership of Ibrahim Abatcha.

After ten years of warfare, the disparate groups making up FROLINAT, and which to a certain extent had operated independently, held talks in the north of the country and succeeded in forging a common policy. Goukouni Oueddei then assumed overall leadership of FROLINAT.

By 1978, the liberation movement had brought down two French-supported regimes and the French were increasingly pressed to maintain an indirect role. Two years before, the movement also decided that it needed external support to intensify the struggle, especially from Libya and Algeria. Hissène Habré, who was to become the darling of the U.S. years later, objected to this decision and was expelled by the majority in the FROLINAT.¹

Jean Dupuy, a European historian, is an authority on African affairs and U.S. relations with the African continent.

1. Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1977-78* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. B541; and Virginia Thompson and Robert Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, p. 71.

Habré then retired to the eastern region, near the Sudan border, with 300 personal followers. This was the beginning of the independent course which was to be followed by the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) under Habré's command.²

The period between 1978 and 1980 was a troubled one, but Chad was nonetheless striking out along a path of genuine independence. In late 1979, a Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) was formed, after intense positive efforts by neighboring African states, including Nigeria, Libya, and the

Sudan to establish an independent government led by FROLINAT. It was the first government Chad had known since "independence" which was freely established among Chadians, and without the French playing a major role in the process. The second GUNT included representatives of every Chad political grouping.

In 1980, Paris had to withdraw its troops from Chad. However, France had not altogether accepted the fact that neo-colonial rule

had come to an end. The Giscard government sought to undermine Chad's new independence through the use of surrogates, and notably by using the Armed Forces of the North headed by Hissène Habré.

It is well-known that Habré received counsel, money, arms and protection from France.³ The FAN leader was notoriously effective. He repeatedly initiated attacks on the GUNT forces, and these led to widespread conflict.⁴

In 1980, the GUNT requested the assistance of Libya in order to bring an end to Habré's insistent efforts to seize power by force of arms. By the end of the year, the FAN had been defeated, and Habré had fled. Chad seemed to be entering a period of stability.

The 1981 election of François Mitterrand in France seemed to confirm the promise of stability. The French Socialists were publicly committed to non-intervention in Africa.

Tragically, Chad then fell victim to the geopolitical adventurism of the new conservative government in Washington.

2. Legum, Thompson and Adloff agree in their estimates of FAN strength at this time.

3. The point is made explicitly in Bernard Lann, "Chad: Recent History," in *Africa South of the Sahara*, 1982-83. See also, Thompson and Adloff, op. cit., n. 1, chapter 4, "The Process of Disintegration."

4. This is the view of most informed observers. See, for instance, Lann. Also: *Africa Research Bulletin* (United Kingdom), 1979 and 1980.



Associated Press

Ndjamena, Chad, December 4, 1990. Idriss Déby, Chadian guerrilla leader chats with French Foreign Legion officer after deposing U.S. puppet Habré. After 25 years of war, Chad has again won independence.

The U.S. Destabilization of Libya

When the Reagan administration took office in 1981, the U.S. embarked upon a campaign to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the government of Libya. The motives behind this campaign were in large part geopolitical. The new administration held the view that a friendly government in Libya was vital to the protection of American interests in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵ It did not regard the Libyan Jamahiriya as sufficiently friendly, and set about the familiar process of making war on those who stand in the way of U.S. designs and U.S. power.

The Reagan administration was particularly concerned about the implication of Habré's defeat in Chad. And, according to one observer, it was Libya's assistance to Chad "that galvanized the U.S. policy change" toward Libya.⁶ It was therefore almost inevitable that the uncertain situation in Chad would attract U.S. interest in early 1981.

Washington had been flirting with the idea of taking hostile action against Libya for some time. The CIA, in cooperation with France and Egypt, had been involved in other schemes to destabilize Libya in the 1970s.⁷ On the whole, however, the Carter administration had followed a mixed and "flexible" policy. The policy adopted by the Reagan administration was far more ambitious than any previous plans to interfere in Libya. It constituted a major shift in policy and involved a wide range of overt and covert actions.

5. Discussed at length in Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?" *International Affairs* (London), winter 1981-82, esp. pp. 19-25.

6. David Ignatius, "The U.S. Seeks to Mobilize Opponents of Khadafy in Libya and Outside," *Wall Street Journal*, July 20, 1981.

7. Roger Faligot, "The Plot to Unseat Qaddafi," *The Middle East* (London), August 1981.

The tone of official policy towards Libya became overtly hostile in the spring of 1981. The Washington correspondent of New York's *Daily News* reported in May that "top United States officials have begun describing Khadafy as a 'cancer that has to be cut out.'... The Reagan administration is drafting a secret strategy to use Egypt and other moderate Arab states to topple the regime..."⁸

By the early summer of 1981, the general outlines of the U.S. government's anti-Libya strategy were becoming known as the result of a series of "leaks," some genuine and some deliberately misleading.

The *Washington Post* described this strategy as "a plan involving the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. resources to oust Qaddafi and reverse Libyan policy."⁹ Newsweek described the U.S. program as a "large-scale, multi-phase and costly scheme to overthrow the Libyan regime of Colonel Kaddafi." It was, according to that magazine, "a classic CIA destabilization scheme."¹⁰

U.S. officials at the time did, perhaps obligatorily, deny some media reports. However, the nature and number of "leaks" in the second half of 1981, as well as the increasingly hostile declaratory policy of the U.S., made it clear that President Reagan had approved a hostile and aggressive plan of action against Libya. As Peterzell said:

...a comprehensive review of press accounts leaves little doubt that a major covert action program was proposed and that the target was Libya.¹¹

Events in 1981 demonstrated that a large-scale program aimed at Libya was being rapidly implemented. The U.S. urged its NATO allies not to allow Colonel Qaddafi to make State visits to their countries.¹² The new French government was asked to continue the embargo on arms deliveries to Libya instituted by Giscard d'Estaing.¹³ The Italian government was asked not to deliver military spare parts to Libya.¹⁴ U.S. oil companies were also asked to withdraw personnel from Libya.

U.S. diplomats tried to persuade various African states to move motions of censure against Libya before the June 1981 summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity. They urged African governments to seek to change the site of the 1982 OAU summit from Tripoli to Dakar.¹⁵ The U.S. also made a

8. Lars-Erik Nelson, "U.S. Drafting Strategy to Aid Bid to Ax Khadafy," *Daily News* (New York), May 17, 1981.

9. Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Has Sought to Pressure Qaddafi," *Washington Post*, August 20, 1981.

10. "A Plan to Overthrow Kaddafi," *Newsweek*, August 3, 1981.

11. Jay Peterzell, "Reagan's Covert Action Policy (III): Libya," *First Principles* (Washington, Center for National Security Studies, March 1982), p. 1.

12. Wright, *op. cit.*, n. 5, p. 13, fn. 1.

13. *Ibid.* Wright reported that U.S. officials made this point to the new French Foreign Minister, in Washington on June 4, 1981.

14. *Ibid.* Also, *New York Times*, November 1, 1981.

15. *Ibid.*, n. 5, p. 14, fn. 8, which cites "private communications from OAU member State officials."

major effort, using offers of military and economic aid as well as diplomatic pressure, to persuade Liberia to break relations with Libya and to expel its diplomats.¹⁶ Then, on May 12, 1981, the Liberian President ordered the closing of the Libyan People's Bureau in his capital.

In the same month, amid an intense anti-Libya campaign in the media, the Reagan administration ordered the closing of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington.

At this time as it was seeking to isolate Libya through propaganda and political action, the U.S. began to apply direct military pressure against it. The late President Anwar Sadat revealed only a few weeks after the event that the U.S. had sent AWACS aircraft to Egypt to monitor the Sudanese and Egyptian borders with Libya at the end of May.¹⁷ In August, American aircraft from a carrier off the Libyan coast shot down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sirte. Shortly after the October assassination of President Sadat, the U.S. again sent AWACS aircraft to Egypt to monitor the Libyan border. In November, a large-scale, joint military exercise involving several thousand American troops and Egyptian and Sudanese units was held in the Western desert of Egypt, an area from which Egypt had previously made armored attacks into Libya.

By mid-1982, it was evident that the plan rumored a year before was a fact. The U.S. was seen using military, political, diplomatic, propaganda, subversive and paramilitary means to undermine the Libyan regime.

Despite the considerable resources devoted to the U.S. campaign, the Reagan administration achieved only limited success. It did create political difficulties for Libya, and new economic and technological problems there as well. However, it made little headway toward the objective of overthrowing the Libyan government. The principal reason for this failure, of course, was the U.S. inability to undermine internal public support for the government. In fact, it appears that U.S. actions rallied large numbers of Libyans to the present leadership.

To increase pressure, the U.S. decided to launch attacks on Libya's southern border — not so much as an invasion but as constant harassment. From bases in Chad, "friendly" Libyans would attack on areas across the border. To that end, the Reagan administration began providing extensive covert support to Habré's FAN after its defeat at the hands of the GUNT at the end of 1980.¹⁸

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15, fn. 9.

17. Sadat made this public on television. See transcript, "Meet the Press," NBC, August 9, 1981, p. 6.

18. Discussed in greater detail below.



Associated Press

Al Geneina, western Sudan, November 13, 1981. Chadian refugees compete for necessities. Chad's struggle for independence lasted from 1965 to 1980. When stability returned the U.S. got involved and derailed the chance to end such privation.

The CIA Coup

In the autumn of 1980, as GUNT forces were pushing the FAN toward Chad's borders, it seemed that the Chadian people could finally look forward to peace. With reconciliation under way between the south and the rest of the country and a government which all sides supported, the prospects for stability and the resumption of normal life were good. After 16 years of war and chaos, Chad seemed to be entering a new era.

Yet the country was not to be left in peace. The forces which would eventually overturn its first independent government were already being unleashed. Beginning in early 1981, the Reagan administration secretly prepared a *coup d'état* to further its own geopolitical ambitions. Washington had two objectives. It wanted to unseat what it saw as a radical and possibly dangerous government in order to install a "friendly one." It also wanted to create the conditions which would permit it to mount an attack across Libya's southern border.

The U.S. covert operation was, in fact, the continuation of a plan set in motion by Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand's predecessor. It seems that the two plans even overlapped for some months.

According to French sources, the d'Estaing government was preparing to rescue Habré well before the GUNT succeeded in driving him out of Chad. In the beginning of 1981, France's *Service de Documentation Exterieur et de Contre-espionnage*, the SDECE, had formulated a plan to change the course of Chad's history yet again. Their plan was a classic of manipulation. It called for the following steps:

● Habré's main force was in Ndjamena; if it was forced to flee the capital, it was to be flown by the SDECE to the Sudan and to eastern Chad;

● there Habré's forces, which at the time numbered 3,000 men (and not 5,000 as claimed at the time by Western "diplomats") were to be re-equipped and rearmed;

● Habré was then to restart the war;

● the main political aim was to forge an alliance between Habré and Colonel Wadal Kamougoue, the leader of the Armed Forces of Chad (FAT) and a member of the GUNT;

● this alliance was then to be used to create difficulties for Goukouni Oueddei;

● the leader of the GUNT would then be obliged to call on France to intervene and restore order;

● the plan would thus make it possible to "separate Goukouni from the Libyans" ("d'arracher Goukouni des Libyens").¹⁹

By June 1981, the first steps of this plan had already been implemented. Many FAN troops had been brought out of Cameroon in transports chartered by the SDECE. Re-equipment and rearmament were proceeding.

The Mitterrand government may have initially resisted further implementation of the SDECE plan. It was divided over how to deal with Chad and Libya. Influential members of the government believed that France could not again afford to become involved in the Chad quagmire. Some thought the SDECE plan absurd.²⁰

Nonetheless, the plan seems somehow to have continued. It was the CIA which took over the responsibility for pressing on with a modified version of it.

The U.S. program to overthrow the GUNT was apparently authorized in the spring of 1981. The principal responsibility for carrying it out was given to the CIA. A "senior official in the Reagan administration" confirmed a link between the CIA and Hissène Habré in August of 1983.²¹ The official stated that:

The United States at one time backed Mr. Habré with Central Intelligence Agency funds when he was operating out of the Sudan and Libyan forces were in Chad.²²

The U.S. plan involved both overt and covert activities. In addition to the CIA, a number of other U.S. agencies were involved, including the Department of Defense.

Informed sources state that total expenditure on covert action against Chad had run in "tens of millions of dollars by the end of 1982." In 1983, CBS-TV provided partial confirmation of this estimate. Its Pentagon correspondent reported in June of that year that the original appropriation for assistance to Habré was \$10 million. He stated that a further \$12 million was ap-

19. Outline of the plan based on interviews in Paris by the author.

20. Some informed sources in Paris made this point privately at the time.

21. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Sees Chad as a Portent of Qaddafi's Ambition," *New York Times*, August 19, 1983.

22. *Ibid.*

propriated for a CIA operation to control the OAU peacekeeping force in Chad in 1981 and 1982.²³

Published reports at the time also indicated that covert action in Chad was part of a larger strategy aimed at the destabilization of Libya. In a 1982 article on CIA paramilitary operations, *Newsweek* stated that the CIA had aimed "two separate covert actions" at Libya. One of these "was designed to stir up trouble for him [Colonel Qaddafi] in Chad."²⁴

The overthrow of the GUNT in Chad was carried out in two stages. During the first, the U.S. and its allies reinforced and re-equipped the FAN, even as some FAN elements continued minor skirmishing inside Chad. At the same time, they worked to secure the withdrawal of the protection provided by Libya to the Chad government.

After the Libyan withdrawal from Chad, in November 1981, these powers helped the FAN to launch an offensive aimed at gaining control of the country. A peacekeeping force of the OAU was then brought in, ostensibly to preserve order. It was, in fact, to be used to undermine the GUNT.

The CIA operation in the Sudan may have begun even before the larger covert action program was authorized in 1981. Much of the FAN moved to bases in the Sudan at the end of 1980. The FAN began receiving arms there almost as soon as it arrived in the SDECE's transports.²⁵ An analyst in the Naval Postgraduate School confirmed this early in 1983; David Yost stated at the time that, "During the December 1980-December 1981 period, Habré's FAN operated from bases in Sudan, with Egyptian and Sudanese support."²⁶ Speaking in March 1981, the Egyptian Foreign Minister confirmed that his country had already been providing arms to the FAN.²⁷

Much of this support, of course, was actually being provided by the U.S. Egypt and the Sudan were simply being used by the U.S. — for purposes of deniability — as channels of covert assistance to the Chadian rebels.²⁸ A 1983 statement by a "senior official in the Reagan Administration" makes it clear that these were, for the most part, CIA operations.²⁹

By September 1981, a strengthened FAN, operating in the eastern areas of Chad, was beginning to give a better account of itself. GUNT forces in those areas were "under severe military

23. David Martin, transcript, CBS Evening News, June 27, 1983.

24. "A Secret War for Nicaragua," *Newsweek*, November 8, 1982.

25. The Egyptian Defense Ministry told reporters in January 1981 that it had already shipped a first batch of arms to the FAN "in the southeast." The FAN in fact was in Darfur province of the Sudan. See Olfat Tohamy, "Egypt Sees Threat to Sudan after Libyan Push into Chad," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 23, 1981.

26. David Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), winter 1983, p. 968.

27. "Egypt Admits Aiding Chad Opposition Forces," *Washington Post*, March 17, 1982.

28. "Goukouni Fighting Back," *New African*, June 1983. Also, *Economist Foreign Report*, October 7, 1982.

29. Because these operations involved arms transfers, the Department of Defense is also likely to have been involved.

pressure.”³⁰ The FAN again posed a serious potential military danger to the government.

However, despite the substantial foreign aid he was receiving, Habré had no hope at that time of mounting a campaign which would gain him control of the country. As long as Libya continued to provide military assistance, the GUNT could feel more or less secure. The Libyan presence thus threatened to frustrate the U.S. covert action program against Chad.

The U.S., in consequence, set about trying to remove what it saw as the Libyan “obstruction.” It enlisted the assistance of the new government of France.³¹ France then proposed to the GUNT that it should request the withdrawal of Libyan forces. Though the Chadian government strongly resisted the idea at first, it was subjected to great pressure. It was also offered inducements: new aid and an African peacekeeping force to replace Libyan forces.

Finally, in early November 1981, the GUNT agreed to the French proposals. It asked Libya to withdraw. Tripoli, expressing strong reservations, complied in less than two weeks.³²

The FAN then quickly passed to the offensive. In December 1981, Habré’s forces captured Faya Largeau, cutting the road from Ndjamená to the north. It was at that point which the controversial OAU peacekeeping force was brought to Chad, and another part of the U.S. plan was put into effect.³³ According to a 1982 report from London, the U.S. intended from the beginning to use the peacekeeping force to help overthrow the Chad government.³⁴

The OAU “intervention Force” was given a vague mandate to maintain security in Chad. However, the U.S., which was paying much of the cost, gave the force a secret mandate to tip the balance within Chad against the GUNT. According to *Africa Now*, the OAU force was:

- “not to take any step that could aid the stability of GUNT, the Government of National Unity of the Chad of Goukouni [Oueddei], in whom the White House had ‘no confidence’ ”;

- “tacitly to aid the FAN, the National Armed Forces of Hissène Habré, so that it could, supported by Nimeiri’s Sudan, gain control of a larger part of the country and thus be in a better position when it eventually comes to negotiations between GUNT and FAN”;

- “to give active, if secret, support to any of the Chad military who declare their intention of staging a coup against [Oueddei].”³⁵

It can be said in retrospect that this is exactly what the OAU

30. “Chad: Co-ordinated Opposition Planned,” *Africa Research Bulletin*, October 1981, pp. 6175-76.

31. Wright, *op. cit.*, n. 5, pp. 31-38.

32. “Tchad: le Depart des Troupes Libyennes,” *Afrique Contemporaine* (Paris), Documentation Française, November-December 1981, pp. 18-19.

33. The OAU only agreed to send this force under considerable pressure from the U.S. and France. See Lisa Anderson, “Libya and American Foreign Policy,” *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Middle East Institute, autumn 1982, p. 529.

34. “Chad: U.S. Plans for a Split State,” *Africa Now* (London), June 1982.

35. *Ibid.*

The Libyan presence thus threatened to frustrate the U.S. covert action program against Chad.

force did. Instead of enforcing a ceasefire and blocking the advance of the FAN towards Ndjamená, the OAU stood aside and allowed it to move forward. At the same time, it sought to create the illusion that it was actually helping the government of Chad. The Zairian contingent was suspected of actively helping the FAN.³⁶

In February 1982, having arrived in Chad on the pretense of protecting the GUNT, the OAU reversed its policy and, in effect, recognized Hissène Habré as a legitimate protagonist in a “civil war.”³⁷ At a meeting in Nairobi, the OAU *ad hoc* committee on Chad went beyond its proper mandate and called for a ceasefire, negotiations “between the parties,” and even elections. It was thus putting the GUNT and Habré on an equal footing.

This move was the closing of the American trap. The OAU had been used to provide the screen behind which Habré safely advanced to challenge the GUNT, all the while receiving aid from the CIA.

Three months later, the FAN had reached the outskirts of Ndjamená. In the beginning of June, it seized the capital. The OAU peacekeeping force did nothing. *West Africa* aptly summed up the role played by the OAU in the Chad debacle:

The result was that the OAU force ended up providing the fig leaf of respectability for Habré’s march on Ndjamená (with Egyptian-Sudanese-Saudi-U.S. backing)...³⁸

Few observers at the time realized that the OAU’s apparent ineptitude and blundering were actually part of a carefully orchestrated effort by the U.S. to overthrow the government of Chad, a government which the people of that country had struggled for 16 years to achieve.

36. The U.S. appears to have financed the Zaire contingent. See transcript, *op. cit.*, n. 23.

37. “Whither Chad, post-Nairobi?” *West Africa* (Lagos), February 22, 1982.

38. “Nigeria, Chad and Africa,” *West Africa*, November 1, 1982.

● PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

This Is the Just Cause – Breaking the Silence: Testimony of the Panamanian people resulting from the U.S.A. invasion (San José, Costa Rica: Commission for the Defence of Human Rights in Central America [CODEHUCA], 1990) 119 pp., black & white and color photos.

From the opening description of “This most unjust of ‘Just Causes’ ”...“done under the permissive cloak of silence and complicity,” this courageous documentary study conveys the experience of the Panamanian people and the ghastly human cost of the invasion with detailed, first-hand testimonies of the onslaught. Deeply disturbing but indispensable. Available from: CODEHUCA, Aptdo. Postal 189, Paseo de los Estudiantes, San José, Costa Rica.

Breathing Space for Africa?

Jane Hunter

Africa. For all its vast size and its weight in the world, it was the pea that fell off the President's fork as he bit down on Iraq. Before the Gulf crisis began last August, it seemed certain the 1990s would be an American decade in Africa. The Cold War was over and the Soviets were going home. European attention was riveted on Eastern Europe. For African governments needing aid there was only one address, Washington, even though U.S. interest in the continent was waning. Now, the Bush administration is swapping and shedding its African dominions to build its coalition against Iraq. The result may be a decade in which Libya plays a leading role.

The most compelling manifestation of this change has been in Chad. In December a complaisant administration allowed insurgents favored by France and Libya to topple a key pillar of its African policy, forcing it to hastily dispose of an anti-Libyan contra force it had based there.

Yet the administration has also been strangely silent as Libya, its old archenemy, positions itself to become the major benefactor of Zaire, whose president, Mobutu Sese Seko, provides political support and bases for the CIA to use in its long-running guerrilla war against Angola. During the Reagan years, while U.S. military aid to Africa declined overall, aid to Zaire and Chad increased,¹ signifying the importance of U.S. covert programs in both countries.

Liberia also got lavish amounts of U.S. aid in the 1980s, in this case to outbid the U.S.S.R. and Libya. U.S. Marines sat offshore for months,² while the National Patriotic Front (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor consolidated its hold on most of the country. Taylor's backers are Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Togo. Nevertheless, after dispatching soldiers supposedly as human rights advisers to help U.S.-installed and long-time client President Samuel Doe (since executed) in the early weeks of the conflict against Taylor,³ the U.S. has been notably passive.

It has not tried to counter Libya by backing, beyond lip service, the West African "peacekeeping" forces in control in the capital, Monrovia, or by supporting the interim Liberian government under its protection.⁴ Charles Taylor has charged that the

U.S. provided intelligence to the West African forces,⁵ but the Bush administration is content that Taylor's forces have not damaged its installations there, according to a senior congressional aide.⁶ These include a 1,400-foot tower that serves as a back-up guidance system for nuclear submarines and radio relay transmitters that handle U.S. intelligence and diplomatic communications for all of sub-Saharan Africa.⁷ The CIA's station in Liberia is and for years has been its largest in Africa. It is composed of numerous regional telecommunications personnel, as well as a fluctuating complement of operations officers assigned to work in the country.

It is hardly surprising that Libya would back an alternative to Doe, who welcomed a significant Israeli presence in Liberia. What is extraordinary is that Libya's partners in the enterprise were, until recently, reckoned to be in the anti-Libyan camp. Four years ago Togo reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel, receiving in exchange Israeli bodyguards for President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who had recently been shaken by an attempted *coup d'état*. In July, President George Bush received Eyadéma at the White House.⁸ At the same time Togo was building an amicable relationship with Libya; the Togolese information minister is reportedly a friend of Libya's foreign minister.⁹

In October 1987, President Blaise Compaoré assassinated and supplanted Burkina Faso's President Thomas Sankara—a star in the progressive galaxy and a friend of Libya. He was welcomed as a friend of the West. Compaoré was particularly close to President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, himself in power since 1960 and a close friend of South Africa, the U.S. and of their allies Israel and anti-Angolan guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi.¹⁰ Last year Burkina Faso and Togo reportedly aided Chadian President Idriss Déby in his successful fight against Washington's man Hissène Habré.¹¹

When the U.S. cut Somalia's aid in 1989¹² (citing human rights abuses that were bearable before the Cold War ended¹³),

5. UPI, October 22, 1990.

6. Speaking on background, this aide attributed Washington's failure last summer to prevent the wholesale slaughter and subsequent starvation of many civilians in Monrovia to the lack of initiative of U.S. diplomats there.

7. *New York Times*, June 13, 1990. *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, Ellen Ray, et. al., Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1979, pp. 502-504. As this article goes to press, a knowledgeable source related to the author that the U.S. intelligence installations are still functioning as they were before the recent political developments in Liberia unfolded.

8. AP, July 31, 1990.

9. *Africa Confidential*, December 21, 1990.

10. *Jeune Afrique* (Paris), September 10, 1986; *Le Monde*, June 16, 1985. Savimbi frequently passes through Abidjan on his visits to the U.S. and Europe.

11. *Africa Confidential*, December 7, 1990.

12. *New York Times*, January 1, 1991.

13. *The Nation*, November 7, 1988 reports on government troop massacres of civilians and renewed U.S. military aid.

Jane Hunter is editor of the independent monthly report *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, available for \$20 a year from PO Box 19580, Sacramento, CA 95819.

1. *Africa Analysis* (London), October 2, 1987.

2. The Marines evacuated U.S. civilians from Monrovia and from time to time ferried inadequate amounts of food to the capital.

3. *West Africa* (London), March 12-18, 1990; *Africa Confidential* (London), April 20, 1990; United Press International (UPI), May 9, 1990.

4. Associated Press (AP), September 14, 1990, reported administration support for the decision of the Economic Community of West African States to send its peacekeeping force to Liberia. This was reiterated by Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen when he arrived in the area for a brief attempt to negotiate an end to the fighting AP, September 20, 1990.

President Siad Barré turned to Libya and reportedly obtained armored vehicles.¹⁴ According to one report, Libya agreed to supply arms and advisers in exchange for a Somali pledge not to renew the U.S. lease on military facilities at the port of Berbera when it expires in 1991.¹⁵ Whether the U.S. will want to renew the lease is questionable. Since 1989, it has slashed the staff of its brand new embassy—with three swimming pools and a golf course—from 450¹⁶ down to 30.¹⁷

Barré had previously supplemented his U.S. military aid with South African weapons, pilots and engineers. When insurgent groups pressed their fight to the capital Mogadishu at the turn of the year, South African and “Rhodesian” mercenaries were reportedly still flying for Barré and maintaining his aircraft.¹⁸ Libya, possibly looking beyond the government’s numbered days, said it was trying to send food into Mogadishu.¹⁹ Libya has consistently denied military involvement in Somalia.


Nelson Mandela’s visit to Tripoli last spring and his thanks to Muammar Qaddafi for giving “military training to South Africans who wanted to obtain their liberation through armed struggle,”²⁰ was a powerful boost to Libya’s prestige. It came when, according to the Voice of America, Libya was trying to improve relations with “black African states.”²¹ Botswana’s President Quett Masire paid a state visit to Libya in July.²²

Libya has established good relations with Uganda, whose president Yoweri Museveni is currently chair of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Museveni recently hosted Qaddafi for a discussion of Libya’s form of government with 278 Ugandan officials. After Qaddafi described how the Libyan People’s Committees function, Museveni said, “This is something we should think about... [W]e should remember that the original Greek city governments were like this...”²³

In November, Libya announced it would give Rwanda financial and medical aid to help it settle returning refugees.²⁴ This is a challenge to Rwanda’s ruling Hutu government, which has said it has no room to accommodate hundreds of thousands of

Tutsi refugees, several thousand of whom have been fighting an insurgent war.²⁵

Libya has encountered serious adversity only in Ethiopia and Burundi, which broke relations in 1989 after accusing Libya of supporting comeback plans of deposed Burundian President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza.²⁶ Libyan diplomats were expelled from Addis Ababa last April, after a bomb went off near the Israeli ambassador’s hotel room. The two countries were already at odds over Sudan,²⁷ where Libya is the government’s strongest supporter, while Ethiopia, Israel and the U.S. support the southern Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.



Oxfam

The Decade that Was to Be

As the 1990s dawned, two potent weapons—debt and low commodities prices—were expected to aid Washington in foiling moves by poorer countries to take advantage of the end of the Cold War to renew their struggle for more equitable North-South economic relations. Concomitantly, the U.S. press has devoted whole forests of paper to delighting in the death of communism, but barely a twig to the failure of capitalist “reform” in Africa.

By the 1980s, the debts that African governments were encouraged to take on in the 1970s began to eat up their export earnings and their hopes of growth and development. With its political control of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and influence in the World Bank, the U.S. was well-placed to demand that debtors implement “structural adjustment” as a condition for new lending, debt rescheduling and aid. Public sector cutbacks were supposed to end the drain of funds into inefficient state enterprises and overstuffed government bureaucracies.

However, now it is clear these programs are in reality punitive. By dismantling social programs, they have seriously eroded such standard-of-living indices as infant mortality and education.²⁸ Nor have they produced the promised economic renaissance. Senegal is regarded as a “model student” of the IMF and the World Bank—and, after ten years of structural adjustment, has been rewarded for its efforts with higher foreign aid than its African neighbors. It is now in an economic crisis.²⁹

In Ghana, another generously-aided star pupil, 12.5% of the unionized workforce has been laid off since 1983 and real wages have fallen by more than 30% in the last four years.³⁰ Still, the World Bank resident economist said he (continued on page 36)

14. *Le Monde*, November 18, 1989.

15. *Africa Confidential*, December 21, 1990.

16. AP, December 13, 1990.

17. *New York Times*, *op. cit.*, n. 7.

18. *Africa Analysis*, June 12, 1987; *The Independent* (London), December 22, 1989, cited by *The Star* (Johannesburg), in ANC News Briefing; *BBC Focus on Africa*, 1615 Universal Coordinated Time (UCT), December 18, 1990, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) FBIS-AFR.

19. United Press International (UPI), January 2, 1991.

20. UPI, *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 19, 1990.

21. Voice of America, 1633 UCT, May 18, 1990.

22. JANA (Tripoli), 1646 UCT, July 5, 1990, FBIS-NES.

23. *The New Vision* (Kampala), October 26, 1990, FBIS-AFR.

24. Kinshasa Domestic Service, 0500 UCT, November 28, 1990, FBIS-AFR.

25. UPI, October 29, 1990.


26. *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 6, 1989.

27. *Jerusalem Post*, April 2, 1990.

28. *Los Angeles Times*, “World Report,” July 17, 1990; *Financial Times* (London), September 24, 1990.


29. *Africa International* (Paris), December 1990.

30. *West Africa*, July 23-29, 1990.




ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

"Insure [sic] that the mailings are made under secure conditions [using] commercially purchased envelopes which cannot be traced to the source... [U]se envelopes produced by the New Left or college organizations which would logically have an interest in the organizations ridiculed in your cartoons." (Director FBI to Special Agent in Charge (SAC), San Diego, February 20, 1969)



"...suggests that possibly [Bobby] SEALE is himself a "police agent" and in addition to demanding substantial amounts of money from the local BPP membership, is also passing information on to local police authorities.... Provided it will in no way jeopardize informants, each office is requested to furnish San Diego the names and home addresses of the five most prominent leaders or a suitable substitute of the BPP in your area." (COINTELPRO Black Nationalist - Hate Groups Racial Intelligence, "From SAC, San Diego to FBI Director, March 3, 1969)



This campaign attempted to discredit BPP breakfast program. Copies were sent to local businesses which donated food for ghetto school children.

The Art Roz


The Federal Bureau of Investigation is more commonly associated with crime than with art. But, in its 1960s and 1970s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), FBI artists produced art for criminal purposes.

These propaganda posters, produced secretly by Bureau artists and distributed by "racial squads" were designed—according to an August 1969 memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover—to "disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize" dissent movements. Organizations were damaged, lives were ruined and people were killed as a result of the propaganda campaign waged by the government against those it decided were a threat to the American way of life.

During this period, when the country was rocked by the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements, one of the FBI's most systematic attacks was directed against the militant Black Panther Party (BPP) and other organizations it labeled "black extremist groups."

Crude posters and leaflets like these were mailed to community leaders, specific individuals, and left on subways and "in restaurants frequented by Negroes." The FBI disinformation was in many cases not only maliciously false; it was murderously dangerous.

Roz Payne is a constable in Vermont and teaches the History College. For years, she has indexed and computerized COINTELPRO. FBI Criminal Art is available for display. For further information contact...



Donald Freed is an award winning playwright and historian. He was a member of a Panther support group in the 1960s. This pamphlet "was aimed to drive the Panthers into murder," said Freed. "Then the secret police would have the Panthers and they would also get rid of a white activist." From FBI memo: "DON FREED is a Key Activist... It is the desire of the Los Angeles Office to neutralize FREED by the distribution of a throwaway accusing FREED of being an informant. (Memorandum, "COINTELPRO Internal Security, Disruption of the New Left," from SAC, Los Angeles to Director, FBI, July 9, 1969)

of Crime

Payne

In the early 1980s, federal courts ordered the release of many COINTELPRO documents as a result of civil suits like the one brought by Dhoruba bin-Wahad (see story on page 12). Dhoruba, a former member of the Black Panther Party, served 19 years in jail before he won a reversal of his conviction. Inspired by these civil suits, individuals and groups wrote for their FBI files under the Freedom of Information Act.

Although great chunks of text are blacked out by government censors, the documents indexed and collected by the author into a database reveal how the government misused its vast powers to repress legitimate dissent and control the population. While COINTELPRO operations officially ended in 1971, the FBI continues to disrupt and undermine protest in the United States through new programs like COMTEL and TOPLEV. (See CAIB #31)

As a new anti-war movement is growing and groups are being targeted both for dissent and simply because of their ethnic background, the COINTELPRO program and the disinformation techniques the FBI employed gain a new relevancy far beyond their historical value.

... of the 1960s and the Black Panther Party at Burlington
PRO files. A 25-piece exhibition of these and other works of
contact: Roz Payne, P.O. Box 164, Richmond, VT 05477.



JORGE A PONTE



ROBERT COLLIER



DAVID BROTHERS

DANGER

BLACK MILITANTS BEWARE

THE THREE people pictured above are paid ~~paid~~ informants who are furnishing information to the POLICE about their BLACK BROTHERS.

They are left to right

① JORGE APONTE - born 10/4/41 in NY and lives with wife Barbara at 1077 BERGEN ST BROOKLYN. He is 5'8" 140 lbs and a Lt. in BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

② ROBERT COLLIER - born 1/27/37 Boston, Mass and lives with wife ROMONA in APT 2B - 336 E. 8th ST. New York City. He is 5'11" 170 lbs and works at 501 E 4th STREET, New York City.

③ DAVID BROTHERS - born 12/25/19 NY lives with wife JENNIE in Apt 7 M - 333 LA FAYETTE AVE, BROOKLYN. He works in CORNELL CLUB OF NY and is in BLACK PANTHERS

Wanted Poster: "It is felt that this counterintelligence measure will at least cast some doubt as to the loyalty of [redacted] It may cause them great concern and might even cause them to cease their associations with Black extremist groups. The total impact might even prove deeper within the Black Panther Party Organization." The New York FBI office produced 3,000 copies of this circular. They were left on subways where people "tend to read anything. Other circulars will be left in restaurants where Negroes are known to frequent (Chock Full 'o Nuts)." ("Counterintelligence Program Black Nationalist - Hate Groups Racial Intelligence," From Director FBI to SAC, New York, December 12, 1968)

OAKLAND CONFERENCE
JULY 18-21




SURE GLAD YOU WHITE
DELEGATES COULD COME

The following two posters are part of a series produced by the FBI to stir up racism and sexual jealousy and thereby divide the movement. "...[U]pon receipt [of] Bureau approval [posters] will be anonymously mailed to New Left leaders planning attendance [at a BPP conference on July 18, 1969]."

As a new anti-war movement is growing and groups are being targeted both for dissent and simply because of ethnic background, the COINTELPRO program and the disinformation techniques the FBI employed gain a new relevance far beyond their historical value.

REGISTRATION
FOR CONFERENCE




SORRY, YOU CAN'T ATTEND THE CONFERENCE,
YOU DIDN'T DONATE A WHITE GIRL FOR
US. PANTHERS

"Caricatures' purpose [is] to attack stated aims [of] BPP to allow white groups to function in subordinate positions only and cooperation must include 'use' of white women by BPP members." (To Director, Detroit, New York, San Diego, San Francisco via Washington from Chicago, June 26, 1969)

could not see Ghana surmounting its economic problems for the next 25 years.³¹

Privatization, a standard North-inspired "reform," has not worked in Africa. One of the main reasons for its failure is that investors do not want to cope with the crumbling roads, low water supply, and sometimes faulty telephone and electrical systems which a legacy of Western policy. Many infrastructural projects were designed to benefit companies in donor countries rather than to serve local interests. Often, too, western contractors followed the example of their governments, corrupting African leaders to get the go-ahead for projects. Long-term—less profitable—maintenance was seldom included in contracts. Now, because foreign exchange earnings are consumed by interest payments (and corrupt officials), there is no money to order spare parts for upkeep from foreign suppliers. Further, technical expertise and management remained in the hands of external owners.

Foreign exchange is also scarce because of 15 years of plummeting world market prices of the basic commodities providing the bulk of African nations' export earnings. Some Africans view this economic trend as even more debilitating than their crippling debts. And there is no question that their creditors, Washington and its industrial-



Associated Press

Ndjamen, Chad. Houses damaged in civil war.

ized allies, have total control of the commodities markets.³²

Despite a decade of negative development, Washington has given no sign of abandoning "structural adjustment" as the bedrock of its Africa policy. Perhaps this is because while privatization and bureaucratic pruning have been economically disastrous for Africa, they have been politically productive for Washington. These blame-the-victim precepts have not only provided political leverage; they have undermined assumptions of social responsibility and reciprocity basic to socialism and to many traditional African societies, and have sapped the strength of governments to react politically to the insidious policies.

Where economic subjugation might not suffice, U.S. plans for the 1990s included the possibility of military intervention. It was not that post-Cold War Africa was deemed particularly important. Rather a military establishment faced with cutbacks—the all-but-forgotten "peace dividend"—was in need of fresh purpose. Throughout the 1980s, Congress had urged it to develop small military units deployable for "low-intensity warfare."³³

31. *West Africa*, January 7-13, 1990. See also *Financial Times*, August 13, 1990.

32. Interviews by the author with businesspeople in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, March 1990; *Financial Times*, June 19, 1990 (which does not stress the issue of control).

33. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Low Intensity Warfare*, (New York, Pantheon, 1988); Steven Emerson, *Secret Warriors*, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1988.

Now that the Pentagon was searching for ways to justify its massive budgets, Africans apparently seemed handy for target practice. In early 1990 the 3rd Special Forces Group, deactivated since the end of the Vietnam War, was reformed to specialize in Africa. Maj. Bill Chadwick, the commander in charge of the new Green Beret unit, said that in addition to training and advising foreign armies, units such as his were ready to organize guerrilla wars or to aid developing countries in stopping them.

As he was organizing plans which in all likelihood will result in the deaths of thousands of Africans, he bizarrely noted that there was much malnutrition-induced brain damage in Africa.³⁴

Pluralism Can Be Cumbersome

Before the Bush administration dropped everything to rush off to war in the Persian Gulf, one of the key questions about its Africa policy was how it would handle the continent's sudden and almost unanimous adoption of political pluralism. African students and activists had been inspired by the way mass demonstrations in Eastern Europe in 1989 had brought bloodless changes in government. In 1990, in country after country, the popular call for similar nonviolent change evoked an enormous response from economically and politically frustrated citizens. Massive street demonstrations and strikes erupted across Africa, forcing rulers to make concessions. The cheapest available reform was provisionally allowing rival political parties to function.

This was not really an ideological struggle. As one activist in Côte d'Ivoire explained last March, dissidents merely hoped open elections would rid them of a political clique that had been transferring much of the country's wealth into personal accounts abroad. They hoped the West would be embarrassed into supporting them because of the contradiction between insistence on democracy in Eastern Europe and an attitude of *laissez-faire* acceptance in Africa.

Washington had been content to deal with the autocrats it had always supported and to have free elections continue on the list of human rights that, when it came to Africa, the U.S. has traditionally ignored. At the State Department's April 13, 1990 noon briefing, a reporter asked whether the U.S. would express sympathy for the demands for pluralism in Côte d'Ivoire and several other countries. "I frankly don't think we'll want to insert ourselves into the specific situations in those countries," replied Richard Boucher.³⁵ No one present remarked on the hypocrisy and racism of this study in foreign policy contradiction.

34. *News & Observer* (Raleigh, North Carolina), April 15, 1990.

35. Aired on C-SPAN, April 13, 1990.

Later, the administration half-heartedly climbed on the bandwagon. "The path to development and the path to democracy are one and the same," President Bush told Togo's President Eyadéma last summer. However, when the U.S. ambassador in Kenya pressed President Daniel Arap Moi, one of Africa's few holdouts against pluralism, to liberalize the political system, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen hastened to Nairobi to soothe Moi. Washington "does not wish to prescribe the form of government that Kenya or any other country should adopt," he said.³⁶

Why Moi needed placating brings up the intriguing but probably unlikely notion that the Bush administration has a lingering interest in RENAMO, the bloodthirsty proxy force South Africa set on Mozambique soon after it attained independence in 1975. The Kenyan government has often been reported to be assisting RENAMO.³⁷ Publicly, the Bush administration is vehemently anti-RENAMO. Meanwhile, there have been convincing reports that Israel delivers aid to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan through Kenya.³⁸

Although it has shown little enthusiasm for pluralism in Africa, Washington cannot be unmindful of the opportunities presented by multiparty elections. With its tradition of manipulating elections through the CIA or, since its creation in 1983 through the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington has the ability to play candidates off against each other, encouraging them to sell out more completely and for a lower price. Handled deftly, the electoral process can serve as a safety valve for public discontent, while replacing one stooge with another.

Speculation is particularly intense about how the Bush administration intends to play the elections scheduled for later this year in Zaire. After tumultuous demonstrations in early 1990, President Mobutu Sese Seko acceded to ever-growing demands for multiparty elections. Although Mobutu is not expected to run, opponents charge he is positioning himself to manipulate the process and control the new government.

U.S.-Zairian relations have reached a turning point. The military phase of the CIA's "covert" war against Angola appears to be moving into a new mode, and with it President Mobutu's usefulness as a host to the U.S.-South Africa supported UNITA proxy force. Last year for the first time, Congress prevailed over administration arguments that, despite his gory human rights abuses and his "kleptocratic" administration, Mobutu must get his aid for "national security reasons." Congress cut off all U.S. aid that flowed to the Zairian treasury, much of which continued on into Mobutu's many personal accounts.³⁹ "The State Depart-

ment would like to be able to do something for Mobutu," said a congressional aide at the time.

Still, it is not clear what the department — or the CIA — would like to do, or why. Perhaps, the administration wants to maintain a presence in Zaire to counter Libya's increasing influence. Zaire is a potentially wealthy country and most of the Western powers have gone out of their way to maintain a foothold there. During a December visit to Zaire, where plans were set for an exchange of ambassadors, Libya's foreign minister noted "the natural resources in Zaire together with the finance which can be attracted from Libya will result in an arrangement which will be the envy of the financial world."⁴⁰

**In a remarkable — yet,
as most things
African — unremarked
piece of grotesquerie,
the Bush administra-
tion has shifted from
bitter enemy to bosom
friend of Ethiopia's
President Mengistu
Haile-Mariam as part
of its Gulf War strategy.**

President Savimbi?

It seems clear that the Bush administration intends to cap its war against Angola with the election of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of its proxy force UNITA. During the congressional debate on aid to UNITA last fall, the organization's supporters repeatedly raised Savimbi's demand that any cessation of U.S. military aid be conditional on quickly-organized elections. UNITA has also insisted on delaying its disarmament until after elections. The Angolan government says it will take as long as three years to conduct a census and

clear the roads of mines — laid by UNITA supplied by the U.S. These antipersonnel weapons have taken a devastating toll in lives and limbs; Angola presently has the grievous distinction of having the most amputees of any country in the world — most of them children. The government also fears it is being set up for an electoral defeat like that the U.S. engineered in Nicaragua last year. While an armed UNITA continues terrorizing the countryside, much as the armed contras did in Nicaragua, the U.S., South Africa, and perhaps Saudi Arabia would provide money and/or technical aid to presidential candidate Savimbi.⁴¹ (See page 41.)

Similarly, if nonracial elections are held in South Africa, it would be unrealistic to believe that the Bush administration would not do its best to maximize the prospects of that country's white elite and of black opponents of the African National Congress (ANC). This interest may stem from long identification with the white minority régime. However, absent the active U.S. constituencies for UNITA and the apartheid government of South Africa, it is unlikely despite its interests and sympathies that the war-preoccupied administration would be paying much attention to southern Africa.

The Enticement of Ethiopia

Humanitarian organizations have likewise prodded the administration to take an interest in impending famines, especially in Ethiopia and Sudan. In the case of Ethiopia, these interests

36. *New York Times*, August 6, 1990; Wire Services compiled by Newsgrid, a CompuServe data base, August 3, 1990.

37. *Africa Confidential*, October 26, 1990.

38. *Africa Analysis*, May 26, 1989.

39. AP, October 29, 1990.

40. BBC *Focus on Africa*, 1830 UCT, December 20, 1990, FBIS-AFR.

41. *Lies Of Our Times* (New York), April 1991.

have been traded away to buttress the campaign against Iraq.

In a remarkable — yet, as most things African — unremarked piece of grotesquerie, the Bush administration has shifted from bitter enemy to bosom friend of Ethiopia's President Mengistu Haile-Mariam as part of its Gulf War strategy.

Until it rushed to war on Iraq, the Bush administration was calling loudly for a negotiated settlement to Ethiopia's long civil war. An end to the fighting was seen as the best chance for delivering food to as many as four million people facing imminent starvation. For months, the administration had pressured Israel to stop supplying the government with military aid that encouraged it to shun negotiations.

Israel steadfastly ignored Washington's pleas and insisted that arms deliveries were needed as a bargaining chip to gain the release of some 20,000 Ethiopian Jews. More to the point was Israel's high priority of keeping the Red Sea coast of Eritrea under the control of the government in Addis Ababa. Israel also mounted a powerful lobbying campaign to get the administration to reverse its policy and support Mengistu.

As the Gulf crisis proceeded, that change happened with amazing speed. First the administration announced that its relations with Ethiopia could be normalized once Ethiopia followed through with its agreement to allow the emigration of 20,000 Jews to Israel. Then came reports that Ethiopia's vote on the U.N. Security Council for Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force against Iraq had markedly improved relations between Washington and Addis Ababa.

At the behest of the Israeli government, Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen traveled to Ethiopia in November for talks with Mengistu and Uri Lubrani, Israel's administrator in Lebanon. In December, another announcement about a U.S.-Israeli-Ethiopian agreement that the Jews were free to go was used as a vehicle to communicate the news that Ethiopia would be "rewarded" with Israeli aid. It has been many years since Israel has given anything but military or quasi-military aid.

This was almost certainly a sign that the U.S. turnabout on Ethiopia was a concession to Israel, perhaps even a *quid pro quo* given in consideration for its "low profile" in the Gulf crisis and its having to relinquish the contra war against Libya, very likely in another Iraq-related deal with France.⁴²

42. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, December, November, July, March and February 1990 and December 1989. Ethiopia needed no convincing to vote against Iraq, which it has long despised for supporting the separatist Eritrean People's Liberation Front. There is also some question about Israel's urgency to "rescue" the Ethiopian Jews, who provided a handy pretext for continuing military aid. However, relatives of the Jews who had been brought to Israel in "Operation Moses" in 1984 and 1985 were pressing hard for reunification. So were North American Jewish activists. Congress also got involved, first at the request of these activists, later because the emigration of the Jews would deprive Israel of an excuse for arming the Ethiopian government.

"I have no doubt that they've bought off everyone," said one congressional aide when these possibilities were posed. Other congressional staffers concurred, some agreeing that the administration regarded Africa as expendable.

Libya Forges a New Role

That the U.S. should abandon Africa, especially with Libya in the wings, is worth pondering. Beyond what it indicates about President Bush's lust to humiliate Iraq, what does it say about the administration's attitude toward Libya? Toward Africa? It reveals starkly the same expediency that condemns the poor, the young, the undereducated, and the disproportionately black to kill and to die in a faraway desert.

The benefits to Libya have not gone unnoticed. "Now that the U.S. and France have a lot of their resources in the Persian Gulf, Qaddafi is testing the waters here to see what he can get away with," said the Ndjamena-based "Western diplomat" quoted in the *New York Times*. "Libya, after a long period of hesitation, has begun to reassert itself as a potentially powerful force in the region," opined the paper.⁴³

There is more to it than that, of course. Col. Muammar Qaddafi has always pursued activist policies in Africa — to promote Arab and Afro-Arab unity, to spread Islam, and to counter the subversive efforts both of Israel and of western governments. In the 1970s he made some bad choices, backing Idi Amin in Uganda against Tanzania and backing the Jean Bedel Bokassa régime in the Central African Republic — or Empire, as Bokassa called it — these diplomatic disasters each of which alienated other African governments. The stormy history of Chad, a matter often before the OAU, also harmed Libyan-African relations.

In the early 1980s the Reagan administration and Israel put strenuous efforts into spoiling Libyan relations wherever they existed in Africa and Europe.⁴⁴ That was followed by the April 1986 bombing attack, threats to attack a chemical factory at Rabta, and the Chad-based contra war. The oil glut of the 1980s drove down the price of Libya's sole export and diminished its ability to dispense foreign aid. Ironically, President Bush's moves toward war against Iraq has remedied that by raising the price of oil and the opportunity to sell it.

To please Israel, its U.S. supporters, and the domestic "anti-terrorism" lobby, the Bush administration continues to inveigh against Libya, but its enmity lacks gusto. "The Reagan administration had a phobia [about Libya]," said a Capitol Hill

43. *New York Times*, December 6, 1990.

44. René Lemarchand, ed., *The Green and the Black*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988, passim., and especially Ronald Bruce St. John, "The Libyan Debacle in Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-1987," pp. 125-38 and Jean-Emmanuel Ponde, "Qadhafi and the Organization of African Unity," pp. 139-145.

source, "but I don't think this administration is quite as wacko."

Even before it needed to gain Egypt's cooperation for the Gulf war, the administration seemed open to Egypt's policy of improving relations with Libya. The two are natural economic partners. In 1989 they restored diplomatic relations, broken after Egypt signed the Camp David Accords. They have opened their borders and begun an ambitious set of economic projects. For the past year, Egyptian and Libyan military officials have visited back and forth.⁴⁵

There are reports, confirmed by a senior congressional aide, that Egypt is now lobbying the Bush administration on Libya's behalf.⁴⁶ One rosy prediction is for a high-level U.S.-Libyan meeting in 1991, after which the U.S. will remove Libya from its list of "terrorist" nations.⁴⁷ The year began, however, with the administration's announcement that it was renewing the five-year-old "national emergency" vs. Libya and with it the economic sanctions imposed by the Reagan administration.⁴⁸

This policy might or might not be related to events in the Gulf. The U.S. is said to have warned "that Libya would be next on the Middle East hit-list if [Qaddafi] support[ed] Iraq" and Egypt's promise to lobby the Bush administration was reportedly given on the condition that he stay out of the confrontation.⁴⁹ However, Libya and Iraq have never been close. Iraq returned Libya's donations of humanitarian aid because they did not come with the appropriate degree of political support.⁵⁰ Libya, like so many other countries, had profound objections to the intrusion of "crusader" forces into an Arab dispute.⁵¹

Certainly now that Libya is a major actor in African affairs, sooner or later Washington will have to give it the time of day. Of course it is also possible that, when it next turns its gaze to Africa, the Bush administration will blame Libya for the changes it sees there. Washington will really have only itself to blame. When he met with President Bush last July, Togo's President Eyadéma pleaded for a concerted aid plan for Africa like the one the Western nations are establishing for the new Eastern European governments: "The positive evolution which has marked international relations these past few months ... cannot truly bear fruit unless the appropriate remedies are found to the grave development problems facing the Third World in general, and Africa in particular."⁵²

African countries know all too well that George Bush's New World Order does not run to succor — it is all about disciplining uppity Third World leaders. Logically, Africans may conclude that it is best to keep a low profile and to go their own way. Two years ago, when asked why Washington had not taken up the cudgel against Uganda, whose policies were strikingly similar to

those of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, an aide to President Yoweri Museveni answered that it was deliberate government policy not to advertise those policies.

Nigeria, whose size and prominence have always permitted it to escape submission (except to "structural adjustment"), is now likely to take an even more assertive role. It has brushed aside U.S. and British complaints that it has not harshly condemned Iraq.⁵³ Nigeria has condemned Iraq's presence in Kuwait and called for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.⁵⁴

Recently Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida demanded that the countries of Europe and the Americas set up a massive program of aid and "total debt write-offs" for Africa "because services of our forefathers in the American plantations were unrewarded and unpaid for ... [and] because the exploitation of Africa during the period of colonial rule further impoverished us and enhanced the development of the West."⁵⁵ This new campaign, joined by some U.S. African-American leaders, calls into question speculation that Nigeria, with its historic interest in regional leadership, might have decided to cooperate with Washington as a counterweight to Libya. Rather, it seems, at least some of Africa has begun to relish being left alone.

It is noteworthy that only three sub-Saharan African countries — Senegal, Niger and Sierra Leone — have sent military units to serve in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁶ This may be a first indication that Libya's ascendancy is diminishing the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have been vying to gain the loyalty of African Muslims. Certainly it suggests that African governments foresee no reward from Washington for contributing to its war, or even compensation for their already substantial economic losses.

African countries are also using this period to draw together in a way they were unable to do when Washington was "defending" the continent from Soviet and Libyan "subversion." Although crippled by its own debt burden, Nigeria has said it would work out ways of helping needier African countries — by selling them oil cheaply, if necessary.⁵⁷ It is establishing a rehabilitation fund for Liberia,⁵⁸ and has established a joint commission with Sudan.⁵⁹ Sudan has offered landlocked Chad an outlet to the Red Sea.⁶⁰ Libya, for its part, has signed a "unity" agreement with Sudan.⁶¹

There is a revival of the idea of the 1970s, that many of Africa's crushing problems might be alleviated by increasing South-South economic and political links. "There can be no isolation, there must be interaction," said Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, when he assumed the chair of the OAU. "This decade should close the era of institutionalized colonialism in Africa."⁶² ●

45. Newsgrid, January 15, 1990; Xinhua, Beijing, January 18, 1990; Reuters, March 22, 1990; *Washington Post*, May 27, 1990; UPI, June 20, 1990; MENA (Middle East News Agency, Cairo), 1050 UCT, September 21, 1990 and 1405 UCT, September 28, 1990, *FBIS-NES*; Reuters, December 4, 1990.

46. The earliest of these reports came from Reuters, July 9, 1990.

47. *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), December 5, 1990, *FBIS-NES*.

48. AP, January 2, 1991.

49. *Africa Confidential*, December 21, 1990.

50. *Ibid.* In the Iran-Iraq war, Libya supported Iran. And Iraq was reported to be Chad's second-largest source of aid, France being the first.

51. Reuters, August 15, 1990.

52. Newsgrid, July 31, 1990.

53. *Financial Times*, September 21, 1990.

54. Reuters, September 21, 1990.

55. Nigerian News Agency/Pan African News Agency, 1123 UCT, December 14, 1990, *FBIS-AFR*.

56. Senegal's decision was undoubtedly connected with its feud with Mauritania, Iraq's closest African ally.

57. Reuters, October 13, 1990.

58. Newsgrid, December 17, 1990.

59. Xinhua, December 28, 1990.

60. *Ibid.*, December 30, 1990.

61. AP, September 2, 1990.

62. UPI, *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1990.

Mercenary Mischief in Zaire?

Jane Hunter

Early this February Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko was reportedly getting desperate. His U.S. aid cut off and his approval rating so low that for months, it was rumored, he had not dared set foot in Kinshasa, the capital. Mobutu turned to Bob Denard, the mercenary equivalent of St. Jude, patron of lost causes, to train a new palace guard. Denard has been variously sighted in Kinshasa and at the Kitona military base.¹

Denard, age 61, is believed to have started his military career as a French soldier in Indochina under the name of Gilbert Bourgeaud. He hired on with Moise Tshombe's attempt to secede from Zaire in the early 1960s, and then with the Biafran secessionist effort in Nigeria. Thereafter, he fought in Yemen and Chad, before embarking on an ill-fated commando attack on Benin in 1977, for which he still faces charges in France.²

Denard was also involved in the killing of two presidents of the Comoros Islands, a nation in the Mozambique Channel of the Indian Ocean. The first victim, President Ali Soilih, was shot "trying to escape" in a Denard-led coup in 1978. Ironically, Denard, the quintessential mercenary, had with French backing, previously led the 1976 coup in which President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane was overthrown and Soilih was installed.

Abdallah, however, was not killed then. Indeed, he lived to be installed as Soilih's successor and Denard, unable to return to France, set up Abdallah's presidential guard, converted to Islam, took the name Col. Moustapha M'Madjiou, and married a local. France and Pretoria paid for the force and Denard's private security company, Sogecom, got contracts to provide security for the hotels that catered to South African tourists.³

It all came apart on November 26, 1989 after France and South Africa agreed that Denard had to go⁴ and Abdallah tried to replace him with a new French security adviser. Denard attempted to change Abdallah's decision and ended up shooting him. Then, in an effort to make the murder look like an attempted coup, they took the president's body from his office to his bedroom and fired an anti-tank missile through the window.⁵

The new president, Said Mohamed Djohar, told foreign diplomats that he was a "hostage" to Denard and his group of at least 20 European mercenary followers. France moved in warships and helicopters and South Africa cut off the money.⁶

1. Radio France International, 1636 UCT, February 3, 1991 placed Denard at Kitona; Reuters, February 4, 1991, said he was in Kinshasa and reported the rumors that Mobutu had not ventured into the city. On June 15, 1990 *Africa Confidential* (London) reported that, even when in Kinshasa, Mobutu spent so much time on his yacht that he gained the nickname "Noah."

2. *Washington Post*, December 14, 1989.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *New York Times*, December 9, 1989.

5. *Observer* (London), December 3, 1989.

6. Reuters, *The Independent* (London), December 6, 1989. Associated Press (AP), December 16, 1989 supplied the number.

(Pretoria is believed to have turned against Denard in order to satisfy Mozambique's demands to stop the supply route to the RENAMO guerrillas. This trafficking began flowing through the islands on Pretoria's behalf⁷ from Saudi Arabia and Oman⁸ in the mid-1980s, before South Africa promised to stop the aid.)

Most of his mercenaries returned to France, but Denard, facing outstanding charges there, went to South Africa, where he had business interests and a house in Durban. It is still not known whether France or South Africa gave him any or all of the \$12 million he was demanding to ease his departure from the Comoros.⁹

Mobutu's Defense Minister Admiral Mavua Mudima called the reports of Denard's presence "a complete fantasy."¹⁰ Indeed, it must be wondered why Mobutu would want Denard around, given the fate of his Comoran clients.

If he has turned to the mercenary it could indicate that the Zairian despot has become distrustful of his Israeli-trained presidential guard, the DSP. Last spring, *Africa Confidential* reported that Mobutu had stripped the regular army of its tanks, bombs, and ammunition, stockpiling these lethal goods at DSP headquarters at Tshatshi base and at his fortified estate at Gbadolite.¹¹

Dusty Evans of the South African foreign affairs department claimed that Denard was in that country and that it would violate the terms of his residency if he left or embarrassed the South African government.¹² Diplomats in the Congo, however, said that Denard had recently been spending time at his palatial seaside estate in Gabon.¹³ Earlier, in May, it was reported that Mobutu had begun recruiting mercenaries in Europe and South Africa.¹⁴ In October, Bernardin Mungul Diaka, head of the new Zairian opposition group *Rassemblement Democratique pour la Republic* (Democratic Rally for the Republic), claimed Denard was in Kinshasa. Diaka also asserted that South African military vessels, which were recently reported in Zairian waters, had off-loaded weapons and South African-trained urban guerrillas.¹⁵ In his interview with the BBC, Evans said those ships had been involved in harbor improvement.¹⁶

7. *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), December 21, 1989 (in *ANC News Briefing*, London), citing Didier Francois of the Paris daily, *Liberation* and Peter Vale of the Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg.

8. *Observer*, December 2, 1984.

9. *New York Times*, December 16, 1989; *Africa Confidential*, March 15, 1989.

10. Reuters, February 4, 1991.

11. *Africa Confidential*, May 18, 1990.

12. *BBC Focus on Africa*, 0330 UCT, February 4, 1991.

13. Reuters, February 4, 1991.

14. *Africa Confidential*, May 18, 1990.

15. *SouthScan* (London), October 19, 1990.

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 12.

The CIA in Angola:

Legacy of War, Misery and Manipulation

Phillip W.D. Martin

In September 1988, South African armored units and ground forces crossed the muddy Kavango River into Namibia. This retreat ended, at least ostensibly, a decade-long occupation and a bloody pattern of border strikes into Angola. Because of the retreat, South Africa was forced into a ceasefire agreement with Angola and Cuba and also finally agreed to United Nations Resolution 435. Three months later, after decades of resistance, Pretoria signed the Tripartite treaty which included relinquishing Namibia and its southern bases in Angola.

Around the same time, thousands of Cuban soldiers were packing away knapsacks and tents in a phased withdrawal from Angola where, since 1975, they had fought alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government.


On December 21, 1988, however, a day before the Tripartite treaty was to be signed at the U.N., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker announced that the U.S. would continue military aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and would reject full diplomatic relations with Angola until it made peace with the guerrillas.¹

The rebel UNITA forces led by Jonas Savimbi had been excluded from the agreement. They responded to the Tripartite accord with a series of guerrilla attacks on government installations, civilian population centers and troops near Cajundo in southern Angola.² The boldness of Savimbi's assaults was intended to maximize publicity for the UNITA rebels in the aftermath of the agreement. The U.S. and South Africa continue to offer military, financial and political backing for UNITA while the Angolan government still receives some support from the Soviet Union. Despite diplomatic progress, the war promises to drag on with no military victory in sight for either side.

Phillip W.D. Martin is the director of communications for an international relief organization and has written on Africa and Brazil for the *Los Angeles Times*, *Boston Globe* and other publications.

1. "The United States and Angola, 1974-1988: A Chronology," *Department of State Bulletin*, February 1989, p. 24.

2. Robert Pear, "Angola Accuses Pretoria of Breaking Peace Pact," *New York Times*, February 10, 1989, p. A7.



Anna Zieminski/Impact Visuals

Jonas Savimbi, leader of the U.S.-backed UNITA rebels, symbolized by the rooster.

weapons and "non-lethal" aid, establishing secret airstrips in neighboring countries, etc. In both Angola and Nicaragua, the U.S. sought to portray the contra forces as "freedom fighters" struggling for "democracy" and "multi-party" governments, and in both countries the reality was a largely mercenary army with abysmal human rights records.

Another similarity is the participation of Thomas Alan Twetten whom Bush appointed as Deputy Director of Operations to head the CIA's worldwide spy network. As DDO he is in direct charge at a day-to-day hands-on level of all CIA covert operations around the globe. This position makes him one of the most powerful figures in the U.S. government. Twetten is a 30-year veteran whose overseas postings include Nigeria, Libya, Ghana, India and Jordan. He is well-known on Capitol Hill and in intelligence circles for his key role in the Iran-contra arms-for-hostages deal and as the architect of the disinformation campaign against Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi.³

In a censored deposition taken by investigators in 1987, Twetten admitted that he accompanied Oliver North three times to Europe to arrange the clandestine sale and transport of weapons to Iran. He testified that during this time, he became familiar

3. Louis Wolf, "Naming Names," *CAIB*, Number 32, Summer 1989, p. 14.

with the dummy companies and Swiss banks through which North ran the Iran program.⁴ The point of the Iran-contra deal was to covertly fund the Nicaraguan contras.

Twetten's connection to the Swiss bank accounts would also have put him in very close communication with UNITA officials. The rebel organization received covert funding, controlled by the CIA, from the illegal arms sales to Iran.⁵

In view of the Sandinistas' fate, Twetten and the CIA know how to manipulate the electoral process in a country weakened by military and covert paramilitary operations and economic sabotage. And there is no doubt that, like Nicaragua, Angola is battered and war-weary. Damage caused by South African invasions between 1975 and 1981 alone is estimated at \$7.6 billion, or four times Angola's 1980 export earnings.⁶ The human costs included the deaths of more than 55,000 children from 1980 to 1985. The disruption of the rural economy has caused a massive flow of refugees from the countryside into the cities and led to thousands of deaths. The country is further wracked by a famine which threatens an estimated 1.9 million people.⁷ A total exceeding 300,000 people have died in the last decade.

An end to the conflict remains President José dos Santos' first priority. But, fully three years after what some saw as a glimmer of hope with the signing of the Tripartite accords, UNITA is now militarily better equipped than ever thanks to the U.S. With this pipeline secured, the MPLA cannot hope for a military victory.

Electoral Manipulation Ahead

On December 4, 1990, at the Third Party Congress of the MPLA, the Angolan government bowed to international pressure and announced the establishment of a multi-party system. It called for elections within three years. The mechanism to manipulate these elections is already being put in place. It is expected that UNITA will hire expensive U.S. public relations firms and will undoubtedly receive assistance from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). It was this congressionally-funded organization which provided much of the money for the election which wreaked havoc on Daniel Ortega and his supporters at the polls.

An American source who knows the U.S. intelligence community and both sides of the Angolan conflict has predicted "a high-tech campaign fought out on radio and state-run television. It will look very much like an American campaign with advertisements and everything. A great deal of the progress that has occurred in achieving peace in Angola has been mirrored on the Nicaraguan model, and so you can expect U.S. initiatives."⁸

Perhaps even more important than expensive PR consultants

4. Michael Wines, "After 30 Years In Shadows, a Spymaster Emerges," *New York Times*, November 20, 1990, p. A18.

5. "Unita Linked To Iran Arms Deal, Says US Govt Source," *The Star* (Johannesburg), December 5, 1986.

6. "Children on the Frontline," UNICEF Report, March 1987, p. 20.

7. Oxfam News Release, November 13, 1990.

8. Author's interview, December 1990.

and subsidies are internal factors. Like Nicaraguans, Angolans have been fighting and dying for decades. Many of the gains of their respective revolutions were neutralized by the systematic economic and military sabotage imposed from abroad.

In Nicaragua, the people came to recognize that the U.S. would never give up and the war would never stop until the country said "uncle" and let the U.S. have its way. The human and financial cost of the war would continue to rise and U.S. resources compared to those of the local economy were virtually limitless.

Similarly, one congressional source believes that the machinations of the CIA will be secondary to internal factors in influencing voters in an Angolan election. "If the CIA gave \$20 million to UNITA, the MPLA could come up with its own resources. The real question is how well the government improves its performance and its governing skills. The other factor is the emergence of third, fourth and fifth opposition parties."⁹ One or more of these parties would likely receive CIA support as a back-up should Savimbi fail.

As in Nicaragua, the desire for peace will also be a determining factor in voter decision making. "The main thing," says Bill Minter, writer and long-time expert on southern Africa, "will be whether the Angolans feel the war will start again if they do not vote the right way. A stronger feeling might be to vote against the people who have been in office and had a decade or more of national disasters. It's the natural tendency of anyone regardless of ideol-

ogy... There is also the threat that UNITA will restart the war if they don't win."

A final factor which could play a major role in favor of UNITA is the interface of historical, geographical and tribal differences which divide Angola. The South Africans, and the Portuguese before them, have used race and tribe in a successful campaign of divide and rule. In contrast to the war in Nicaragua, the CIA could appeal to ethnic and racial differences to UNITA's advantage. These factors were created or exacerbated by the U.S.-South Africa-sponsored war.

The Fight for Hearts and Minds

UNITA's fight for control of Angola has been waged on two fronts, both of which tipped the playing field toward the U.S., South Africa and UNITA. The first was the public relations war for hearts and minds.

Jonas Savimbi, the flamboyant UNITA leader, is a well-practiced propagandist. In 1975 UNITA representatives were flown to New York on a multi-day visit secretly arranged by the CIA. Initially, they won over members of the United Nations and the New York press corps until news leaked out that UNITA was in league with racist South Africa.¹⁰

9. *Ibid.*

10. John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, (New York: W.W.Norton & Co., 1978,) p. 197.

The
mechanism
to manipu-
late these
elections is
already
being put in
place.

The million dollar question for the Reagan administration was: How do you turn a man who collaborated with the Portuguese in the colonial era, espoused Maoist ideology, reigned despotically over troops and civilians within his territory, and works closely with white South Africa, into a black freedom fighter?

For \$600,000 a year, Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly—the well-connected Republican public relations firm with a history of lobbying for CIA protégés like the Marcoses and the Saudi royal family—thought they had the answer.

Their first relatively simple task was establishing Savimbi's pro-western credentials. Appearances on *60 Minutes*, *Nightwatch* and in the pages of the *New York Times* in 1986, portrayed him not as a friend of South Africa but as the enemy of the Soviet-backed MPLA government and their Cuban allies.¹¹ Although bitterly criticized by the Congressional Black Caucus and other liberal Democrats, UNITA was applauded by conservative and "moderate" congresspeople, including Robert Dole (R-Kan.), the Senate minority leader. To them, Savimbi, with his thick beard, green fatigues and strong oratory skills, not only looked the part of a revolutionary—he was the real McCoy. His political history as a Maoist and his autocratic style were conveniently ignored by his fervently anti-communist supporters. Shortly after his first visit to the U.S. in 1986, President Reagan authorized a \$15 million aid package. In subsequent years millions more were paid out to support the Angolan contras. During his latest trip to Washington in October 1990 to round up materiel and political support, a group of conservative religious operations even held a \$25 a plate "Prayer Breakfast for Angola" to benefit Savimbi's movement.

Some recent revelations may have again tarnished Savimbi's expensively polished image. In 1989 a former UNITA disciple revealed that six years earlier, Savimbi had burned twelve women and three children at the stake after accusing them of practicing witchcraft. The informant also detailed Savimbi's role in the disappearances of several of his key officers, some of whom were members of other tribes.¹² Tribalism is rife in the UNITA ranks.¹³ Savimbi is the nominal leader of the Ovimbundu people who comprise as much as 40% of the Angolan people. Non-Ovimbundu are often targeted for elimination by the majority tribe. Fred Bridgland, a biographer of and staunch apologist for Savimbi, accepted the evidence of violent purging and witch burning as "80 to 90 percent correct."¹⁴

The million dollar question for the Reagan administration was: How do you turn a man who collaborated with the Portuguese in the colonial era, espoused Maoist ideology, reigned despotically over troops and civilians within his territory, and works closely with white South Africa, into a black freedom fighter?

Even Black, Manafort, *et. al.* were hard pressed to reestablish Savimbi's "freedom fighter" facade after these revelations. In an apparent attempt to hold on to U.S. aid, enlist liberal support, and salvage Savimbi's reputation, UNITA hired Morris Amitay, the former director of the Washington-based American-Israeli

Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). "Amitay was hired by the black rebel group," a congressional source told the publication *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, "to lobby liberal Democratic Congressmen who have traditionally opposed the CIA program but have been responsive to AIPAC and defenders of Israel."¹⁵ This assertion has a ring of truth since Israel has, in the past, assisted both South Africa and the CIA in Angola.

The Military Front

The second front is military. It was in January 1975, at the end of years of bloody fighting against Portuguese colonialism, that three indigenous factions—the MPLA, UNITA and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) were preparing to take over the reins of government under the agreement set by departing Portugal. The process of democratization was disrupted in March when the CIA-backed FNLA gunned down 50 MPLA activists and plunged Angola again into seemingly interminable war.¹⁶

During the spring and summer after the massacre, there was a massive infusion of Soviet weapons. Cuban troops arrived in late October to fight alongside MPLA govern-

ment forces. These factors, combined with a congressional cutoff of U.S. aid to the rightwing guerrillas, prevented the defeat of the MPLA by the combined forces of South African troops, CIA-sponsored mercenaries, Zairian regulars, the FNLA and UNITA. Code-named *LAFEATURE* by the CIA, the action became a political and military disaster for the Agency.

But the CIA had hedged its bets. In addition to its support for the ill-fated FNLA, the Agency had also been nurturing a relationship with a rival guerrilla operation—UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi. On March 19, 1981, just two months into his new administration, Reagan formally requested that Congress repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment forbidding U.S. aid to the rebels. Although the request was rejected by a wide margin, Reagan and CIA director William Casey would not take "no" for an answer. The Saudi Arabians—foreshadowing their fiduciary role in the Iran-contra affair—began training the tribe-based UNITA forces in Morocco in early 1981. In exchange they received sophisticated U.S. AWACS aircraft.¹⁷

15. *Israeli Foreign Affairs*, November 1990, p. 4.

16. John Stockwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.

17. Michael Martin, "Savimbi and Angola—The Right's Last, Best Hope," *The Nation*, December 19, 1987, p. 744.

11. R.W. Apple Jr., "Red Carpet for a Rebel or How a Star is Born," *New York Times*, February 7, 1986.

12. Christopher Hitchens, "Minority Report," *The Nation*, May 22, 1989.

13. Margaret Novicki, "Against All Odds," *Africa Report*, January 1985, p. 8.

14. Hitchens, *op. cit.*, p. 690. Also see "Who is Jonas Savimbi," *Africa News*, July 11, 1988, pp. 6-8.

Pretoria was also pivotal to the exercise of the Reagan Doctrine in southern Africa. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick cemented this relationship on the official level in 1981 when she met with high level South African military intelligence officers. This meeting violated U.S. policy at the time which barred official visits by South African officers of brigadier or above.¹⁸

In June 1985, the Congress lifted its prohibition on aid to UNITA. Since then, the rebels have received millions of dollars in U.S. arms, including shoulder mounted Stinger missiles, which have been highly effective against Soviet-made MI-24 helicopters and low-flying jets. The CIA has also conducted Stinger and light anti-tank weapons training at a secure UNITA encampment where "reporters were not allowed."¹⁹ Great amounts of UNITA's military hardware were delivered to an abandoned airbase near Kamina, Zaire and were then flown on to Savimbi's bases in Angola. Details of the operation were worked out when Casey traveled secretly to South Africa in March 1986.²⁰ The CIA chief also made arrangements when he met with Mobutu in Zaire and later that same year during the Angolan leader's visit to Washington.²¹ Further evidence suggests that the CIA coordinated arms shipments and training with Pretoria.



MPLA

Angola has the highest per capita incidence of amputees in the world. Many of the victims of the U.S.-supplied Claymore landmines are children.

When the South Africans finally withdrew from Angola in September 1988, in compliance with the Tripartite agreement, the MPLA saw an opportunity to reassert control over the rebel-dominated southeast. This area had been held by UNITA with the aid of South Africa. The South African Defense Force struck back from the air but quickly withdrew when it was assured that UNITA forces had prevailed.

It is believed that South Africa continues to work with the CIA in Angola. "The CIA has maintained a good working relationship with South Africa via Angola over the years and specifically with UNITA," — said John Stockwell, former chief of the CIA's Angola Task Force. "And I would presume with

18. Claudia Wright, "A Girl's Best Friend," *New Statesman*, November 5, 1982, p. 18.

19. Patrick Tyler, "Savimbi Recounts Pretoria Aid," *International Herald Tribune*, August 2, 1986.

20. "CIA Chief Visited SA to plan UNITA arms — diplomat," *Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), September 18, 1986.

21. James Brooke, "CIA Said to Send Rebels in Angola Weapons Via Zaire," *New York Times*, January 31, 1987, p. A1.

confidence that the South Africans are right in there with the CIA people in Angola...and I would project [South African] military advisors on the ground and in Savimbi's headquarters." Stockwell's prediction has been borne out, according to an interview with Jan Breytenbach, a former commander of South Africa's "Foreign Legion."²² Colonel Breytenbach, who founded and led the "Buffalo" Battalion was convinced that the U.S. sent not only \$50 million in aid this year to UNITA, but American special forces troops as well. "[The U.S. has] got black troops," said Breytenbach to the *Independent*, "and they could be integrated easily into UNITA." The U.S. wanted to use its own troops in order to keep the Stingers and wire-guided anti-tank missiles from slipping into South African hands. If such a transfer were discovered it could prove an embarrassment to the U.S. government, according to the colonel.²³

One source close to the Angolan government said that when de Klerk visited Washington last year he was asked by Representative Mervyn Dymally (D-Calif.) if his forces were in Angola. He replied that the South Africa troops still in place were "mercenary units." This assertion was disputed by a key congressional source. "Among the aid have been military advisers from South Africa," he said. "Clearly they are not mercenaries."

UNITA's Troubles at Home and Abroad

UNITA is facing troubles on both the military and propaganda front these days. Relations with the U.S., the lifeblood of the guerrilla operation, have not been smooth. While there is evidence that the CIA and Israel are pushing for the war to continue, the State Department has been looking for a negotiated settlement.²⁴ Congress is also increasingly divided over backing UNITA. The close vote on the House floor and the conditions attached to the 1991 intelligence authorization package, reflect growing skepticism. Savimbi's human rights record was cited during debates. Congress eventually passed the \$60 million UNITA appropriation by a narrow margin but conditioned it on a "realistic" ceasefire, a timetable for free elections and an end to Soviet military aid to the MPLA.

22. Richard Dowden, "US Sent Missiles and Men to UNITA," *The Independent*, November 19, 1990.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Israeli Foreign Affairs, op. cit.* p. 4.

"The key to the bill," said one key congressional source, "was telling UNITA that the political will was no longer available to sustain them indefinitely."²⁵ Even the relatively minor compromise conditions were unacceptable to Savimbi's congressional supporters and the President, who vetoed the bill. The actual funds, however, were unaffected since they had been approved by the Defense Department. "The money is there, and it's being spent," said Minter. "It's illegal but the Intelligence Committee will have to decide whether to challenge it. Congress will have to decide who has authority."

In Angola too, Savimbi's problems are mounting. There are numerous reports that, although not in crisis proportions, division within UNITA ranks is looming. Meanwhile, the shooting war is in a seemingly intractable stalemate.

Savimbi and the CIA now view elections as UNITA's best and only chance to take power. In late September last year, rebel officials met with Soviet diplomats in Portugal to discuss conditions for a permanent ceasefire which could lead to a political settlement. This unprecedented meeting was followed up with one in Washington on December 12 involving Savimbi and then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Meanwhile, Angolan Foreign Minister Pedro Castro Van Dumen met with Secretary of State Jim Baker to work out details of a ceasefire. Previously, Savimbi had indicated that he would only negotiate if the MPLA recognized UNITA.

On September 30, he explained UNITA's sudden willingness to drop its demand by pointing to Soviet involvement in the negotiating process. Ann Griffin, spokesperson for TransAfrica, the Washington-based lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, was more suspicious. "Savimbi seems more interested than in the past to initiate a settlement," she said. "When elections come, he may have been assured by [the] Americans that victory is his... and is therefore pushing for elections as early as possible."

If a sixth round of negotiations between the MPLA and

25. James Brooke, "Angola's Feelings Don't Get in the way of Profits," *New York Times*, "Week in Review," January 12, 1986, p. 3.

UNITA in Portugal this spring results in elections for Angola, the U.S., the Soviet Union and Portugal will be applauded for their mediation. But elections alone, as has been shown in Nicaragua and elsewhere, do not guarantee democracy.

Pursestrings for Survival

Ultimately, the fate of Angola rests with the U.S. The economic survival of Angola is predicated in large measure on U.S. private corporate investments. The chief means of support has long been derived from the Chevron Corporation, which in 1985 accounted for 75% of Luanda's oil revenues, estimated in total value at \$2.5 billion. Another U.S. company, Texaco, is also producing in Angola.

Trade between Angola and the U.S. and rose from \$856 million in 1982²⁶ to \$1 billion in 1984 and to \$2.2 billion in 1988, making the U.S. Angola's largest trading partner in the 1980s at 61.4% of all Angola's foreign trade in 1988. Over ninety percent of that trade was crude petroleum, according to 1989 U.N. statistics.

Although branded by the Bush administration as hardcore Marxist-Leninist, the MPLA has pursued diverse economic policies which they believe will improve the living conditions of the Angolan people. In 1985-86, Angola instituted an economic reform program, including a major privatization program for its rural sector, to provide incentives for farmers and distributors. Admitting its mistakes, the MPLA, eliminated subsidies on state-owned companies, cautiously devalued its currency, and sought membership, despite U.S. opposition, in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.²⁷

The economy, however, can never be healthy while the war continues and the war will not stop while President and former CIA Director, George Bush pursues a policy of covert aid for UNITA. The CIA's continuing involvement in Angola, in tacit alliance with the practitioners of *apartheid*, undercuts any possibility of a democratic or pluralistic political solution. ●

26. *Ibid.*

27. Kenneth B. Noble, "Angola Says Rebels Can Help Write Constitution,"

Savimbi and the CIA now view elections as UNITA's best and only chance to take power.

PHILIP AGEE SPEAKS AGAINST GULF WAR

The Philip Agee Defense Committee, a project of Speak Out!, is distributing a short video on the Gulf War. The 45-minute tape, produced by Agee examines the history of Western intervention in the Middle East and U.S. complicity in events leading to the Gulf War. Agee also talks about his ongoing legal battle to reinstate his U.S. passport and government efforts to silence him. Video packets (VHS copy, background materials) are \$10 each. Send payment to: Philip Agee Defense Campaign, P.O. Box 84087, San Diego, CA 92138 or call (619)223-3219 for more information. Make checks payable to Philip Agee Defense Campaign and indicate campus or group affiliation with all payments.

Philip Agee is currently on a speaking tour of the U.S. through April 15 and is available for interviews on local and national stations. For more information or to schedule an interview, contact Speak Out! at: (415)864-4561 or (619)223-3219.

On the Run, by Philip Agee is now available for CAIB at half price. (See page 67.)

Greasing the Killing Machine:

U.S. Backing for RENAMO

Prexy Nesbitt

The Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) is one of the most effective proxy armies in the world. Funded and remote-controlled by South Africa, the MNR is better known by the acronym RENAMO. In Mozambique they are called *bandidos armados*. This 14-year-old counter-revolutionary group elicited the following critique of its operations from the U.S. State Department:

"...civilians...were reported to be victims of purposeful shooting deaths and executions of axing, knifing, bayonetting, burning to death, forced drowning and asphyxiation, and other forms of murder where no meaningful resistance or defense [was] present."¹

The report "conservatively estimated that 100,000 civilians may have been murdered by RENAMO in this manner."²

Apartheid South Africa, determined to preserve at any cost the privileges of white colonial rule, is not RENAMO's only friend. In a hearing before the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State under the Reagan administration, admitted the existence of a number of "financial backers of RENAMO, private individuals in some cases, in other cases people with political connections in the government..."³

Despite extensive evidence of RENAMO's press-ganging of rural youths and its clearcut war of terror against a civilian population, it has enjoyed significant U.S. support.

Support From the Congressional Right

Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Representative Dan Burton of Indiana, former Senator Paul Trible of Virginia, former Representative Jack Kemp of New York, Representative Robert Dornan of California, and Senator Steven Symms of Idaho, all Republicans, have stumped for RENAMO in and out of Congress. Kansas Republican senator and former presidential aspirant Robert Dole was also on the RENAMO bandwagon

Prexy Nesbitt is Co-chair of the Chicago chapter of Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC) and a senior U.S. consultant to the government of Mozambique. The author wishes to thank Steve Askin, Jill Schlueter, Faith Smith, and H.K. Venda for their assistance on this article. The author assumes all responsibility for the content of the story.

1. *Gersony Report*, April 1988, p. 19. Submitted to Ambassador Jonathan Moore and Dr. Chester Crocker.

2. *Ibid.*, n. 1, p. 25. For a thorough estimate of war damage see: *Children on the Front Line: The Impact of Destabilization and Warfare on Children in Southern Africa and South Africa*, Third Edition, (New York: United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], 1989). Measuring "war-related loss of life" in Mozambique, the report estimated that between 1980 and 1988, over 900,000 people died, including 494,000 infants and young children. If the years 1975 through 1980 are included, the figures are higher yet.

3. Hearings before the House Subcommittee on African Affairs, 100th Congress, 1st Session, June 24, 1987.

until media coverage of atrocities made it impossible.

In the mid-eighties, RENAMO's record was less known to the international community, and this small group in Congress could, and did, trumpet their support. RENAMO President Afonso Dhlakama declared:

I would like to thank Senator Paul Trible and Congressman Dan Burton, who have fought our battles for a fair hearing in the United States Congress.⁴

Although it is difficult to conceive of a rightwing army that the Reagan administration wouldn't like, it never quite had the stomach for a public defense of RENAMO. For this temerity it incurred the unlikely wrath of the extreme right. Jesse Helms vehemently opposed Chester Crocker's position with regard to RENAMO and the administration's reluctance to establish official contact with the insurgents.

At a congressional hearing in July of 1987, Helms resorted to redbaiting, a tactic typically he reserves for liberal foes. Echoing vintage Reagan rhetoric, Helms lavished praise on the "freedom fighters in Mozambique." He went on to say: "And I shall hereafter refer to that Communist government by the name of the Communist Party of Mozambique which is FRELIMO. RENAMO is the name for the freedom fighters."⁵ In their efforts to persuade the administration to shift in favor of RENAMO, Helms, Dole and others went to the extent of holding up confirmation of Melissa Wells, Reagan's nominee for Ambassador to Mozambique,⁶ on the grounds that she condemned RENAMO and supported FRELIMO.⁷

The same year, nineteen members of Congress led by Representative Jack Kemp sponsored a visit to the White House for external RENAMO leader Arturo Janeiro da Fonseca and Howard University Professor Luis Serapiao, a U.S.-based RENAMO representative. The confab was apparently a move to embarrass Mozambique's President Joaquim Chissano, who was visiting the U.S. at the time.⁸

RENAMO's cause was also put on Washington's public agenda with legislation sponsored by Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) and Representative Dan Burton, a member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Commit-

4. Dhlakama spoke at a press conference in Washington, DC, October 28, 1986, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Room.

5. Hearing before House Subcommittee on African Affairs, June 24, 1987.

6. Neil A. Lewis, "U.S. in Policy Shift, Holds Talks with Mozambique Rebel Figure," *New York Times*, July 13, 1987.

7. At the June 24, 1987 Subcommittee Hearing, Senator Symms referred to "Mrs. Wells' denigrating characterization of RENAMO..." He went on to attack her personally in the public hearing.

8. "Commitment to Mozambique," *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 1987.

tee. Burton and Wallop's package of \$5 million in direct assistance to the "non-communist resistance in Mozambique" met with little support except from a group including Jack Kemp, Robert Dornan, Paul Trible and Jesse Helms.⁹

PR and Lobbying: the Role of the Rightwing Thinktanks

The Conservative Caucus Foundation (CCF), to which many of the above-mentioned individuals belong, called on the Reagan administration to support RENAMO and pressure the Mozambican Government to accede to RENAMO's demands.¹⁰ Howard Phillips, National Director of the CCF, is a man who maintains close social ties with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and sees Chester Crocker as guilty of conducting a "pro-Soviet" African policy in his attempts to promote improved relations between the U.S. and Mozambique.¹¹

The rightwing Heritage Foundation joined the CCF in attacking Reagan administration policy toward Mozambique. The well-heeled Heritage lobby steadily churns out material on behalf of RENAMO in the U.S. and Western Europe. In July of 1987, the widely circulated Heritage PR sheet *The Backgrounder* asserted:

Of all the insurgencies against pro-Soviet regimes anywhere in the world, RENAMO's is closest to victory. It would be a logical next step for the administration, in making the Reagan Doctrine a reality, to change its policy toward Mozambique and bring it in line with U.S. policy toward other Marxist-Leninist governments that are being challenged by their own people.¹²

William Pascoe, until recently a senior policy analyst for Heritage, has repeatedly predicted the fall of FRELIMO and victory for RENAMO, arguing that the "administration should establish formal contacts with RENAMO immediately..."¹³ Heritage support and activity is not limited to propaganda. In about 1985, Heritage offered to provide offices and material resources for RENAMO's newly created Mozambique Infor-

mation Office (MIO) headed by Thomas W. Schaaf, Jr. and Luis Serapiao.¹⁴



Around 1986 Schaaf registered with the Justice Department as an American agent for RENAMO and in 1988 served as the executive director of another RENAMO agency, the Mozambique Research Center in Washington.¹⁵ Schaaf admitted receiving support from a conservative lobbying organization, Free the Eagle, which provided desks, office space, telephones, and travel money.¹⁶ Schaaf has extensive background in Africa. He served as an agricultural advisor at a mission station in Zimbabwe where he claims to have come into contact with "dissident" Mozambicans including Dhlakama, who, Schaaf alleges, asked him to promote RENAMO's cause in the U.S.¹⁷

Another office also claimed to be the legitimate representative of RENAMO in the U.S. Arturo Vilankulu presented himself as Secretary for External Affairs for RENAMO and enjoyed the support of the Conservative Action Foundation, a group with ties to the notorious World Anticomunist League (WACL).¹⁸ Vilankulu claimed that his "credentials were vouched for by the President of WACL, former U.S. General John

Singlaub, former Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Joseph Strauss from West Germany, and Manuel Mahluza and Khembo dos Santos from the RENAMO National Council."¹⁹

Subsequently, the two offices accused each other of being enemy infiltrators and FRELIMO agents. Their fight lasted throughout 1987-88. Despite the split, rightwing forces were still making at least a public relations impact in the U.S. on behalf of RENAMO.

On November 4, 1987, RENAMO lobbyists and representatives arranged a meeting with Reagan's national security adviser Frank C. Carlucci III, former CIA Deputy Director and Secretary of Defense, in an attempt to change the admini-

14. *Op. cit.*, n. 9. In December of 1990, Serapiao was relieved of his post by RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama.

15. Robert Pear and James Brooke, "Rightists in U.S. Aid Mozambique Rebels," *New York Times*, May 22, 1988.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Anders Nilsson, *Unmasking the Bandits: The True Face of the M.N.R.* (U.K.: ECASAAMA, 1990), p. 52.

18. In a somewhat remarkable conversion, Vilankulu now heads the New York-based Friends of Mozambique. He says he is done with RENAMO and now works with Mozambique's President Chissano and the FRELIMO party.

19. *Op. cit.*, n. 17. Also: Richard Horwood "Contras Private Pipeline Pumps at U.S. Behest," *Washington Post*, October 16, 1986 and Reinhold Robert, "Ex-General Hints at Big Role as U.S. Champion of Contras," *New York Times*, October 14, 1986.

9. "RENAMO's US Friends," *New African* (London), May 1987.


10. Howard Phillips, *Washington Times*, September 23, 1985, p. 5A.

11. *Op. cit.*, n. 9.

12. Heritage Foundation "National Security Record," June 1986.

13. *Executive Memorandum #138*, October 28, 1986, and Heritage Foundation, *Backgrounder #48*, July 9, 1987.

stration's policy towards Mozambique.²⁰ Carlucci met RENAMO representatives accompanied by Pat Buchanan, Schaaf, Neal Blair (President of Free the Eagle), Paul Weyrich of the Free Congress Foundation, William Pascoe from Heritage, and Grover Norquist (foreign policy adviser to 1988 Republican presidential candidate Pierre S. duPont IV).²¹ White House officials played down the meeting and one U.S.



Associated Press

Lisbon, Portugal, March 23, 1988. Former RENAMO spokesperson Paulo Oliveira at a press conference where he asserted that Pretoria continued to supply and support the bandidos armados.

official said that Carlucci claimed surprise at seeing a RENAMO representative in the meeting. Neal Blair countered that he informed Carlucci's office beforehand of "everyone who was coming" including Schaaf and the group he represented.²² Whatever the ultimate influence of such RENAMO lobbyists, their publicly acknowledged access to high-level U.S. officials is clearly significant.

Weekend Warriors: Help From the Paramilitary Right

An agency known as Freedom, Inc., has acted as a major source of material support for RENAMO.²³ In 1988, Freedom, Inc. arranged an illegal visit to Mozambique for three prominent U.S. journalists, enabling them to interview Afonso Dhlakama. The journalists were from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Newsweek*. Freedom, Inc. was founded in early 1988 and jointly chaired by former *Conservative Digest* co-publisher and

member of Howard Phillips' Conservative Caucus, Larry Abraham and the notorious international financier Sir Harry Schultz.²⁴

Freedom, Inc.'s Executive Director is Robert C. MacKenzie, a veteran anticommunist who was wounded in the Vietnam War before volunteering to serve with Rhodesian Special Forces.²⁵ He has served with the South African Special Forces as well. He was also second in command of the Transkei Defense Forces. He is believed to remain in contact with his former commanding officer in Rhodesia, Garth Barrett, who later became the commanding officer of the 1st Reconnaissance Commando in South Africa. Apart from running Freedom, Inc., MacKenzie contributes articles to *Soldier of Fortune* magazine under the pseudonyms Bob McKenna and Bob Jordan.²⁶

According to British and Zimbabwean journalists, MacKenzie and Schaaf apparently met in Rhodesia and have been working together on and off since the 1970s.²⁷ Schaaf accompanied MacKenzie on his trip to Mozambique in 1986. MacKenzie claims to have entered Mozambique from Malawi in September 1986, bringing knives, walkie-talkies and other supplies to the rebels.²⁸ He published a personal account of his visit in the May 1987 issue of *Soldier of Fortune* under the byline of Bob McKenna—a laudatory puff piece on Dhlakama and RENAMO. In fact, MacKenzie's RENAMO ties go back nearly two decades. He gave training and tactical advice to RENAMO in the late 1970s when he worked for the Rhodesian Special Forces. In 1979, he led a raid on an oil storage depot at the port of Beira in Mozambique.²⁹

Mercenary Prayer Wheels: The Role of the Christian Right

The Religious Right has been pivotal in forging U.S. connections to RENAMO. One of RENAMO's closest religious supporters is Peter Hammond, a British national who heads the South African-based "Frontline Fellowship."³⁰ His organization is considered by Mozambican government circles and western diplomats working in the region to be a major cover for mercenaries operating in Mozambique and throughout Southern Africa.³¹ Hammond's name came up during the trial of another foreign missionary, Australian Ian Grey, arrested in 1987 by the Mozambican authorities. Grey referred to Hammond as one of the intermediaries between RENAMO and Malawi.³² Hammond has led groups of "missionaries" from the California-based Christian Emergency Relief Team (CERT) under the guise of distributing bibles and spreading the word of Jesus.

Another rightwing Christian group is Jimmy Swaggart Ministries. Swaggart's flock has denied a claim by RENAMO supporters that it was providing aid to RENAMO through churches

20. David B. Ottaway, "Carlucci and the Mozambicans: A Tale of Two Viewpoints," *Washington Post*, November 10, 1987.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. Freedom, Inc. financier Sir Harry Schultz has worked closely with retired General Daniel Graham, former director of the DIA and onetime adviser to Pretoria on psychological warfare. Graham has also served as deputy chair of the U.S. branch of WACL. See "Mozambique Plausible Deniability," *Africa Confidential*, December 2, 1988, pp. 1-2. Also: *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 60.

24. *Op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 60.

25. The Rhodesian Special Forces, later known as the Selous Scouts, were among the original trainers of RENAMO.

26. *Op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 60.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

29. *Op. cit.*, n. 15.

30. *Ibid.*

31. Paul Fauvet, "The Religious Right—Allies of Pretoria," Mozambique News Agency, April 1988.

32. "RENAMO's Financing Arrangements," *Facts and Reports* (Amsterdam), December 1, 1989, p. 21.

in "RENAMO-controlled sections of Mozambique."³³ Following his 1987 arrest, Ian Grey confirmed that he had received aid from Swaggart.³⁴ Despite the group's aid to Mozambican refugee camps in Frontline countries such as Zimbabwe, Swaggart's frequent trips to South Africa and the Mozambican and Zimbabwean governments' official investigations of the activities of his group reinforce allegations that its real role may be that of supporting RENAMO.³⁵

The evangelical right's involvement has been further revealed since Grey's 1988 arrest, trial and imprisonment for security offenses.³⁶ Grey was working out of Malawi for a little known pentecostal sect called Shekinah Ministries, an organization with close RENAMO ties since 1985.³⁷ Shekinah preaches in RENAMO-controlled areas of Central Mozambique and transmits messages back to the RENAMO propaganda office in Washington.³⁸ Grey admitted that the messages were military in nature, giving RENAMO's account of clashes with Mozambican troops, numbers of casualties, claims of aircraft shot down and so on.³⁹ Shekinah, whose headquarters according to Grey are currently in Jacksonville, Florida, sent fundraising letters to various U.S. fundamentalist churches, raising money ostensibly for the purchase of thousands of bibles in Portuguese and in various Mozambican vernacular languages. Since the vast majority of people living in rural Mozambique cannot read, it is reasonable to suspect that the money has been used for other purposes.⁴⁰

Grey's captured diaries also included references to a ministry called the End Time Handmaidens (ETH), based in Arkansas.⁴¹ The relationship between Grey and the Handmaidens was confirmed in the ministry's February/March 1988 newsletter which encouraged Christians to "keep praying and fasting for Ian Grey," who has been "held a prisoner in Mozambique for four months on trumped-up charges."⁴² Additionally, the group worked in Zimbabwe with Shekinah Ministries.⁴³ In the U.S., Shekinah had very significant public relations connections. It solicited and received television coverage of its role in Mozambique on both Jim and Tammy Bakker's popular and now ended

RENAMO landmines are placed on roads travelled by Mozambican soldiers but also by civilians, especially children and women en route to their fields. The mines, Hatch noted, were "designed not to kill, only to maim," thereby creating a long-run obstacle for the government to care for the wounded.

PTL program and on Pat Robertson's 700 Club.⁴⁴

On balance, ETH never played as important a role for RENAMO as did Shekinah. In fact, ETH dissociated itself from Shekinah once it recognized Shekinah's politico-military profile in Africa and elsewhere.

The one prominent church leader who never equivocated on his love for RENAMO was presidential aspirant Reverend Pat Robertson. In April of 1986, Pat Robertson's 700 Club aired a

news feature, entitled "The Bush War," produced by CBN reporter Scott Hatch.⁴⁵ The segment featured film footage of a guerrilla exercise in the use of explosives. "A guerrilla war is fought with the mind as much as with bullets," said Hatch as the camera focused on RENAMO landmines which are placed on roads travelled by Mozambican soldiers but also by civilians, especially children and women en route to their

fields. The mines, Hatch noted, were "designed not to kill, only to maim," thereby creating a long-run obstacle for the government to care for the wounded.⁴⁶ Hatch's journey was made possible by Thomas Schaaf from the RENAMO office in Washington, DC.⁴⁷

Money and Materiel

James Blanchard III, a Louisiana businessperson, also appeared on the 700 Club to promote the RENAMO cause. Since 1986, Blanchard has provided medical supplies and radios for the rebel group.⁴⁸ He also said that he contributed about \$3,000 a month to RENAMO, and went on to estimate a total donation of \$50,000 to \$75,000 from 1984 to 1986.⁴⁹ RENAMO support does not end here. The U.S. chapter of the World Anti-Communist League, headed by John Singlaub of Iran-contra and post-Marcos Manila infamy, provides "material and psychological support for RENAMO."⁵⁰ Indirect support also comes from some familiar national organizations, including the Joseph Coors [Beer] Foundation, a major capital supporter of Heritage, the far-right Free Congress Foundation and the secretive Council for National Policy, all of which support RENAMO.

Mozambique Today

Despite the negotiation of a partial ceasefire with RENAMO on December 1, 1990, and repeated pledges from the de Klerk government in South Africa, RENAMO's violence continues. One of the stipulations of the accord was total cessation of

44. Paul Gifford, *The Religious Right in Southern Africa* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 1988), p. 80.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

46. *Op. cit.*, n. 36, p. 198.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Op. cit.*, n. 15.

49. *Op. cit.*, n. 15, and letters from James Blanchard to RENAMO.

50. Raymond Copson, *Mozambique, Conflict Assessment and U.S. Policy: A CRS Report for the U.S. Congress*, July 21, 1988, p. 51.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Steve Askin, "Mozambique Terrorists Backed by Evangelical Right," *National Catholic Reporter*, September 18, 1987.

35. This according to Australian Broadcasting Company reporter Debi Richards. See: Sara Diamond, "Spiritual Warfare" (Boston: South End Press, 1989), p. 199.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

37. *Op. cit.*, n. 31, p. 2.

38. Steve Askin, "Mission to RENAMO: The Militarization of the Religious Right," *Issue*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1990, pp. 31-32.

39. *Op. cit.*, n. 31.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Op. cit.*, n. 38.

42. *Op. cit.*, n. 35, p. 199.

43. *Ibid.*

RENAMO attacks in the economically crucial Beira and Limpopo transportation corridors. These attacks have continued. Electrical power to Maputo, Mozambique's capital, has been cut with increasing frequency.

In eleven years of war, RENAMO has caused the deaths of at least a million Mozambicans, most of them under age 21. This is in a country of just over 16.5 million. The endless warfare has created a cultural climate of generalized violence, flooding the country with so much automatic weaponry that Mozambique is now a major contraband small-arms market for South Africa. Armed bands that have nothing to do with RENAMO roam Mozambique. These are the *petit-bandidos* — small-time bandits, composed of individuals whose only sense of activity for the



Anders Nilsson/Mozambique Information Agency

Mozambican mother and child recuperate from a RENAMO attack. As in Central America, health care facilities have been specifically targeted by the bandidos.

last ten years has come from killing, maiming and torturing.

Peace talks now going on in Rome offer the possibility of ending the violence and normalizing life in Mozambique. A new constitution, multi-party elections, and opening Mozambique's economy to private capital are part of the process. All such changes should be understood in the context of economic and social prostration. As in Nicaragua, western policy, flouting international law, has reacted to popular revolution with carrot and stick: the stick of devastating "covert" violence and the carrot of diplomatic and economic blackmail.

The fate of Mozambique and other newly independent countries like it depends in part on our capacity and determination to expose the public and private networks in western nations which are responsible for the stick of covert wars. Without the threat of the stick, the carrot loses its appeal, allowing emerging nations more freedom to determine their own economic and political future. ●

● PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

Counterrevolution: U.S. Foreign Policy by Edward and Regula Boorstein (New York: International, 1990), 338 pp.

Very well-documented review of the U.S. policy of counterrevolution. Analysis of what the authors call "atomic diplomacy." This timely study of U.S. intervention in its many guises deserves the widest possible reading.

A History of Survival

- 1962 Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) organized in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- 1964 Guerrilla war for independence begins.
- 1972 Nixon administration loans \$435 million to Portugal under Azores agreement.
- 1973 Portugal deploys 40,000 more troops to quell the uprising.
- 1974 Dictatorship falls. Cease-fire. Portugal agrees to withdraw.
- 1976 After 470 years of colonial rule, Mozambique gains independence. Samora Machel, head of FRELIMO, becomes president.
- 1976 Mozambique closes its border with white-ruled Rhodesia, in solidarity with Zimbabwean independence movement.
- 1977 Ken Flowers, head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), organizes some Mozambican colonial forces and others into Mozambican National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO). Supported by Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa; the stated aim is to "create maximum confusion for the Mozambique government."
- 1976-79 Border clashes between Mozambican and Rhodesian forces escalate.
- 1979 Lancaster House talks and Black majority rule in Rhodesia.
- 1980 Rhodesia becomes Zimbabwe. Border reopened. MNR moves bases to South Africa.
- 1981 Mozambique exposes a CIA spy ring working out of the U.S. embassy in Maputo. Five U.S. nationals expelled. (See *CAIB* Number 12.) The CIA had direct cooperative links with South African Intelligence and was involved in the murder of 12 and kidnapping of three ANC activists living in Mozambique.
- 1984 Mozambique and South Africa sign the Nkomati Accords, which commit Pretoria to ending its support for RENAMO.
- 1985 200 kilograms of RENAMO documents captured by Mozambique at Gorongosa detail RENAMO's command and supply lines from South Africa. (Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report* — London: Commonwealth Secretariat & James Currey, 1989)
- 1986 Mozambican President Samora Machel dies in plane crash enroute to peace talks with South Africa. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests South African complicity in the fatal accident. (See *CAIB* Number 27.)
- 1987 In one month, as many as 450 military radio transmissions between RENAMO bases and South Africa are intercepted. (*New York Times*, November 30, 1987, p. A7.)
- 1988 In Homoine, 424 civilians killed in worst MNR massacre to date. (*New York Times*, May 11, 1988, p. A18)
- 1989 Paulo Oliveira, a RENAMO leader who took advantage of FRELIMO's amnesty law of 1987 publicly admits that at least 90% of RENAMO forces were *raptados*, meaning kidnapped or press-ganged into RENAMO units. (William Minter, *The Mozambican National Resistance, As Described by Ex-Participants*, 1989)
- December 1, 1991 RENAMO and FRELIMO sign "partial cease-fire." Peace talks ongoing in Rome, Italy. RENAMO attacks continue in Mozambique.

— **Research: Sessy Nyman, an anti-apartheid activist and leader of the Mozambique solidarity movement from South Carolina.**

The case of the disappearing diplomat:

A Dirty Little Exfiltration in Uganda

Anthony L. Kimery

For nearly two weeks beginning September 10, 1988, a State Department "back channel" of communication between the CIA and the Secretary of State's office was abuzz with cable traffic about the disappearance of an important North Korean envoy at the North Korean mission in Kampala, Uganda.

That official was Chong Man-Su. His disappearance caused a tense diplomatic rift between the U.S. and Uganda, which was reacting to North Korea's claim that the U.S. or one of its Western allies was behind the mystery. The U.S. embassy adamantly denied any complicity and offered a superficially credible explanation. The incident seems to have died a quick and inconsequential death. But not before the CIA and the State

"When there's reason to believe that vital intelligence can be obtained from someone, a country's sovereignty is the least of your concerns."

Department were almost caught red-handed illegally whisking Chong out of the country.

The truth of the matter was that the U.S. had been complicit in Chong's disappearance. Chong was exfiltrated out of the country in a covert operation that, while engineered by the CIA, was actually overseen and covered by the State Department.¹ It was a brazen act which violated both Ugandan sovereignty and State Department procedures for handling defectors and asylum seekers.²

According to a recently retired senior CIA officer, however, "exfiltrations of this sort—in which some friendly country's sovereignty is violated—is the norm, not the exception." He explained that because Chong was believed to possess intelligence on PLO activities in Uganda, the ends justified the means.

When there's reason to believe that vital intelligence can be

Anthony L. Kimery is an award-winning investigative journalist based in Washington, specializing in national security issues whose work has appeared in the mainstream press. He is currently Washington Bureau Chief for *Money Laundering Alert*, a Miami-based publication. [Editor's note: this story is partly based on Department of State documents which the author made available to the magazine for the purpose of verification.]

1. That the operation was illegal is admitted in State Department documents on the matter.

2. That this was also a violation of internal State Department procedures was determined by close reading of a classified State Department policy paper on the subject.

obtained from someone, a country's sovereignty is the least of your concerns. It's not so much of a problem though when you have someone who's willing to defect but you create a circumstance whereby he's got no choice. Either way, whether the intelligence is justified in getting or not, you're breaking someone's laws to do so. This is a situation which has repeatedly risked U.S. relations...with other countries.

Chong was of such interest to the U.S. that the State Department and the CIA were respectively willing to risk Uganda's severing diplomatic relations and nixing U.S. intelligence collection efforts there if the operation were exposed.

Both intelligence and counterintelligence officials justified the snatch by asserting that Chong possessed information about "PLO-linked terrorists" working in Uganda under the cover of PLO-run businesses. The sources, who demanded anonymity, claimed that the PLO had strong ties to North Korea.

They also claimed that Chong, through his official capacity as North Korea's agricultural liaison to Uganda knew of PLO-backed operations there through Samed, which operates various business enterprises in more than thirty countries and manages a vast investment portfolio estimated at \$50 million. Samed forms the core of the PLO's economic ministry. At the time of Chong's defection and kidnapping, Samed had a particularly large agricultural project in Uganda and sources explained that "counterterrorist officials" believed Chong was capable of enlightening them about the PLO's business in Uganda. According to the officials, the "U.S. war on terrorism" legitimized such risky and potentially illegal extremes as this operation.

Copies of State Department cables on Chong's exfiltration provide an intriguing behind-the-scenes look at U.S. cloak-and-dagger diplomacy in the making and how, in this case, it clearly and deliberately violated another nation's laws.

The Fine Art of Political Prevarication

In one of these documents, 18-year Foreign Service officer and then-deputy embassy chief, Robert Gribbin III, offers a virtual how-to guide for concocting a cover story for intelligence activities; in this instance, he created a cover story which may have caused the torture, and perhaps the deaths, of innocent civilians who were wrongly implicated by the U.S. in abetting Chong's defection.

Furthermore, because of media allegations of surreptitious U.S. complicity which the embassy would neither confirm nor deny, "both we and the British, not to mention South Koreans, are at a heightened state of alert regarding possible North Korean provocations" against U.S., British, and South Korean interests, Gribbin noted in one of his cables to Washington.

This sordid affair began on September 15, 1988 when Uganda's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a confidential diplomatic communique to the U.S. embassy and other foreign missions in Kampala notifying them that Chong was missing and requesting that they provide any pertinent information. Four days later, North Korea publicly announced that Chong had disappeared and strongly suggested that the British or Americans might have been involved. Gribbin noted in a cable to Washington that the embassy had responded by telling journalists that "standing State Department instructions for responding to this sort of question at any time, and any place in the world, concerning any individual is not to comment upon, confirm or deny any such allegation or report."

The North Korean ambassador, Kim Tae-Ryong, charging that Chong was nothing more than a cotton official in North Korea's Trade Ministry attached to the Ugandan army, said he had been "kidnapped by South Korean puppets." South Korea dismissed the allegation, countering that North Koreans were

"we believe this issue will fade away over the next few days. Unfortunately, a missing person is not a significant event here...Many Ugandans have gone 'missing' over the past decade...either by their own choice into exile or hiding, or to prison or death at the hands of security or army personnel."

harassing South Koreans in Kampala. In fact, Chong is now known to have been a high-level North Korean intelligence officer.

In the midst of all the accusations, what seemed clear was that Chong was last seen in the vicinity of the British, South Korean, and U.S. embassies. Consequently, the rumor quickly spread that Chong had taken refuge in the U.S. chancery. Although the embassy had no comment, one official informed Washington that he had denied the charge in an off-the-record interview with a local journalist.

Things Fall Apart

The situation quickly deteriorated. On September 21, Agence France Presse, citing a "Western diplomatic source," reported that Chong was indeed "holed up" in the U.S. embassy. Gribbin cabled Washington to say that the story had included a denial by an unnamed U.S. official, and nonchalantly calmed his nervous Washington superiors by asserting that the "Ugandans are bemused by the vehemence between Koreans on this matter." The bottom line in his message to Washington was one of reassurance: "we believe this issue will fade away over the next few days. Unfortunately, a missing person is not a significant event here...Many Ugandans have gone 'missing' over the past decade...either by their own choice into exile or hiding, or to prison or death at the hands of security or army personnel."

Gribbin reassured the State Department that "we see no current attempt to pursue this matter too vigorously by local authorities. For example, we have not been contacted by the police." But the Ugandans weren't about to let the U.S. off the hook so easily. That afternoon, Gribbin was summoned by Uganda's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tarsis Kabwegyere, who pointedly asked Gribbin about the allegations that Chong was hiding in the embassy. The matter, he told Gribbin, "was confusing" and "a problem for his government." Gribbin said he told Kabwegyere that "my response to all queries was consistent with standing U.S. Government policy which was simply not to comment upon such charges," adding, "I said I was not in the business of kidnapping."

Following the questions from Kabwegyere, Gribbin was grilled by Foreign Minister Paul Ssemogerere "who asked if I thought the man had been kidnapped," Gribbin reported. "I said no, he probably decided to take off just as do hundreds of East Germans and others who regularly flee communist rule. Again [he] asked my opinion if I thought the man was still in Uganda, I replied that if I were he, I would be long gone."

The CIA-State Shell Game

Gribbin, though, had been central to Chong's puzzling disappearance. The evidence is in a September 26 report he sent to Charles Freeman, the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for African affairs. The report shows how Gribbin plotted a false story to cover the tracks of the embassy and the CIA, which had coordinated and managed Chong's departure from Uganda.

"We're not out of the woods on this one yet," Gribbin began his report. "Minister Ssemogerere called me in early Saturday morning to review our conversation of the previous afternoon and to advise of a State House request that I be more explicit." He told Freeman that three days earlier, the CIA's chief of station (COS)³ had met with Jim Muhweze, the Ugandan chief of internal intelligence, during which the COS had told Muhweze that he had learned that Chong "was a defector, that he was safely out of the country and that his departure would not be an embarrassment to [Uganda's] President [Yoweri] Museveni." Gribbin reported that the COS "was of the view that this conversation would terminate Ugandan investigations."

During his meeting with Ssemogerere, Gribbin reported that, "believing that because of [the COS's] talk the previous night with Muhwezi of which Ssemogerere was not aware, that perhaps I should have a quiet word with the President on the matter. The Minister agreed, saying that would be fine."

Later that day, following a State House lunch for Nancy Reagan, Gribbin met with President Museveni on the "vast expanse of the State House's lawn." There, Gribbin reiterated the story that the CIA chief of station had given to Muhwezi. According to Gribbin's report to Washington, Museveni had two points in response. First, he was "miffed" that the usual procedures for "refugees and asylum seekers" were not fol-

3. The COS cannot be named here because of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act prohibiting the disclosure of the names of CIA officers. Nor can any person on his staff be named. The COS was identified in Ellen Ray, *et. al.*, *Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa*, (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1979).

lowed.

Uganda is a party to the United Nations protocol on asylum and is considered a "friendly" country by the U.S. Based on that, State De-

partment procedures for dealing with persons seeking asylum in a friendly third country appear to have been violated, since the procedures for coordinating asylum requests were not followed.

"Secondly," Gribbin said, "since the individual appeared to have departed Uganda illegally, the President was concerned that some foreign government or intelligence service operated in direct contravention" of Ugandan law. "That was not acceptable," Museveni said.

"The President said that just as he was not permitting North Koreans to usurp Uganda's police power by conducting its own searches and roadblocks, he could not permit others to act illegally either," Gribbin said. Museveni then asked Gribbin if he knew how Chong had left Uganda. Gribbin said no. Gribbin reported that Museveni then "asked my advice of what should be done and I suggested whatever happened was done and that doing nothing further was perhaps best."

Museveni, however, was not satisfied. He formally requested that the U.S. turn over whatever information it had on Chong. "Where do we go from here?" Gribbin asked Washington.

He outlined three options: "no further reply, recount events as they transpired, or provide a cover story." The first option was no good. Gribbin explained: "I received a direct request from the chief of state and feel we must reply...Consequences of mistrust and antagonism would be too great if we demurred." The second option also posed a dilemma: "Telling the truth would mean having to eat crow. Museveni would recognize, of course, that I knew more than I divulged. I believe he would react; perhaps by expelling me or [the] COS. He all but said that if we acknowledge blatantly violating his laws, he would be bound to do something."⁴

The Big Lie

That left only one alternative. Noting that Museveni already suspected that Chong had escaped via Lake Victoria (which abuts Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), Gribbin detailed how a "credible cover story" could be concocted. Supposedly based on a debriefing of Chong, an elaborate tale was given the Ugandans about how Chong had defected to the U.S. In it, the U.S. had played no role. But this cover story posed considerable risk, Gribbin emphasized. "It indicates that Western services violated Kenyan sovereignty as well. If we go with the story, it will be essential that [Chong] stick with it forever."

The cover story also put innocent Ugandans in jeopardy, since it implicated several taxi drivers in Chong's "escape." "Undoubtedly some taxi drivers and others" would be picked up for interrogation by Ugandan police, Gribbin pointed out, but, he sagely noted, "maybe some smugglers [will be] caught" in the process. Gribbin reported that he had "coordinated this mes-

4. Another immediate concern would be the potential problems for U.S. corporate interests in Uganda, including Exxon, Mobil and Eastman Kodak.

"Telling the truth would mean having to eat crow. Museveni would recognize, of course, that I knew more than I divulged. I believe he would react; perhaps by expelling me or [the] COS."

sage" with the CIA station chief, and asked Freeman for his "thinking on this matter," saying he was "prepared to go which ever way Washington decides."

Superb Leadership Management, U.S. Style

The following day Gribbin received a cable from Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead. "We welcome your suggestions," Whitehead told him, "and are working with the CIA on instructions you will receive shortly." Whitehead's message also conveyed slaps on the back for Gribbin and everyone else who was involved in getting Chong out of the country.

"Although we recognize overall mission performance in this sensitive matter was a first-class team effort — with superb credit to go around a plenty," Whitehead said, "we especially applaud the superb leadership management, and cool judgement you brought to bear at each stage; congratulations. Please also be generous in passing around 'well done's'...to all who helped make it possible."

Although it has been two years, the State Department still refuses to comment on the Chong affair, least of all on the documents which disclose the illegal U.S. role in the matter. What is clear is that the embassy was willing to stick out its neck — and those of the unwitting Ugandans who would be rounded up by the security forces — to successfully bring the Chong affair to an end. Gribbin himself feared the consequences of the Ugandans learning the truth about the Chong operation and the pivotal U.S. role in it: "We may be covering our tracks for some time to come," he cautioned Freeman.

What has become of Chong Man-Su — as well as why the State Department and the CIA were so willing to take such risks — remains a mystery. What clearly is not a mystery is why this little episode is one of the U.S.'s most recent secrets. ●

● PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

If an Agent Knocks: Federal Investigators and Your Rights (New York: Center for Constitutional Rights, 1989)

This booklet is a practical guide to dealing with the FBI and related agencies. In both English and Spanish, it answers such questions as:


- WHAT IS POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE?
- DO I HAVE TO TALK TO THE FBI?
- WHAT IF I SUSPECT SURVEILLANCE?
- WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS?
- AVAILABLE FROM:

CCR, 666 Broadway, NYC, 10012 (212) 614-6464



Breaking with Dependency and Dictatorship: Hope For Haiti

Fritz Longchamp and Worth Cooley-Prost



Associated Press

Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who on February 2, 1991 became the first democratically elected president of Haiti, offers new hope to an impoverished and often invaded country.

Despite close ties to Haiti, most people in the United States know little about their small neighbor. What they do know is generally confined to crisis-oriented news reporting and titillating Hollywood images of bizarre voodoo practices. That ignorance and stereotyping are functional for U.S. conservative power structures whose interests are often antithetical to those of the Haitian people. A realistic portrayal of U.S. policy would appall those Americans who affirm genuine democracy and basic human rights.

In November 1989, newly-appointed U.S. Ambassador Alvin P. Adams, Jr.¹ arrived in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Giving speeches about democratic elections in fluent Creole, literally from the moment he set foot on Haitian soil, Adams was soon known as *Bourik Chaje* ("loaded burro") based on the Haitian proverb that a loaded burro can't stand still.

Fritz Longchamp, an internationally recognized Haitian analyst, is Executive Director of the Washington Office on Haiti (WOH), an analysis and public education center. WOH publishes the *Haitian News and Resource Service*, the journal *Haiti Beat*, and other materials (contact Washington Office on Haiti, 110 Maryland Avenue, NE, Washington, DC 20002).

Worth Cooley-Prost, senior writer for a biomedical research consulting firm, has written articles on social justice issues in Haiti, works with several U.S.-based grassroots support groups, and currently chairs the WOH Board of Directors.

1. Now 47, Adams entered the Foreign Service upon receiving a law degree

Haitians have long known that the U.S. Embassy² has more or less quietly shared power with the string of dictators who have ruled the country since the U.S. occupation of 1915-1934. Adams' very high profile and open involvement, however, are new behavior for U.S. ambassadors in Port-au-Prince. When virtually all sectors of Haitian society were calling for President Prosper Avril to step down in early 1990, the dictator left Haiti (for Florida) only after a wee-hours chat across his kitchen table with Adams. The U.S. press portrayed this incident in a positive light and Adams as a helpful, progressive force. Ignored was the strong implication of undue U.S. influence over the internal affairs of a sovereign country.

in 1967. After a U.S. Agency for International Development detail as Area Development Officer in Viet Nam's Quang Nam province in 1968, he worked in Saigon as Special Assistant to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker from 1969 to 1970 and as embassy political officer from 1971 to 1972. Returning to the U.S., he was a staff member of National Security Council from 1972 to 1974 and special assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from 1974 to 1976. After several senior level positions at State, Adams served as ambassador to Djibouti from 1983 to 1985. He was Deputy Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism at State from 1987 until being sent to Haiti, reportedly at his own request.

2. In July 1986, the U.S. ambassadorship to Haiti became vacant. One U.S. diplomat interested in assignment to a French-speaking country took a look at the Haiti file, then decided not to apply. "This is a CIA assignment," he said in a personal communication, "and I don't feel like fighting with them."

In March 1990, Avril was replaced by a provisional government headed by former Supreme Court Justice Ertha Pascal-Trouillot and a 19-member State Council representing all sectors of Haitian society. Adams continued to press his election agenda, despite repeated warnings from Haitian leaders that democratic elections could not occur in the continuing climate of Duvalierist and military-sponsored terror. During the summer of 1990, a number of major players in the Duvalier regime returned from exile, including Roger LaFontant, a leader of the *brutal Tonton Macoute* organization. Although the Minister of Justice immediately issued a warrant for LaFontant, the military refused to implement it — a clear signal that the Duvalierist system was alive and well. In October, the Duvalierist party even nominated LaFontant as its presidential candidate.

The situation changed overnight when, in response to the LaFontant candidacy, a coalition of democratic parties nominated former Salesian priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Voter registration leapt by over 35% in the days after Aristide's nomination. Publicly, the State Department said it would accept whatever president the people chose. According to U.S. businessman Vernon Gentry, U.S. neutrality in the electioneering was only theoretical. Marc Bazin, Washington's flag bearer, was "adequately financed by the U.S. embassy to build a political machine."³

On December 16, Aristide won by a huge margin.⁴ This victory came at a time when, thanks to vigorous U.S. efforts, countries throughout Latin and Central America and the Caribbean were electing "pro-market economy" leaders. Aristide, a proponent of liberation theology and long an incisive critic of U.S. policy, has consistently urged economic justice. Thus, as most of the hemisphere was turning right, Haiti turned left.

It remains now for the U.S., which has a long history of destabilization of even mildly leftist governments, to fulfill its pledge to support a democratically elected leadership in Haiti. It would be impossible, given Haiti's current economic frailty and geographic proximity, for any Haitian government to withstand direct opposition from the United States. Not only is the U.S. more powerful militarily, it also largely controls the Haitian economy. Although geographically incorrect, the saying "Miami is the capital of Haiti" reflects economic reality. The official exchange rate, set during the Marine occupation 60 years ago, is still 5 gourdes to the U.S. dollar; virtually all prices of consumer goods in Haiti are listed in dollars rather than gourdes. An examination of checks written in Haiti tends to confirm the strong U.S. role — often, the only cancellation stamps they bear are those of Florida banks.

3. Vernon Gentry, *Times of the Americas*, (Washington), December 26, 1990.

4. At the Port-au-Prince polling place where one of the authors observed the count, there were 189 voters. Seven ballots were spoiled in the presidential race (2 blank, 5 marked more than once); of the remaining 182, 171 votes were cast for Aristide. Marc Bazin, the former World Bank executive widely perceived as the State Department's favorite son, got 5 votes, coming in just behind spoiled ballots.

Marine Invasions: 1492 to 1934

When Columbus landed on Haiti in 1492, he set a precedent for 500 years of invasions in this hemisphere. Within 20 years of what is arrogantly termed his "discovery," virtually all the half-million indigenous Taino and Arawak were dead, ravaged by European diseases and the brutalities of enslavement. African slaves were brought to replace them.

In 1804, Haitian slaves staged the world's first successful slave revolt, making Haiti the second independent republic in the New World after the U.S. A successful slave revolution was hardly good news in pre-Civil War America, which responded with a policy of systematic isolation. For the balance of the 1800s, while encouraging a lopsided economic relationship benefiting its interests, the U.S. withheld diplomatic recognition of Haitian sovereignty. When official relations were finally established in 1886, a black diplomat was deemed socially unacceptable, and the first Haitian envoy was specifically instructed to stay in New York rather than going on to Washington.

While it did not ignore the economic utility of the relationship, U.S. 20th century policy focused primarily on Haiti's strategic location. The Windward Passage, which Haiti shares with Cuba, determines shipping access to much of this hemisphere. In a recent Op-Ed piece, Vernon Gentry quoted former Secretary of State George Shultz, meeting at the White House with

It remains now for the U.S., which has a long history of destabilization of even mildly leftist governments, to fulfill its pledge to support a democratically elected leadership in Haiti.


U.S. businessmen, as saying "...the commercial and military importance of the Windward Passage ... must not be jeopardized. [It] must remain politically favorable to Washington and our allies. ...We shall not permit that vital waterway to be straddled by hostile governments."⁵

Attempts to control the Passage go all the way back to the Spanish-American War. In 1915 Washington invoked the Monroe Doctrine and sent Marines, ostensibly to protect 40 or so U.S. citizens living there from "German threat."⁶ The real reason was to prevent German control of the waterway.

After the invasion, the U.S. was confronted by a Haitian constitution which specifically excluded foreigners from owning property in Haiti. A young Washington politician named Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then assistant secretary of the Navy, promptly drafted a new constitution, and in 1916 the Haitian American Sugar Company (HASCO) became the first U.S. business to open its door in Haiti. Whether through psychic input, or inside information, the HASCO company was actually founded in Philadelphia in 1912 — four years before it would have been allowed by law to put down roots in Haitian soil.

5. Gentry, *op. cit.*

6. The Marines had actually invaded Haiti very briefly the year before, dropping in long enough to pick up Haiti's gold reserves and take them to the City Bank of New York. The gold remains in U.S. custody today.



Keystone

“Papa Doc” Duvalier passes the torch of dictatorship on to his son “Baby Doc.”

The Duvalier Years

The Marine occupation continued through 1934 and may be credited with two important “achievements.” First, Haiti was left with a military structure that still serves as regulator of the country’s political, social and economic life. Second, the Marines built a road network that gave the urban mulatto elite access to peasants’ production and provided a route for moving raw materials to the ports for shipping to foreign markets. Port-au-Prince was firmly established as the functional center of the country. The urban mulatto elite controlled political power while white, non-Haitians dominated the economy.

This alliance between the politically powerful mulattos in Port-au-Prince and foreign economic powers led directly to the Noirist⁷ backlash reflected in the 1957 election of Francois (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier. Promptly dispensing with the need for elections, Duvalier declared himself President for Life. The bloody cruelties which marked the 30-year Duvalierist dictatorship rivalled those of the colonial French slavers. With U.S. military “advisers” providing some training and plenty of weaponry, Duvalier created the *Tonton Macoute* as his personal security force. By the time son “Baby Doc” fled Haiti in February 1986, the *Macoutes* were estimated to outnumber the Army seven to one. Officially known as the Volunteers for National Security, they received no salary but were granted full freedom to extract whatever they wanted for themselves from the areas under their control. In exchange, they protected Duvalier’s political and economic interests throughout Haiti.

The Kennedy government had little use for “Papa Doc” and was actively involved in attempts to overthrow his regime. With

7. Noirism refers to the ideology of the black middle and upper class who were denied participation in leadership roles based on skin color, despite their academic backgrounds. They advocated that blacks should be in charge of Haiti since the population was 95% black.

the Cuban revolution, however, U.S. interests changed. Haiti’s cooperation became essential to the success of U.S. efforts to have Cuba expelled from the O.A.S. in 1963. From then on, Duvalier enjoyed the full diplomatic and economic support of the U.S. When Francois Duvalier died on April 12, 1971, the U.S. ambassador Clinton Knox was the only diplomat present at the midnight swearing-in of 19-year-old Jean-Claude Duvalier as the new President for Life. The U.S. continued to supply his government as it had his father’s with economic, political and military support.

With U.S. military “advisers” providing some training and plenty of weaponry, Duvalier created the *Tonton Macoute* as his personal security force.

Although the Carter administration professed an active policy of support for human rights, conditions for the Haitian people changed only in terms of somewhat expanded freedom of speech. When the democratic opposition in Haiti attempted to create a political base, however, Duvalier cracked down on the press, the human rights community, independent trade unions, and the political opposition. The U.S. issued a perfunctory formal protest over this broad repression, but business as usual continued.

The Eighties: “Development” Years

As Haiti moved from being one of the poorest to the poorest country in the hemisphere, Washington promoted “stability” and ignored the root causes of Haiti’s problems. Although military intervention remained an option, U.S. policy during the 1980s focused on food, forums, and firearms. Primarily through the Agency for International Development (AID), the U.S. pushed programs designed to shift agricultural focus from locally-controlled subsistence farming to foreign and elite-controlled export production; to manipulate international forums so that alliances among Third World countries could not occur; and to continue arming the Haitian military.

Food Security

It has been said that the only thing wrong with the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is that the Haitian people can’t survive it. The most glaring effect of this “development” policy was the increase of absolute poverty in Haiti from 50% to 80% during the 1980s. While U.S.-owned factories did create about 60,000 jobs between 1975 and 1988, wages—approximately \$3 a day—are too low to live on. (It has been estimated that each employed Haitian feeds six others.) Assembly industry profits do not stay in Haiti. Rather they flow north to the corporations which own the industries and to the financial institutions which fronted the investment capital.

The agricultural economy, on the other hand, pays better wages and provides 400,000 jobs. Fully three-fourths of Haitians

depend on sharecropper farming for their living. This sector, however, is in grave decline. The ironically-named "Food Security" policy—pushed by the Reagan administration—undermined subsistence farming and offered inducements to Haiti to import much of its food from the U.S.

Its argument went like this: Inefficient peasant farmers can't possibly compete with the quality, quantity and price of modern U.S. agricultural production. Thus, instead of wasting their time, Haitians should buy their food from the U.S. To get the hard currency needed to pay for it, they should work in the new assembly industry factories conveniently located right in Port-au-Prince, thanks to the economic incentives provided by the CBI. The CBI is financed with loans which must be repaid in dollars, thereby deepening dependency on the U.S. and the financial institutions it controls, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The lure of these urban assembly industry jobs shifted tens of thousands of subsistence farmers to Port-au-Prince. In the countryside, they could at least feed their children. In the city, however, where unemployment is estimated at 80%, many starve. As the peasants left the land, it was taken over by the wealthy conglomerates which grow export crops like winter strawberries and mangoes instead of staples. Additional agricultural land has been lost to deforestation. [See page 59.]

"... donating food on a routine basis is like treating a bad tooth with aspirin. The benefit lasts only as long as the last dose, and in the meantime the infection progresses until it becomes fatal."

—Antoine Adrien

Government and private food donation schemes have exacerbated the problems of hunger, cash crop agriculture and unemployment. Besides fostering foreign dependence, much food "aid" ends up on the black market. The Haitian farmer can hardly compete with food that started out free.

Both U.S. policymakers and the Duvalier governments were happy to encourage food relief programs sponsored by Americans who were "concerned" about poverty in Haiti. Antoine Adrien, a leader in the Haitian movement for democracy and human rights, has said that "... donating food on a routine basis is like treating a bad tooth with aspirin. The benefit lasts only as long as the last dose, and in the meantime the infection progresses until it becomes fatal."⁸

Similarly, various American groups have swamped the island with donated used clothing, which puts Haitian weavers and tailors out of business. There is a poignant irony to the ubiquitous sight of impoverished Haitians who have never been past elementary school wearing T-shirts from U.S. colleges and expensive summer camps.

8. "Haiti and U.S. Relations," Seminar, Arlington, Virginia, September 19, 1990.

International Forums

Haitian dependency, exacerbated by the "Food Security" program, was deepened in the 1980s. The U.S. actively prevented the formation of coalitions of Third World nations in the hemisphere and instead, encouraged participation in such U.S.-dominated institutions as the OAS. Within this controlled framework "stability" could be maintained while Haiti and other poor countries were played off against each other. The economic "carrots" were a factory here, some cash there. The "sticks" were trade and loan leverage and the threat of a U.S. invasion.

"The U.S. 'development' model for Haiti was imposed "without the participation or even the knowledge of most of the Haitian people... [who] are paying for the prosperity of an elite and of foreigners by their very lives. [Poverty and illiteracy are] an integral part of an unacknowledged economic slave system..."

—Mary Evelyn Jegen, Pax Christi, 1987.

The cornerstone of this policy remains the CBI, which forces every country to sacrifice its own policies and domestic interests to attract U.S. investment. An essential element of this strategy is low labor costs, which often disregard costs of living and violate fundamental labor rights. U.S. corporations which have abandoned chunks of their domestic production and "runaway" to exploit cheap Haitian labor include: General Electric, GTE, Maidenform, Honeywell, Stride-Rite and Hagar.

Low cost is not the only attraction. U.S. corporations want the freedom to exploit without interference. Until November 1990, baseballs used in major league games were made in Haiti by the Rawlings Company, owned by the Ohio-based Figge Corporation. While they sold in the U.S. for \$10 to \$11, the 1000 Haitian women who hand-stitched each ball 108 times received only 10 to 13 cents a piece—if they completed their minimum daily quota. For the past five years, the Haitian Corporate Campaign, Pax Christi USA, and a network of Figge Corporation stockholders have worked together to raise the issue of Third World women's employment practices before the American public. At the end of November 1990, two weeks before the Haitian elections, Rawlings suddenly announced the relocation of the Port-au-Prince plant to Costa Rica, where higher wages are being paid. Rawlings cited "political instability" as the reason for its move. By that it meant the "instability" of the first free, fair and democratic election in Haiti's history—that of Jean-Bertrand Aristide—in contrast to the "stability" afforded by successive Duvalierist and military dictatorships.

Aristide has consistently denounced the U.S.-inspired development model for Haiti. His platform calls for an inward-oriented economic program designed to create an economic base that will benefit all sectors of Haitian society. Given its past history, the U.S. may well balk at anything it perceives as interfering with the ability of transnational corporations to operate as they please and extract maximum profit.

Arming the Military

The third facet of U.S. policy toward Haiti is military. Although the Haitian military academy is no longer staffed entirely by U.S. instructors, every Haitian officer who graduates from the academy receives training in the U.S. Both the *Tonton Macoutes* and, later, the paramilitary Leopard forces were schooled and outfitted by the U.S. Given this close relationship, it is not surprising that U.S. policy planners are confident that their interests will be protected in Haiti.

During the Duvalier years, most direct arms supplies from the U.S. were covertly channeled through Israel. The U.S. thus hoped to avoid awkward questions about supporting brutal dictatorships. In February 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti for France aboard a U.S. Air Force transport jet, appointing Henri Namphy head of the military government he left behind.

The Namphy regime and those which succeeded it through November 1987 – all of which received direct U.S. military assistance – were responsible for more civilian deaths in 21 months than Jean-Claude Duvalier managed in 15 years.

U.S. policymakers then felt free to resume open military assistance and Congress voted several million dollars in direct military aid. Within two weeks of Duvalier's exile, the U.S. gave the military government \$500,000 in anti-riot gear. This gift supported the domestic repression and control function of the Haitian army and sent a clear message to the Haitian people.

The Namphy regime and those which succeeded it through November 1987 – all of which received direct U.S. military assistance – were responsible for more civilian deaths in 21 months than Jean-Claude Duvalier managed in 15 years.

On November 29, 1987, the first elections held in thirty years were aborted by a military-supported massacre of voters recorded for posterity by international media. In response, the U.S. Congress withdrew military assistance to Haiti and decreed that humanitarian aid be directed through non-governmental agencies. Predictably, the previously established Israeli channel was reactivated and the U.S. arming of the Haitian military continued unabated.

The series of military regimes in power after Duvalier's departure constituted a period known as Duvalierism without Duvalier. Henri Namphy was followed in early 1988 by Leslie Manigat who became president in the widely boycotted, unconstitutional election of early 1988. When Manigat made preliminary moves to loosen the military's grip on the country, he was promptly escorted out of the country by those who had put him in the palace a few months earlier. One Haitian said at the time that he thought the only person in Haiti who thought Mr. Mani-

gat would be president very long was Mr. Manigat. In June 1988 Namphy declared himself president again but, as expected, was soon forced out of power when Prosper Avril took over in a bloodless coup in September. Avril was backed by a group of young military officers who had a notion that Haiti really did need democratic elections.

Within weeks, Avril consolidated his position by arresting key members of that movement for allegedly plotting a coup against him. Avril presented himself as committed to moving Haiti forward to democracy. That he had been a personal protégé of the Duvaliers, was popularly known as the "Minister of Corruption," and served as Jean-Claude's personal financial manager did not appear to be troubling issues to the architects of U.S. policy.

Throughout these years, the State Department repeatedly attempted to certify that Haiti met the human rights eligibility criteria for U.S. aid, while ignoring actual abuses. U.S. Ambassador Brunson McKinley, who preceded Alvin Adams, was consistently uncooperative with Americans concerned about Haiti, "particularly contemptuous"⁹ toward the Congressional Black Caucus, and entirely uninterested in human rights issues. An Americas Watch board member reported that McKinley dismissed human rights violations as unproven, and when offered proof, he said that he found such issues "boring."¹⁰

Aristide's commitment to human rights may not be welcomed in Washington. Although he was inaugurated on February 7, 1991, there are many who doubt that he will be allowed to last long, especially in light of the changes in military leadership he immediately implemented.

Nor do the events of the New Year bode well. On January 6, between Aristide's election and inauguration, Roger LaFontant briefly seized power, but was quickly removed by the military under popular pressure. For a time LaFontant, the former head of the *Tonton Macoutes* was guarded 24 hours a day by a civilian vigil to prevent an "escape."

Conclusion

Haitian analysts describing U.S. policies of control and exploitation are commonly accused of paranoia and conspiracy thinking. It is in Haiti, however, that the human consequences of foreign-imposed policies are so apparent in poverty and oppression while it is in Washington that the political, military and economic control actually originate.

The U.S. was complicit in creating and supporting the military which maintained a succession of oppressive regimes, from Francois Duvalier in 1957 onward. It also promoted economic policies which exacerbated the gross maldistribution of wealth. Hardly surprising, then, is the deep suspicion which most Haitians feel toward the United States. For its part, the U.S. has clearly demonstrated antipathy toward any system which diverges from strict free market principles. In the wake of Aristide's election, this mutual suspicion has serious implications for the future. ●

9. T.D.Allman, "After Baby Doc," *Vanity Fair*, January 1989, p. 109.

10. *Ibid.*


A Pig By Any Other Name

Questions

1. What does the word "cochon" mean in Creole, and why?
 - a. Pig, because pigs are pigs.
 - b. Bank, because it is your savings account.
 - c. Both of the above.
2. Until the early 1980s, who had the most pigs?
 - a. Gentleman pig farmers.
 - b. Peasant families, no matter how poor.
 - c. Petting zoos.
3. Why did the Haitian Cochon die out during the 1980s?
 - a. They all got African Swine Fever (ASF) and died.
 - b. Because some got ASF and the rest were slaughtered to prevent the spread of ASF to this continent.
 - c. Because they all tried to swim to Miami to infect pigs in America, and pigs are not good swimmers.
4. What did the loss of the pig mean to the Haitian people?
 - a. Loss of money for school, weddings and taxes
 - b. Loss of 50% of traditional protein food.
 - c. Marked increase in deforestation.
 - d. More health problems, because the pigs ate garbage.
 - e. All of the above.
5. What possible connection is there between pigs and deforestation?
 - a. Peasants cut down trees because they were dumb.
 - b. Peasants cut down trees to catch the pigs which had climbed the trees to escape from U.S. AID.
 - c. Peasants cut down trees because charcoal was the only other cash crop available to peasants.
6. But AID sponsored a Swine Repopulation program to replace the pigs with healthy U.S. pigs, so what's the beef?
 - a. U.S. pigs became a new black market commodity instead of going to the peasants.
 - b. The pigs required a higher standard of living than the peasants ever had themselves.
 - c. Many pigs died because of climate differences and contaminated water.
 - d. All of the above.

Answers

1. c Pig and bank are the same word in Creole. The Creole pig is a small, black, hardy strain which forages for food, requiring virtually no care.
2. b The pig was the backbone of the peasant economy. Even the poorest families had a pig, and thus readily available cash when needed. At the end of the 1970s, there were about a million Creole pigs in Haiti.



3. b An outbreak of African Swine Fever (ASF) among Creole pigs along the Dominican border led to the Swine Eradication Program. With token involvement of the Dominican, Mexican, Canadian and Haitian governments, AID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture slaughtered all the Creole pigs so that ASF would not spread to this continent. By 1982, most pigs in Haiti were eradicated.
4. e Loss of the pig had major negative effects on the peasants. That it was done to protect the interests of the U.S. did not soften the blow.
5. c The only other readily available cash crop is trees, which are sold to turn into charcoal for cooking. Few people in Haiti have electricity; even fewer have stoves.
6. c Under 5% of the pigs were replaced by purebred pigs from America. Haitians called them "Four-Legged Princes," because they demanded a standard of living far higher than that of the average Haitian family. Peasants can't pay for the antibiotics, vitamin-enriched food, and pure water which the pigs need to survive. Therefore only the wealthy can afford to keep them.

Aftermath of the U.S. Invasion:

Racism and Resistance in Panama

Clarence Lusane

Today, more than a year after the U.S. invasion, Panama remains a country under siege, still reeling from the effects of the war. But many dissidents and human rights activists now say they will not allow President Guillermo Endara to consolidate power. Nor will they stand peacefully by while U.S. troops remain on Panamanian soil.

In the week leading up to the one year anniversary, thousands of people took to the streets to participate in protest marches and memorials, burn U.S. flags, hold vigils, visit the gravesites of the dead, and battle city police. These events signaled a release from the trauma of the December 20, 1989 invasion which seems to have paralyzed political activism.

Given this explosive context of political, economic and cultural chaos, 1991 promises to be a pivotal year for Panama. "December 20 has made a deep injury against humanity," said Myrna Anaya, General Coordinator of the Costa Rican-based Commission for the Defence of Human Rights in Central America (CODEHUCA), "an injury that is still bleeding."

Other, even deeper wounds have been festering for a long time. For most of this century, two ideological themes have dominated U.S. foreign policy: anticommunism and racism. Consistently, the U.S. has legitimated its support for repressive and racist governments, especially in the Third World, by pointing to the fact that they are anticommunist.

In Panama, a small, mostly black nation which straddles Central America and South America, these linked ideological weapons have been particularly destructive. Rather than fulfilling the dubious U.S. pledge of restoring democracy, the United States and the Endara regime have restored the kind of racial exclusion policies that were a hallmark of pre-1968 oligarchic rule. For blacks, *mestizos*, and Indians in Panama, who make up almost 85% of the population, advances in racial integration under Torrijos and Noriega have vanished virtually overnight.

U.S. Covert Role in Panama

The history of U.S. intelligence and military operations in Panama goes back more than a century. Between 1856 and 1989,

Clarence Lusane is a freelance writer based in Washington, DC who previously worked at CAIB. He is the author of *Pipe Dream Blues: Racism and the Drug War*, to be published this year by South End Press.

the United States launched at least 15 interventions into that country.¹ Because of the threat to U.S. control of the Panama Canal, however, no period was more important than the years after 1968 when Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera came to power. During that time, at least nine U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, military intelligence, naval intelligence, and the FBI were operating in Panama.²

Their activities included wiretapping, monitoring ships, buying media and controlling politicians. They also subsidized the National Guard, under the control of then-Brigadier Gen. Torrijos, with outright bribes and booty.³

According to research by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the Army's 470th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) waged a bitter battle with the CIA over which agency would have hegemony over Panama. When Torrijos came to power via a coup in 1968, his ties to the 470th gave the Army the upper hand. His links were so close that the 470th's Efrain Angueira — main case officer for Torrijos — hid the general's wife and children during his coup.⁴

The CIA Embrace and Abandonment of Manuel Noriega

Reportedly, Noriega was recruited by the 470th during the mid-1950s while he was still in high school at \$25 a month.

He would later be paid by both the 470th and the CIA. According to Hersh, during the 1960s, the MIG paid nearly every National Guard officer between \$50-\$800 a month depending on rank.⁵

Torrijos' and Noriega's switch to the CIA occurred in December 1969 after an unsuccessful coup attempt by Torrijos' chief of staff, Col. Amado Sanjur. Torrijos mistakenly thought that the 470th had engineered the plot. In fact, it was the CIA which suspected Torrijos of flirting with communism and paid Sanjur \$100,000 to overthrow him.⁶ The 470th never recovered its former influence and within a year was essentially out of the picture, leaving the field once again to the CIA.

Six months after the failed coup, the CIA freed Sanjur from

1. "U.S. Interventions in Panama," *NACLA*, July/August 1988, p. 33.

2. Seymour M. Hersh, "Our Man in Panama," *Life*, March 1990.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

In the week leading up to the one year anniversary, thousands of people took to the streets to participate in protest marches and memorials, burn U.S. flags, hold vigils, visit the gravesites of the dead, and battle city police. These events signaled a release from the trauma of the December 20, 1989 invasion which seems to have paralyzed political activism.

jail and spirited him to Miami. In the early 1970s, he gave key testimony about Noriega's complicity in drug trafficking. Based on Sanjur's allegations — according to a 1978 Senate Intelligence Committee report — the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Agency, seriously considered assassinating both Torrijos and Noriega as early as 1972. In June 1975, a Justice Department investigation determined that for reasons unknown, BNDD officials never activated the proposed plan.⁷

By 1972, the CIA was paying Noriega upwards of \$100,000 annually. Despite his drug trafficking ventures and his friendly ties to Cuba, Noriega's willingness to provide intelligence on leftists in the region made him a valuable asset.⁸

That value increased when Torrijos died in 1981 in a suspicious airplane crash and Noriega assumed the presidency. There remains considerable speculation that the crash was arranged by Noriega and/or the CIA.

By the mid-1980s, Noriega's public denunciation of U.S. policy, his ties to Cuba, and his reluctance to fully cooperate in the U.S. campaign against Nicaragua meant that he had outlived his usefulness to U.S. intelligence agencies.

In December 1985, Admiral John Poindexter met with Noriega in Panama in an effort to convince him to allow the contras to be trained there. Noriega refused. The following year, Noriega was asked to take part in Colonel Oliver North's scheme to accuse the Sandinistas of shipping arms to El Salvador. Again Noriega refused to cooperate in the U.S. war against the Sandinistas.⁹

In February 1988, Noriega was indicted by federal grand juries in Miami and Tampa on charges of drug trafficking, money laundering and racketeering. At least 16 years had passed since the U.S. first learned about Noriega's drug trafficking. During that time, according to Senate testimony, Noriega was paid \$100,000 or more for every planeload of cocaine through Panama.¹⁰

The United States, first under Reagan and then Bush, spent the next two years in a verbal war with Noriega. While publicly threatening the unrepentant general, the U.S. began secret, behind-the-scenes negotiations in which it offered him immunity from U.S. prosecution in exchange for his resignation. When the talks finally fell through, Bush sent in the troops using the slimmest of pretexts.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. "Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: Panama," A Report of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Communications, U.S. Senate, April 13, 1989, testimony on February 10, 1988, by Floyd Carlton, a former Panamanian drug courier testifying as a Federal prisoner wearing a hood to hide his identity under the Federal Protection Program.

Council for Public Security and National Defense

U.S. intelligence manipulation of the domestic affairs of Panama intensified after the installation of the Endara government. Panamanian and U.S. reporters, most notably David Adams of National Public Radio, discovered a CIA spy operation known as the Council for Public Security and National Defense. As Adams reported on NPR's December 25, 1990 "Morning Edition," the Council, which employs 100 operatives, was housed in the Presidential Palace. "A closer inspection of the [July 1990 presidential] decree creating the Council," said Adams, "reveals that it has never been ratified by the country's National Assembly and its establishment has also been kept secret from several government ministers as well as the general public." When its existence was disclosed, both opposition and loyalist politicians called for an investigatory commission.¹¹

Comptroller-General Ruben Colléz, who is in charge of government spending, says he has no record of the Council in his budget. He states further that he would be reluctant to sign anything having to do with the Council.¹² In the NPR report, Adams cites "sources close to the operation" who confirm that the Council "is receiving technical assistance from the CIA and may even be completely subsidized by that Agency." Government officials, including Vice President Guillermo "Billy" Ford, denied knowledge of funding in press interviews. "I do not know," said Ford in the Adams report, "who's paying for it at this given stage."

In addition to concern about the secrecy of Council funding, many Panamanians had serious doubts about the independence and integrity of the Council's initial director, Menalco Solis. He is a friend of President Endara and a lawyer who also served as a Treasury Secretary under Noriega. "His record is very scary,"

said a Panamanian who knows him well. "He can be a dangerous man."¹³ Panama's *La Prensa* newspaper called Solis a "servant of the [Noriega] dictatorship" and compared the agency to the KGB and Gestapo. The paper made a plea that "all real democrats must unite to strangle this monster in its cradle before it grows."¹⁴

Given the unsavory and widely resented history of the CIA in Panama, the Council scandal was another — perhaps ultimately fatal — blow to Endara's claim to legitimacy. As a result of the controversy, Solis resigned on December 31, 1990.

11. David Adams, "Morning Edition," transcript, National Public Radio, December 25, 1990.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Lee Hockstader, "Aide Quits After Uproar in Panama," *Washington Post*, January 2, 1991.

In December 1985, Admiral John Poindexter met with Noriega in Panama in an effort to convince him to allow the contras to be trained there. Noriega refused. The following year, Noriega was asked to take part in Colonel Oliver North's scheme to accuse the Sandinistas of shipping arms to El Salvador. Again Noriega refused to cooperate in the U.S. war against the Sandinistas.

The Facade of Democracy

One year after the invasion, about the same number of U.S. troops remains in Panama as prior to "Operation Just Cause." The role and impact of these 10,000 soldiers, however, is much more extensive. U.S. troops now patrol the streets of Panama and effectively function as Panama's security force.

Government officials, including President Endara—who was installed in power on a U.S. military base three hours before the invasion commenced—confer daily with U.S. advisers according to various news reports.¹⁵ Panamanian police are receiving



Juantxu Rodrigues / Associated Press

Bodies lined up in a Panama City morgue. Spanish photographer Juantxu Rodrigues, who took this photo, was killed on December 21, 1990, the second day of the U.S. invasion.

riot control and security training under the U.S.-sponsored project, "International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program." The choice of instructors, the curriculum and course materials are determined by the U.S. Justice Department.¹⁶

Although "security" services have been expeditiously delivered, U.S. post-invasion economic aid has been slow and low. Bush initially promised to send \$1 billion in aid. Somewhere along the way, the request in Congress was halved and passed finally at \$420 million. Of that amount, less than \$120 million had been sent as of December 1990.

That aid has yet to trickle down to the majority of Panamanians for whom conditions have deteriorated since the invasion. The official unemployment estimate has grown to about 25 to 30 percent from a pre-invasion level of 17 percent.¹⁷ Unofficially, some news organizations, such as the *Washington Post* and Black Entertainment Television,¹⁸ report a figure of 40 per-

cent while many politicians and labor leaders say that in many areas it is much higher. Even the government admits that fewer than 50 percent of all Panamanians work full-time.¹⁹

The economic crisis in the country which deepened with U.S. sanctions against Noriega, has been exacerbated by the anti-labor actions of the Endara government. Within months of being installed, Endara fired 10,000 government workers.²⁰

The Endara government, backed by the U.S., is moving rapidly to blunt the growing workers movement. On Friday, December 13, 1990, the Endara-dominated National Assembly voted 51 to 7 to pass Law 25 that bans public workers from participating in demonstrations. "This law is unconstitutional," according to Alberto Boyd, president of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) and a member of the National Assembly. "Law 25 is a fascist law."²¹ On the heels of that law, a new bill—Law 56—has been proposed that would effectively outlaw demonstrations by designating them as threats to national security.

Isabel Corro of the Association of the Fallen of December 20, forcefully denounced Bush's and Endara's claims of democracy. "Democracy in Panama is a big, big lie," she said. "We are not a star in the American flag." Corro's father was killed during the invasion and later discovered in a mass grave. "How would Bush," she asked in anguish, "like to find his son or daughter in a mass grave?"²²

Racism Renewed: The Return of the Rabiblancos

One of the most disturbing trends of the new government is the return of racial privilege for whites. From 1903 to 1968, an oligarchy of several white families ruled Panama. When Torrijos overthrew them, he began a process of integration that extended into the Noriega era. "[He] gave more opportunity to blacks and mestizos," said Winston Welch, an economic adviser to the PRD. "Now, there are very few blacks in power."²³ Instead, the descendants of the Spanish colonial oligarchic families are back. The Panamanian people call this new era of racism the return to power of the *rabiblancos* which means white behinds.

"This is the same oligarchy that ruled from 1903-1968," said Euclides Fuentes Arroyo, secretary general of the National Union of Journalists. "You see the same names, the same traitors."²⁴

15. Lee Hockstader, "U.S. Army Guarantees Endara Stays in Power," *Washington Post*, December 16, 1990.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Lee Hockstader, "In Year Since U.S. Invasion, Panama's Problems Mount," *Washington Post*, December 16, 1990.

18. Black Entertainment Television, News Report, January 4, 1991.

19. Lee Hockstader, *op. cit.*

21. Author's interview with Alberto Boyd, December 14, 1990.

22. Author's interview with Isabel Corro, December 15, 1990.

23. Author's interview with Winston Welch, December 18, 1990.

24. Author's interview with Euclides Fuentes Arroyo, December 18, 1990.

The minister of education, Adade Gordon, is the only black in the present government. Mario Panther, a former student activist and presently deputy secretary of foreign relations of the PRD, also accused the current government of racism. "You have to dig very deep," he said, "to find a black person in government now."²⁵ Although Endara claims to not be a racist, he may be digging a bit too deep. He says of his housing minister: "I'm sure he has black blood - his hair is kinky, now that I think about it."²⁶

Accusations of racism against the Endara regime are fueled by the President's ideological and personal ties to his mentor - former president Arnulfo Arias. During World War II, Arias was a Nazi sympathizer and was well-known for granting whites preferential treatment.²⁷

Ironically, Endara's marriage to 23-year-old Ana Mae Diaz, who is of black and Chinese heritage, has made his household the target of racist gossip. Her penchant for acting and dressing in ways which tweak the manners and mores of the white elites has generated racist nicknames, such as ChiChoChu which roughly means "Chinese-Nigger Bitch." *La Prensa* even ran a cartoon of President Endara in a loincloth carrying a spear.²⁸

Race and Refugees

A visible manifestation of the marginalized position of blacks is in the refugee camps established in the wake of "Operation Just Cause." As of December 1990, 1,765 refugees, mostly black, remain in horrible and squalid conditions at the Albrook Refugee Camp according to camp officials.²⁹ More than 800 people remain in seven other camps around the country.³⁰

Most of the refugees come from the black neighborhood of El Chorrillo that was totally destroyed on the first night of the U.S. invasion. Hundreds of homes were bombed into dust; several thousands were killed and injured. Pledges by the United States and Endara to rebuild the area and provide housing to those made homeless remain unkept. Because of press restrictions, government control of information, quick disposal of the dead in mass graves and lack of resources on the part of human rights activists, the number of casualties remains unknown. Most human rights groups estimate the number of Panamanians killed by the invasion as ranging from 2,000 to 7,000.³¹

The Albrook Camp, located in a large steel hangar at the Albrook airport has families as large as ten living in units that measure roughly 10 by 10 feet. The hangar, formerly part of the Albrook Air Force Base, is hot during the day and cold at night.

25. Author's interview with Mario Panther, December 18, 1990.

26. Lee Hockstader, *op. cit.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. Jose de Cordora, "High Society Views Panama's First Lady With Much Disdain," *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1991.

29. Author's interview with Ashton Bancroft, December 16, 1990.

30. Figures obtained from Albrook officials and U.S. State Department.

31. The six human rights organizations in Panama differ on the number of Panamanians killed. The Panamanian Committee for Human Rights believes about 500 were killed, the Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America (CODEHUCA) and the Panamanian Human Rights Commission (CONDEHUPA) estimate about 2,000, and the Association of the Fallen of December 20, 1989 estimates about 7,000.

32. Author's interview with Ashton Bancroft, December 16, 1990.

33. Author's interview with Father Alan McLellan, December 19, 1990.

To enter the camp, residents and approved guests must show identification and pass through a security fence staffed by one soldier each from Panama and the United States.

According to Ashton Bancroft, who was elected General Coordinator of the Camp by the residents, the Red Cross was put in charge of camp administration by the U.S. government. According to Bancroft, Red Cross provisions are inadequate. Breakfast, even for the children, consists of only a biscuit and coffee. The only other meal - served late in the day - is largely rice and beans. Although the Red Cross provides some services, such as food and bus transportation for school children, it does not provide basic items such as soap, toothpaste, or toothbrushes.³²

While those outside of the camps have fewer restrictions, they sometimes live under even worse material conditions. In Colon - a city of 123,000 which is 80 percent black - about one-third of the residents live in condemned housing. Drugs and prostitution run rampant. Unemployment has more than doubled, from a shameful pre-invasion 25 percent to a current level of about 60 percent according to Father Alan McLellan, who has been active in Colon for more than 20 years.³³

"Colon is like a broken tooth," says Bishop Carlos Maria Ariz, "hurting and decaying." After years of active involvement with the population, Ariz lays blame for current conditions at the feet of a racist central government. "People in Colon," he asserts, "are treated this way because they are black."³⁴

Rising Resistance

There is growing evidence that the people of Panama are organizing and fighting back. On December 20th, the anniversary of the invasion, the author participated in a rousing march throughout the city. By the time it reached the rally site at El Chorrillo, it had swelled from a few hundred to many thousands. Tens of thousands more Panamanians cheered as they stood along the crowded route.

"We will continue the struggle," said human rights activist Isabel Corro speaking at the cemetery where many of the victims of "Operation Just Cause" are buried. "Today is not the end, but the beginning of justice for all of us." ●

34. Author's interview with Bishop Carlos Maria Ariz. December 19, 1990.

● PUBLICATION OF INTEREST

Ron Ridenour, *Back Fire: The CIA's Biggest Burn* (Havana: Jose Marti Publishing, 1991) 170 pp.

In 1987, Cuban television broadcast an 11-part series exposing CIA infiltration of Cuba and the success of Cuban counter-intelligence in destroying this espionage ring. Eighty-seven CIA agents were exposed, and, after ten years, 27 Cuban double agents came out of the closet.

Ridenour has described the entire operation in detail in this book. The exhaustive, illustrated narrative is interspersed with interviews with many of the double agents. An excellent case study of a counter-espionage operation.

Bush's Splendid Little War

Michael Parenti

In the summer of 1898 when the Spanish-American War was grinding to a halt, the U.S. ambassador to England, John Hay, wrote to Colonel Theodore Roosevelt of the Rough Riders: "It has been a splendid little war." The war was hardly that. It was a war of aggression against a vastly weaker adversary who did not want to fight. It was "splendid" only in that it provided a quick, decisive win.

Today some Americans, including the President, still retain a taste for "splendid little wars." Grenada and Panama come to mind—and now the assault upon Iraq. But Saddam Hussein is not a Sandinista, a Castro, a Qaddafi, nor even a populist-nationalist like Noriega. Although Saddam has brought a better than average standard of living to his people, he manifests few of the ideological egalitarian impulses that rightwingers like Bush find so loathsome. Saddam has murdered large numbers of communists and other left dissidents—a policy which usually endears a dictator to U.S. leaders. Indeed, until recently, "worse-than-Hitler" Hussein received a good deal of U.S. aid himself. So why has Bush come down so hard on him? Let's look at the reasons given by the White House:

We went into the Middle East to defend Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion. If the Iraqis intended to take Saudi Arabia, why didn't they just walk into that country immediately after grabbing Kuwait and before U.S. troops arrived? In any case, defending Saudi Arabia is obviously no longer—if it ever was—Bush's primary goal.

The President is concerned with protecting human rights in Kuwait and elsewhere in the region. Few rights exist in Kuwait or any of the region's feudal monarchies. Women are still stoned to death on suspicion of adultery; democratic councils are non-existent or instantly crushed, and a few superrich families control the entire politico-economic life of the society.

Mr. Bush is upholding the United Nations commitment to defend its member states from aggression. Why now? Both Syria and Israel invaded Lebanon and still occupy portions of that country, yet the U.S. has never threatened war against either of them. Instead the U.S. gives enormous amounts of aid to Israel and has become kissing cousins with "terrorist Syria." Turkey invaded Cyprus and took half that island, yet the U.S. made no military moves against its NATO ally. Indonesia invaded and annexed East Timor and killed half its population and the U.S. quietly supported the action. The U.S. invaded Grenada on dual false pretexts of saving American medical students and preventing "the establishment of a Cuban-Soviet beachhead." Furthermore, Bush, himself, invaded Panama last year, an action that caused a substantial loss of Panamanian lives and invited the

Michael Parenti is the author of *The Sword and the Dollar: Imperialism, Revolution and the Arms Race*, and *Make-Believe Media: The Politics of Entertainment* (to be published in July).

condemnation of U.N. member states. The U.S. military occupation and political repression of Panama continues.

Saddam would have controlled too much of the world's oil and would have raised prices and threatened our supply. When OPEC—led by the Saudis and controlling vastly more of the oil supply than Iraq does today—drastically raised prices in the 1970s, the United States went along with it. So did the big oil companies, who passed the costs—and then some—along to the consumer. These costs motivated us to develop alternative energy sources and greater efficiency in fuel consumption, eventually helping to drive oil prices down. Furthermore, the 1990 embargo deprived the world of the very Iraqi (and Kuwaiti) oil supply that Bush's action was supposed to preserve. Yet as of January 1991, the world's net oil supply was the same as when Iraq and Kuwait were among the suppliers. All this demonstrates the difficulties faced by any one producer who might try to control the market. The war against Saddam is not about protecting America's oil supply since most of the Middle East oil goes elsewhere. U.S. consumers can get all the oil they want, with or without Iraq.

Iraq poses a nuclear threat. This polemic was tacked on to Bush's litany of horrors months after he had embarked on intervention in the Gulf region, right after opinion polls showed that Americans were concerned that Iraq might develop a nuclear capability. Nuclear weapons in the hands of any nation are something to be opposed. But the President intervened in the Gulf area long before this became an issue. Moreover, with sanctions in place, it was already impossible for Iraq to get the necessary materials to build a bomb.

Iraq threatened to attack and destroy Israel. Iraq never had the ability to destroy Israel, but certainly Saddam has proven he was serious about attacking that nation. Yet, it was only in retaliation for the U.S. attacks against him. Therefore, Bush could have easily prevented the missile firings on Israel by refraining from war against Iraq.

The intervention into the Middle East will protect the U.S. economy and safeguard jobs at home. Secretary of State James Baker uttered words to that effect in November. It is the first time he or anyone else in Bush's national security entourage has evinced any concern for the nation's unemployed. One should note that after five months of intervention in the Middle East, unemployment in this country has only worsened. Anyway, there are more constructive and less costly ways of putting people back to work—with programs for low cost housing, mass transit, environmental protection, improved education and medical infrastructures, care for the elderly and other basic human services, and the like.

The reasons given to justify this country's murderous assault against the Iraqi people sound terribly contrived. Once the war

began they were largely replaced by the call to arms and a rallying round the flag. For too many people the war became its own justification, demanding our unquestioning support because of its very existence. But this mindless jingoism does not mean that real reasons for the Gulf war do not exist, ones that Bush might prefer to keep quiet.

How About The Real Reasons?

First, for decades the United States has maintained a global military machine, with some 300 major military bases in every region of the world. Its major function is to prevent politico-economic change, specifically the emergence of revolutionary or populist nationalist governments that would use the land, labor, capital and natural resources of their society in ways that might be inimical to transnational corporate interests.

Our leaders long have sold this global machine — with its gargantuan military budget — to the American public by claiming it was needed to defend us from “the Soviet Menace.” The Warsaw Pact nations are transforming themselves into rightwing capitalist regimes and the Soviet Union seems to have fallen into line. What will now serve as justification for the mammoth budget that supports global counterinsurgency? New demons and threats must be conjured up: narco-terrorists, nuclear madmen, Middle East Hitlers, and the like.

The U.S. invasion of the Middle East is an emergency rescue operation for a near \$290 billion military budget, the military-industrial complex, and the policy of global interventionism. In July 1990 for the first time in years, the Democratic leadership in Congress was talking about real cuts in arms spending and “peace dividends.” Enter the Gulf crisis and major cuts are put on hold. In a world of evil adversaries, who dares deprive our soldiers of a single hand grenade or Stealth bomber?

The Middle East crisis also allows U.S. leaders to do what they have wanted to do for decades, establish a long-term military presence in that region: not a gingerly toehold in Lebanon as Eisenhower and Reagan attempted, but a massive occupation in an area rich in oil and potentially unstable regimes. While Bush is not protecting the oil that comes to the U.S., he is protecting the oil supplies and reserves of the giant cartels that sell and distribute it elsewhere at great profit.

A Saudi professor in this country, who wishes to remain anonymous, informs me that large contingents of U.S. troops are stationed in eight cities in Saudi Arabia. They are there not to protect the Saudis from the Iraqis but to protect the royal family from its own restive populace — which threatened to grow more restive with the events in Kuwait.

Fear of revolutionary ferment is what is behind Bush’s desire to remain indefinitely in the Middle East, to build another NATO, that would “stabilize” the region. He wants to make sure that the existing economic structure is not tampered with by populist troublemakers who might give the people ideas about who should control the resources of their respective countries. With the dissolution of Soviet power, Moscow’s reaction to events is no longer a restraining consideration. Ultimately the goal is to open every region of the world to direct U.S. military intervention — if such is needed.

There is another compelling reason why Bush pursues an interventionist policy. Many wars are begun, noted Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist Papers, Number 6*, because of the political interests of leaders. By plunging into conflicts abroad, they seek to diminish the impact of burning issues at home, thereby securing their political fortunes. Margaret Thatcher well understood this when she leaped into the Falkland/Malvinas Islands fray — and won reelection.



C.T. Wemple/Impact Visuals

President Bush understands it also. Like any politician, his first concern is his own political survival. Last July his popularity was slumping badly because of the savings and loan scandal. Every evening, TV news programs were peeling off another layer of corruption, thievery, bribery, and plunder of the public treasury. That process of exposure was virtually obliterated by the Gulf crisis and the ensuing war.

Mr. Bush is playing for big stakes. If he pulls off a “splendid little war,” his political fortunes will be better secured at home. In 1992 he may weather the recession, the savings and loan scandal and silence the military-budget cutters and anti-interventionists. There are also new disclosures regarding the Iran-contra scandal that implicate him. These will be harder for prosecutors to pursue if he is enjoying the untouchable popularity that comes with a national superpatriotic orgy and a strong leadership image.

But if the war gets really messy and involves too many American casualties — the only ones the media count — then Bush’s popularity is likely to plunge and he will become increasingly vulnerable on domestic issues. As I write this after more than a month of bombardment, the activation of hundreds of thousands of peace activists and the launching of the ground war the conflict is already something other than “quick and decisive.”

Even after “liberating” Kuwait for the benefit of the Emir and his filthy rich family, Bush will still face serious problems. Will “Hitler Hussein” remain in power? Will Kuwait become another occupied Panama? The U.S. will be keeping troops in that region indefinitely. The morning after victory, more of the American public may begin to wonder if the bloodshed and the more than \$80 billion bill was worth it. They might recall that the only war worth supporting is what Benjamin Franklin called “the best war,” the one that is never fought. ●

Living in the National Security State

Louis Wolf

In this appalling hour of imperial paroxysm, not much of anything seems funny. However, if we let this colossal insanity silence our laughter, it will end by killing our spirit. Smile if you can. Keep your shoulder to the wheel. This, for certain, is where the rubber meets the road.

● THE HEAT'S ON AT LANGLEY

Winter at CIA Headquarters is apparently not so cushy as hardworking patriotic spooks have every right to expect. *CAIB* has learned of some rather provocative behavior among the estimated 22,000 to 26,000 personnel.

In 1957, when they began constructing the sprawling seven-story, 1.4 million square foot complex, DCI Allen Dulles refused to disclose the number of persons who would work there. Sorry, said Dulles, but that's classified information. The contractor had to guess, and climate control at Langley has never been right. Employees, incessantly uncomfortable in summer and winter, habitually adjust the thermostats. When the new 1.1 million square foot addition was started in 1984—complete with a vast underground document storage area—DCI William Casey gruffly stonewalled the contractor again. So, more guesswork.

The supergrade bureaucrats in the Office of Logistics (spookspeak for “physical plant”) resorted to appropriately draconian measures. All thermostats were recently secured to foil unauthorized tampering.

Remarkable naivete. The elementary tradecraft course—a requirement for many employees—begins with “flaps and seals” (mail opening) and lockpicking. Thermostat-fiddling now takes a little longer. “Picking” the thermostats is currently much in vogue.

● AND YOU THOUGHT WE WERE JUST A MAGAZINE

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned. Virtually everything in late capitalism is subject to the relentless trivialization of the casino economy. Witness this recent excerpt from the *New York Post*. (See box above.)

The next day's *Post* reported that *Covert Action* won the \$25,000 purse. *Conditional* took second and *Do Not Touch* was third. *Covert Action* picked up \$97,000 the previous week in the aptly titled “Presidential Final.” *CAIB* has yet to see a penny.

● FLACKING FOR MURDER AND MAYHEM, INC.

Langley is on a public relations offensive.

At George Washington University on the evening of February 6, the Agency declined to identify their designated PR person in advance.

Before a crowd of 100 or so students and faculty, a moderator summarized the speaker's 26-year Agency career, and then introduced Mr. Ceferino Epps. Epps stepped to the podium,

pulled a micro recorder from his vestpocket and announced he was taping the session because the CIA thinks its people are usually misquoted. We understand. We took our tape recorder too.

His presentation was vintage Company PR: a boilerplate description of the Agency's “mandate,” and functions, and the ritual genuflection toward the wilted fig leaf of congressional oversight. Citing the Church Committee investigation, he asserted: “Since 1975, we are adhering to the changes, the strengthening, the clarifications, if you will...” Has he already forgotten Iran-contra?

But even the smoothest flacks sometimes let a little truth slip out, and Mr. Epps may now be licking his wounds. *CAIB* learned from the CIA press office that he “has been transferred to another office.”

Epps solemnly described the “President's Daily Brief,” the Top Secret all-source intelligence document generated each night and hand-carried to the White House at dawn. According to Epps, Bush has authorized Dick Cheney, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and John

Sununu to also receive the document—which they may read but none may retain. A pause followed. Then Epps blurted: “Oh, the Vice-President gets a copy too.”

Making Quayle an asterisk wasn't enough. Describing the CIA's analysis and dissemination processes, Epps declared confidently: “The issues that we were addressing...in the 60s, 70s and 80s are still being addressed, but now there's a whole new set of issues for the 90s and into the year 2000 that we need to address, without forsaking some of the other issues that we manipu— — that we bring along with us.”

If the Company's PR Office will reinstate Mr. Epps and task him with elaborating further on the fine art of manipulation by the CIA, we would all be most grateful. ●

Covert Action heads feature at Yonkers

Coming off the greatest race of his life in the Presidential Final last week; 6-year-old Covert Action returns to Yonkers Raceway in tonight's \$25,000 Open Handicap Pace.

The bay son of General Star was outstanding in last Saturday's \$97,000 Presidential Final at the Meadowlands, going all out around the Big M's mile oval in a lifetime-best 1:52 4/5.

In his last outing over the Yonkers half-mile on Jan. 5, Covert Action went wire-to-wire in that evening's Open feature in 1:57 3/5.

Tonight, Ray Schnitker will drive once again for his father, trainer Warren, from post eight as the 3-1 morning-line choice.

Former Yonkers Open standouts Resonator (Ted Wing) and Conditional (Walter Case Jr.) return to the Hilltop in tonight's Open to challenge Covert Action.

(February 2, 1991, New York Post)

CovertAction

INFORMATION BULLETIN

Back Issues

- No. 1 (July 1978): Agee on CIA; Cuban exile trial; consumer research in Jamaica. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 2 (Oct. 1978): How CIA recruits diplomats; researching undercover officers; double agent in CIA.
- No. 3 (Jan. 1979): CIA attacks CAIB; secret supp. to Army field manual; spying on host countries. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 4 (Apr.-May 1979): U.S. spies in Italian services; CIA in Spain; CIA recruiting for Africa; subversive academics; Angola. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 5 (July-Aug. 1979): U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia; CIA in Denmark, Sweden, Grenada. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 6 (Oct. 1979): U.S. in Caribbean; Cuban exile terrorists; CIA plans for Nicaragua; CIA's secret "Perspectives for Intelligence." *Photocopy only.*
- No. 7 (Dec. 1979-Jan. 1980): Media destabilization in Jamaica; Robert Moss; CIA budget; media operations; UNITA; Iran.
- No. 8 (Mar.-Apr. 1980): Attacks on Agee; U.S. intelligence legislation; CAIB statement to Congress; Zimbabwe; Northern Ireland.
- No. 9 (June 1980): NSA in Norway; Glomar Explorer; mind control; NSA.
- No. 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980): Caribbean; destabilization in Jamaica; Guyana; Grenada bombing; "The Spike"; deep cover manual.
- No. 11 (Dec. 1980): Rightwing terrorism; South Korea; KCIA; Portugal; Guyana; Caribbean; AFIO; NSA interview.
- No. 12 (Apr. 1981): U.S. in Salvador and Guatemala; new right; William Casey; CIA's Mozambique spy ring; mail surveillance. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 13 (July-Aug. 1981): South Africa documents; Namibia; mercenaries and gunrunning; the Klan; Globe Aero; Angola; Mozambique; BOSS; Central America; Max Hugel; mail surveillance.
- No. 14-15 (Oct. 1981): Complete index to nos. 1-12; review of intelligence legislation; CAIB plans; extended Naming Names.
- No. 16 (Mar. 1982): Green Beret torture in Salvador; Argentine death squads; CIA media operations; Seychelles; Angola; Mozambique; Klan; Nugan Hand. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 17 (Summer 1982): History of CBW; current plans; Cuban dengue epidemic; Scott Barnes and yellow rain lies; mystery death in Bangkok.
- No. 18 (Winter 1983): CIA and religion; "secret" war in Nicaragua; Opus Dei; Miskitos; evangelicals in Guatemala; Summer Institute of Linguistics; World Medical Relief; CIA and BOSS; torture in South Africa; Vietnam defoliation. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983): CIA and media; history of disinformation; "plot" against Pope; Grenada airport; Georgie Anne Geyer.
- No. 20 (Winter 1984): Invasion of Grenada; war in Nicaragua; Ft. Huachuca; Israel and South Korea in Central America; KAL flight 007.

- No. 21 (Spring 1984): *New York Times* on Salvador election; manipulation in *Time* and *Newsweek*; Accuracy in Media; Nicaragua.
- No. 22 (Fall 1984): Mercenaries and terrorism; *Soldier of Fortune*; "privatizing" the war in Nicaragua; U.S.-South African terror; Italian fascists.
- No. 23 (Spring 1985): Special issue on "plot" to kill the Pope and the "Bulgarian Connection"; CIA ties to Turkish and Italian neofascists.
- No. 24 (Summer 1985): State repression, infiltrators, provocateurs; sanctuary movement; attacks on American Indian Movement; Leonard Peltier; NASSCO strike; Arnaud de Borchgrave, Moon, and Moss; Tetra Tech.
- No. 25 (Winter 1986): U.S., Nazis, and the Vatican; Knights of Malta; Greek civil war and *Eleni*; WACL and Nicaragua; torture.
- No. 26 (Summer 1986): U.S. state terrorism; Vernon Walters; Libya bombing; *contra* agents; Israel and South Africa; Duarte; media in Costa Rica; democracy in Nicaragua; plus complete index to nos. 13-25. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 27 (Spring 1987): Special issue on Religious Right; *New York Times* and Pope Plot; Carlucci; Southern Air Transport; Michael Ledeen.
- No. 28 (Summer 1987): Special issue on CIA and drugs: Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Central America; Nugan Hand; MKULTRA in Canada; Delta Force; special section on AIDS theories and CBW. *Photocopy only.*
- No. 29 (Winter 1988): Special issue on Pacific: Philippines, Fiji, New Zealand, *Belau*, Kanaky, Vanuatu; atom testing; media on Nicaragua; *Reader's Digest*; CIA in Cuba; Tibet; Agee on *Veit*; more on AIDS.
- No. 30 (Summer 1989): Special issue on the Middle East. The *intifada*, Israeli arms sales; Israel in Africa; disinformation and Libya; CIA's William Buckley; the Afghan arms pipeline and *contra* lobby.
- No. 31 (Winter 1989): Special issue on domestic surveillance. The FBI; CIA on campus; Office of Public Diplomacy; Lexington Prison; Puerto Rico.
- No. 32 (Summer 1989): Tenth Year Anniversary Issue: The Best of CAIB. Includes articles from our earliest issues, Naming Names, CIA at home, abroad, and in the media. Ten-year perspective by Philip Agee.
- No. 33 (Winter 1990): The Bush Issue: CIA agents for Bush; Terrorism Task Force; El Salvador and Nicaragua intervention; Republicans and Nazis.
- No. 34 (Summer 1990) Noriega and the CIA; assassination of Martin Luther King Jr; Nicaraguan elections; South African death squads; U.S. and Pol Pot; Council for National Policy.
- No. 35 (Fall 1990): Special issue on Eastern Europe. Analysis on the Persian Gulf and Cuba; massacres in Indonesia; CIA and Banks; Iran-*contra*.
- No. 36 (Spring 1991) Racism and National Security. FBI targets Arab-Americans and Black Elected Officials; Destabilization in Africa: Chad, Uganda, Zaire, Angola, Mozambique; Haiti; Panama; Gulf War; COIN-TELPRO "art."

Subscriptions (4 issues/year)

- _____ \$17 one year _____ \$32 two years. U.S.
- _____ \$22 one year _____ \$42 two years Can., Mex.
- _____ \$27 one year _____ \$52 two years Lat. Am., Eur.
- _____ \$29 one year _____ \$56 two years other
- _____ \$5 per year additional charge for institutions

Back Issues: Please **circle** the numbers you want on above list.

\$ _____ for _____ (total number of) back issues @ \$6 per copy.
(Institutions add \$.50 each) For surface mail per copy outside U.S.
add \$1.50. Airmail add \$2.00 per copy Can., Mex., \$4.00 other.

\$ _____ Gift subscription to: _____

Books, etc.

- _____ \$25 Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa (Ray, et al.)
- _____ \$9.95 Deadly Deceits: 25 Years in the CIA (McGehee)
- _____ \$7.95 Secret Contenders: CIA and Cold War (Beck)
- _____ \$6.50 White Paper/White Wash (Agee & Poelchau)
- _____ \$6.00 Packaging the Contras (Chamorro)
- _____ \$10 On the Run (Agee)
- _____ \$1 Buttons "No CIA" (additional \$.50)

I enclose \$ _____ TOTAL (U.S. dollars only, please) for
subscription, gift subscription, books, etc. and postage.

Name _____

Address _____

MAIL TO: CAIB, P.O. Box 34583, Washington, DC 20043



Terry Allen

On January 26th, two hundred thousand people from around the country marched in Washington to protest the Gulf War. Many who protested opposed the “economic draft” of young blacks and latinos who chose military service because they are faced with a society which offers them few other options for education or job training, much less gainful employment.

CovertAction
INFORMATION BULLETIN

P.O. Box 34583
Washington, DC 20043